SCOPES WIDER (paragraphs 8 to 15) as he sketches the development of the dialectic historically, from Plato to Kant, and differentiates his concept of second negativity as the ‘turning point of the whole movement of the notion . . . the innermost source of all activity, of all inanimate and spiritual self-movement, the dialectical soul that everything true possesses and through which alone it is true; for on this subjectivity alone rests the sublating of the opposition between notion and reality, and the unity that is truth’ (p. 835).

The third subdivision that I make covers the last 12 paragraphs which disclose concreteness both in its totality and in each sphere, in each of which, as well as in the whole, inheres the impulse to transcend, and this includes the system itself. The intimation of totally new beginnings is not restricted to the fact that sciences, Hegel plans to develop—Nature and Spirit. Inherent in these intimations are the consequences of what we will have been grappling with in the whole of the Science of Logic.

The Absolute Idea as a new beginning, rooted in practice as well as in philosophy, is the burden of this writer’s contribution. While this cannot be ‘proven” until the end of Hegel’s rigorous and yet free-flowing final chapter, it is necessary here, by way of anticipation, to call attention to the three final syllogisms in the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences, which, we all know, had not been included in the first edition of the work. To this writer these crucial additions to the 1827 and 1830 editions constitute the summation, not alone of the Encyclopaedia, but of the whole cycle of knowledge and reality throughout the long, tortuous trek of 2,500 years of Western civilization that that encyclopedic mind of genius Hegel was trying to bring to a conclusion. Just as the first of these syllogisms (paragraph 575) shows that the very center of its structure — Logic, Nature, Mind — to be, not Logic, but Nature, so does the very last paragraph in the Science of Logic.

WETHER one conceives Nature as “externality” in the Hegelian sense, or “exteriority” in the Sartrean manner, or as “Practice” in Lenin’s World War I view, the point is that Hegel, not Sartre, nor Lenin, but Hegel, conceives Nature as mediation. When I develop this further at the end of the paper, we’ll see what illumination our age casts on the movement from practice that helps us in grappling with the dialectic, but here it is best to continue with the three central divisions I suggested:

(1) The same first paragraph of the Absolute Idea that riveted our attention to the highest opposition cautioned against imposing on the new unity of opposites reached — the Theoretical and Practical Idea — an old duality: “Each of these by itself is still one-sided . . . .” The new, the highest opposition, rather, has to self-develop: “The Notion is not merely soul, but free subjective Notion that is for itself and therefore possesses personality.” But this individuality is not “exclusive,” but is “explicitly universality and cognition and in its other, has its own objectivity for its object” (p. 824). All that needs to be done therefore is for the Absolute Idea “to hear itself speak,” to “outwardize” (Aussurung). Its self-determination is its self-comprehension. Or, put more precisely, “its own completed totality” is not any new content. Rather it exists wholly as form and “the universal aspect of its form — that is, method.” From that moment on Hegel will not take his mind’s eye from the dialectic for, as he puts it, “nothing is known in its truth unless it is totally subject to method” (als der Method vollkommen unterworfen ist).

(2) No less than 11 paragraphs follow the pronouncement that the Absolute form, the Method, the Notion is the whole. The pivot around which they all revolve, Hegel stresses over and over again, is the “universal absolute activity,”
the Method which is "therefore to be recognized as 'unrestrictedly universal'..." (p. 826). In a word, this is not just another form of cognition; it is the unity of the Theoretical and Practical idea we have reached. Far from being a "merely external form" or the instrument it is inquiring cognition, the method is no "mere aggregation" of determinations but "the Notion that is determined in and for itself," the middle, the mediation, because it is objective and it is "posited in its identity," "subjective Notion" (p. 827).

T O BE SWEPT UP by the dialectic is to experience a plunge to freedom. Since, however, the rigor of thought cannot be allowed to dissolve into "Bachmannian revelry," it's necessary to work through those paragraphs without missing any links. First is the beginning, the Absolute as beginning. When Hegel refers us back to the very start of the Doctrine of Being, where he first posed "What Must Science Begin?" it is not for purposes of proving that Absolute is mere unfolding of what was implicit from the start, the manifestations. It also becomes a totally new foundation — absolute negation. Although from the start Hegel emphasized that everything, no matter how simple it sounded, equally contained immediacy and mediation (p. 68), it is now so permeated with negativity that it is no mere remembrance of things past when he writes that "there is nothing, whether in actuality or in thought, that is as simple and abstract as is commonly imagined" (p. 829).

The long passageway through "concrete totality" of diverse, contradictory forces and relations from the Doctrine of Being through Essence to Notion makes it clear that though every beginning must be made with the Absolute, it becomes Absolute "only in its completion." It is in the movement to the transcendence of the opposition between Notion and Reality that transcendence will be achieved in subjectivity and subjectivity alone. In a word, this new beginning is both in thought and in actuality, in theory and practice, that is to say, in dialectical "mediation which is more than a mere beginning, and is a mediation of a kind that does not belong to a comprehension by means of thinking..." Rather, "what is meant by it is in general the demand for the realization of the Notion, which realization does not lie in the beginning itself, but is rather the goal and the task of the entire further development of cognition" (p. 828).

Whether or not one follows Marx's "subversion" of Absolute's goal, the "realization of philosophy" as a "new Humanism," the unity of the ideal and the real, of theory and practice, of (if you will) philosophy and revolution, one cannot fail to perceive Hegel's Absolute's advance (Weltersghen) and "completion" as the conclusion and fulfillment, as the beginning anew from the Absolute, for he never departed from conceiving all of history, of human development, not only as a history in the consciousness of freedom, but, as we shall see later, as achievement in actuality. Even here, where Hegel limits himself strictly to philosophical categories, to the history of thought, Hegel maintains the need to face reality. In tracing the conceptual breakthroughs of the dialectic from Plato to Kant to his own view of second negativity, he calls attention to Plato's demand of cognition

3"Marx takes over the task of the philosophy which ended with Hegel and puts revolutionary Marxism, as reason become practice, in the place of the whole previous tradition," writes Professor Michael Cohen in his commentary referring to M. Hegel, "Thein und Praxis im Denken Hegels" (Stuttgart, 1965). It is there, continues Löwith, "where it is established for the first time that, for Hegel, theory and practice share an equal primacy, since spirit as will is a will to freedom and freedom is the goal of all historical praxis." "Mediation and immediacy in Hegel, Marx and Feuerbach," incl. Warren E. Stein- kroos' edition of New Studies in Hegel's Philosophy, p. 122 (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1971).


"that it should consider things in and for themselves, that is, should consider them partly in their universality, but also that it should not stray away from them catching at circumstances, examples and comparisons..." (p. 830).

Considering things "in and for themselves," Hegel maintains, has made possible the working out of ever-new unities and relations between practice and theory. That is the achievement of Absolute Method. To what extent the method is analytic, to what extent synthetic as it exhibits itself as Other, the dialectic method is not, while the unity is not reduced until, as the unity of the two, the "less synthetic than analytic moment" determines itself as "the other of itself." The point is that it is the power of the negative which is the creative element; it is not the synthesis, but the absolute negativity which assures the advance movement. Since this is what separates Hegel from all other philosophers, and this philosophic ground, precisely, the how a "universal first, considered in and for itself, shows itself to be the other of itself," it will dominate the last 12 paragraphs following the conclusion with "the grouping point of the movement of the notion..." the practical soul that everything true possesses and through which alone it is true; for on this subjectivity alone rests the sublation of the opposition between Notion and Reality, and the unity that is truth" (p. 835).

B EFORE, however, we go to those paragraphs developing second negativity to its fullest, I'd like to retrace our steps to the threshold of the Absolute Idea, "The Idea of the Good," and call attention of this learned audience to the Russian Communist celebration of the 100th anniversary of Lenin's birth, which coincided with Hegel's 200th, as this will illuminate the problematic of our day. Academician Kedrov, Director of the Institute of History of Science and Technology, embarked on still another attempt to "disengage" Lenin from Hegel with the claim that the word, "alas" before the quotation, "Cognition not only reflects the world but creates it," shows Lenin was merely restating Hegel, not bowing to Hegel's "bourgeois idealism." The simple truth, however, is that the most revolutionary of all materialists, Vladimir Il'ich Lenin, witnessing the simultaneity of the outbreak of World War I and the collapse of the Socialist International, felt compelled to return to Hegel's dialectics as that unity of opposites which might explain the counter-revolution within the revolutionary movement. Absolute negativity became Lenin's philosophic preparation for revolution, as Lenin's Abstract of Hegel's Science of Logic shows. By the time his notes reach the Doctrine of the Notion, Lenin states that none of the Marxists (and the emphasis on the plural makes it clear he includes himself) had fully understood Marx's greatest theoretical work, Capital, "especially its first chapter," since that is impossible "without having thoroughly studied and understood the whole of Hegel's Logic" (p. 180). His passion at the approach of the Doctrine of the Notion — NB Freedom = Subjectivity, ("or") End, Consciousness, Endeavor, NB — had made it clear that Lenin knew (1914) sees in freedom, in subjectivity, notion, the categories with which both to transform the world and to gain knowledge of the objectively real because he had already, in the Doctrine of Essence, recognized, in Hegel's critique of causality, the limits of traditional "science" to explain the relation between mind and matter.

Lenin then proceeded to grapple with the role of practice in Hegel, especially when Hegel writes of the Practical Idea as having "not only the dignity of the Universal, but also the simply actual." Lenin's quotation about cognition.
that the Communists are presently trying to expunge is significant, not because he accords such "creativity" to cognition. Rather, it is due to the fact that Lenin, in "granting" that creativity to cognition, had followed it up with calling attention to the fact that Hegel had used the word, Subject, "here suddenly instead of 'Notion'" (p. 213). And to make matters worse still for those Russian epigonoi, it was all in the sentence about "the self-certainty which the subject has in the fact of its determinateness in and for itself, is a certainty of its own actuality and the non-actuality of the world."

Vulgar materialists are so utterly shocked at Lenin writing about the "non-actuality of the world" and the "self-certainty of the Subject's actuality" that they quote, not Hegel, as Lenin did, but Lenin's "translation": "i.e., that the world does not satisfy man and man decides to change it by his activity." But the point is that, after that "translation," Hegel is quoted in full on the contrast between inquiring cognition where "this actuality appeared merely as an objective world, without the subjectivity of the Notion, here it appears as an objective world whose inner ground and actual subsistence is the Notion. This is the Absolute Idea" (p. 823).

IT IS THIS appreciation of the Absolute Idea, not as something in heaven or in the stratosphere, but in fact in the objective world whose very ground is the Notion, that has castigat Communism so worried about Lenin. Ever since the June 17, 1953, East German Revolt and the emergence of a movement from practice to theory and a new society, they have rightly sensed that Lenin's break with his own philosophic past of the photopolymer theory of reality plus voluntarism produced the Great Divide in the Movement that has yet to run its course. We will take up the illumination the actual movement from practice these past two decades sheds on the problematic of our day at the end of the paper. Here it is necessary to reserve Hegel's own concentration on and development of, second negativity, in those last 12 paragraphs of Absolute Idea.

(3) Beginning with paragraph 15, and all the way to the end of the chapter, we no sooner face the subjectivity that has overcome opposition between Notion and Reality than we learn that, since this subjective is the "innermost," it is also the "most objective moment" (p. 836) and it is this subjectivity as objectivity which is "subject, a person, a free being..." Clearly, free creative power assures the plunge to freedom. It is the unifying force of the Absolute Idea. And since absolute negativity, the new foundation, is not "something merely picked up, but something deduced and proved" (p. 838), this subjective couldn't but be objective, so much so that it extends to the system itself.

There too we learn that the content belongs to the method; is the extension of method so that the system, too, is but another "fresh beginning" which has been arrived at through an infinite remembrance of things past and advance signposts (Wertgehen). Which is why paragraphs 20 through 25 not only never depart from absolute negativity as the transcending mediation, but every advance in the system of totality becomes "richer and more concrete."

The expression, "richer and more concrete," no more than the categories of subjectivity, reason, freedom, may not have led the reader to think of any such "materialistic" movement as the movement in which man makes himself free, but here is how Hegel spells out "Free Mind" in The Philosophy of Mind:

"When individuals and nations have once got in their heads the abstract concept of full-blown liberty, there is nothing like it in its uncontrollable strength,"

just because it is the very essence of mind, and that as its very actuality... The Greeks and Romans, Plato and Aristotle, even the Stoics did not have it... If to be aware of the Idea — to be aware, that is, that men are aware of freedom as their essence, aim and object — is a matter of speculation, it is, this very idea itself is the actuality of men — not something which they have, as men, but which they are" (Paragraph 482).

The fact that, in the Science of Logic, the stages in dialectical advance are not shown as so many stages in the historic development of human freedom, but, in the same circle, become a circle of circles, is, however, a constant reminder that every absolute is a new beginning, a before and an after, if not a "future," surely a consequence, a "successor"—or, expressed more accurately, has only the antecedent and indicates its successor in its conclusion" (p. 842). Whatever Hegel said, and meant, about the Owl of Minerva spreading its wings only at dusk simply does not follow from the objectivity of the drive, the summation in which the advance is immanent in the present. While he never grew unwise as a philosopher, he seems to have been interested in, any blueprint for the future, he was not preoccupied with death, the "end" of philosophy, much less of the world. His philosophy is the "end" only in the sense that "up to this moment" philosophy has reached this point with "my" philosophy of absolute negativity. From way back, when his first and greatest elemental work, The Phenomenology of Mind, ended with nothing short of the Golgotha of the Spirit, Hegel had succeeded in describing the final act as if it were an unfolding of the everlasting. When subjected to the dialectic method which, according to Hegel, no truth can escape, the conclusion turns out to be a new beginning. There is no trap in thought; though it is finite, it breaks through the barriers of the given, reaches out, if not to infinity, surely beyond the historic moment.

And in the final two paragraphs we see that there is no rest for the Absolute Idea, the fulfilled Being, the Notion that comprehends itself, the Notion that has become the Idea's own content. The negativity, the urge to transcend, the ceaseless motion that will go into new spheres and sciences and first then achieve "absolute Befreiung." The absolute liberation experienced by the Absolute Idea as it "freely releases itself" does not make it ascend to heaven. On the contrary, it first then experiences the shock of recognition, "the externality of space and time existing absolutely in its own without the moment of subjectivity" (p. 843).

S O MUCH for those who consider that Hegel lived far, far away from the concrete objective world, in some mystic ivory tower in which he "deduced" Nature from the idea. Equally wrong, however, are those who, while recognizing that Hegel presents the transition to Nature as an actual process of reality, conclude that Hegel is standing on his head. Proud as Hegel might have been of the feat, we need to turn to both the Science of Logic and the Philosophy of Mind, especially the three final syllogisms, to see what Hegel was telling us.

What was an intimation in the Logic about Nature being the mediation is spelled out as the first syllogism at the end of the Encylopedia of Philosophical Sciences: Logic — Nature — Mind. In the paragraph (573) Hegel further assures us that "Nature, standing between Mind in its essence, subdues them, not indeed to extremes of finite abstraction, nor stands aloof from them..."

One of the most relevant of the scholarly studies of 1960's — Reinhard Klemens Maurer's Hegel und das Ende der Geschichte: Interpretationen zur Phänomenologie — holds that it may very well be true that the first of these final

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1Elsewhere I have developed more fully the ramification and break in Lenin's philosophic development (See Ch. 3, "The Shock of Recognition and the Philosophic Ambivalence of Lenin" in Philosophy and Revolution, pp. 95-120).

2A. V. Miller, the new translator of Hegel, called my attention to the fact that in the Wallace translation "sich" (them) is mistakenly read as "sie" (itself).
syllogisms (paragraph 575), which has Nature as the mediation, gives the appearance that "Hegel turns to Darwin, turns to dialectical materialism and other nature-geneses of man and would also mean to 'Liberty,' there leading the course of necessity," but Hegel himself brings in a "correction" with paragraph 576, where the sequence then reads: Nature-Mind-Logic. Professor Maurer then proceeds to "appropriate" that syllogism as expressing the dialectic of the Phenomenology. Whatever one may think of that analysis as a philosophy of history or whatever, the point most Hegel scholars do agree with is that the final syllogism (paragraph 577), at least since Otto Pöggeler wrote about it in 1961, is this: "in opposition to the usual interpretations of the Hegelian text, I should like to propose the following: that the actual science of Spirit is not the Logic, but the philosophy of Spirit."

Thus the focus of the third syllogism has shifted and the stress (correctly to this writer) has been laid on the fact that Logic has been replaced and, in its stead, we get, not the sequential, but the consequential Self-Thinking Idea. To Hegel this has resulted from the fact that "it is the nature of the fact, the notion which causes the movement and development, yet this same movement is equally the action of cognition."

Hegel's Absolutes never were a series of ascending ivory towers. Revolution-ary transformation is imminent in the very form of thought. As we saw from the Absolute Idea chapter, the unifying force was free creative power. By the time we reach the mediated final result, Absolute Mind, the absolute negativity that was the moving force in Logic, in Nature, in Geist where we saw them as concrete stages of human freedom, there no longer is any difference between theory and practice. Which is why our age, which has been witness to a movement from practice for two long decades (ever since the death of Stalin lifted the incubus from the heads of the masses in East Europe), can best understand this writer Hegel's genius is lodged, precisely, in the fact that his "voyage of discovery" becomes one endless process of discovery for us, and the "us" includes both Marx's new continent of thought of materialist dialectics, and Hegel scholars, and the movement from practice that was itself a form of theory once its spontaneously discovered the power of thought along with its physical might. This writer has followed very closely this movement of revolt ever since June 17, 1953, and saw in it a quest for universality because she had already discerned in the dialectic movement of the three final syllogisms in Absolute Mind a new point of departure in the Idea and in the movement from practice.}

THIS MOVEMENT from practice hardly had the ear of contemporary Hegelians, "orthodox" or Marxist, as witness the erudite and Left, late director of the famous Frankfurt School, Theodor Adorno, whose very reason for being, for thinking, for acting was Dialectics, that is, to say, for negation of what is. He entitled the summation of his life's thought, which he certainly considered his intellectual legacy, Negative Dialectics. This, however, has little to do with dialectics of negativity, least of all with the concept of Subject, with which Hegel distinguished his from all other philosophers who left the search for truth at substance only. As "concretized" by Marx for the proletarian class, Subject is supposed to have been accepted also by Adorno, but, again, he keeps his distance

and originality locked into what he calls Negative Dialectics. From the very start of the Preface of his work, Adorno informs us that the positive in the negative, "the negation of the negation," is the enemy: "This book seeks to free dialectics from such affirmatite traits without reducing its determinacy" (p. xii). The "theoretical inadequacies of Hegel and Marx" revolve around what he sees as the all-encompassing evil, the concept, that "subsuming cover," its "auctary.

Naturally Adorno also keeps his distance from "positivists" and the vulgarisms of the knighted Karl Popper of the infamous "Hegel and fascism" school. Nevertheless, Adorno, very nearly out of nowhere, suddenly brings in Auschwitz, seeing some sort of kinship between it and absolute negativity: "Genocide is the absolute integration... Auschwitz confirmed the philosophy of pure identity as death... Absolute negativity is in plain sight and has ceased to surprise anyone" (p. 362).

By "nearly out of nowhere" I naturally do not mean Auschwitz wasn't the reality of fascism, nor do I mean only the suddenness and shock of introducing the subject-matter in the climax to the book, "Meditations on Metaphysics." Rather I mean it is "wrong," that is to say, totally illogical, non-ideological, from his own point of view of an adult lifetime devoted to fighting fascist "ideology" as the very opposite of Hegelian dialectics, its very death in Nazi Germany.

Perhaps a better word than "wrong" would be Adorno's own swearword: "naive." I mean that, as late as 1957, in Aspects of the Hegelian Dialectic, he was — almost — defending even subject-object identity: "Subject-object cannot be dismissed as mere extravagance of logical absolutism... in seeing through the latter as mere subjectivity, we have already passed beyond the Speculative Idealism... cognition, if it is genuine, and more than simple duplication of the subject, must be the subject's objectivity." And indeed in Negative Dialectics he restates the same truth which he writes that, despite the fact that Hegel "defies" subjectivity, "he accomplishes the opposite as well, an insight into the subject as a self-manifesting objectivity" (p. 350).

Why, then, the vulgar reduction of absolute negativity? Therein is the real tragedy of Adorno (and the Frankfurt School): one-dimensionality of thought once you "give up" Subject, once you do not listen to the voices from below — and they certainly were loud and clear and demanding in that decade of mid-1950 to mid-1960 — once you yourself return to the ivory tower and reduce your purpose: "the purpose of discussing key concepts of philosophic disciplines and centrally intervening in those disciplines..." (p. xx). Irresistibly came the next step, the substitution of a permanent critique not alone for absolute negativity, but also for "permanent revolution."

NOW, WHETHER the enduring relevance of Hegel has stood the test of time because of the devotion and rigor of analysis of Hegel scholars, or because from below there surged a movement for freedom and was followed by new cognition studies, there is no doubt that because Absolute Negativity signifies transformation of reality, the dialectic of contradiction and totality of crises, the dialectic of liberation, that Hegel comes to life at critical points of history which Hegel himself characterized as "birth-time of history." And there were Marxists scholars, revolutionary dissidents, who built on new ground. Where a scholar from the West like Maurer was preoccupied with Hegel's concept of where to end, the Czechoslovak philosopher, Karel Kosík, was preoccupied with where to begin anew. Of the East European studies that accompanied the revolt and reviewed

\footnote{The original German edition was published in 1966. I will be quoting from the English translation by E. B. Ashton, published in 1973 (The Seabury Press, N.Y.).

\footnote{Adorno's accusation of "conceptual fetishism" against Marx's famous "Fetishism of Commodities" as "truly a piece from the heritage of classic German philosophy" (pp. 189-90), is not relevant here. Contrast it to Karel Kosík's analysis of the very same section (See footnote 10).}
around Marx's Humanism, especially Marx's "Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic," one of the most rigorous studies was Karel Kosík's The Dialectic of the Concrete.10

Nor were these serious studies limited to the "East."11 As Frantz Fanon saw it, the Africans' struggle for freedom was "not a treatise on the universal, but the untidy affirmation of an original idea propounded as an absolute."12 There is no doubt, of course, that once action supersedes the subjectivity of purpose, the unity of theory and practice is the form of life out of which emerge totally new dimensions. To this writer this is only the "proof" of the ending of Science of Logic, the Absolute as now beginning, the self-bringing forth of liberty. Because Hegel's great work held in sight new horizons — Nature, Spirit — the absolute ideal had to undergo "absolute liberation" (absolute Befreiung). No mere transition (Uebergang) here; Freedom is unrestricted. It will "complete" (vollendet) its liberation in the Philosophy of Mind (Geist). But there is no doubt either in the Science of Logic about the Notion being Subject, being Reality, and not some sort of closed ontology. To think that when Hegel wrote about the "pilot on which the impending world revolution turns" that he referred only to the Idea13 of Christianity in the Greco-Roman world, is both to forget the Christians thrown to the lions and that it was the "resigned" Hegel of the Philosophy of Right, not the young Hegel who toasted the great French Revolution, who wrote about "the impending world revolution."

Is IT MERE ACCIDENT that, after 150 years of indifference, two simultaneous translations of the Philosophy of Nature appear in English? Or that in the new studies on Hegel, one (Riedel) suddenly sees in Hegel an equal primacy to the Theoretical and the Pragmatic Idea? Or that new studies cover East and West, North and South? Or that many of the conferences throughout the world on Hegel coincide with Marx and Lenin as philosophers? Isn't it, rather, that the problematic of our crisis-ridden world impinges in no incidental way on the whole question of the relationship of theory to practice, not just on the immediate level, but one grounded in philosophy? No doubt, as Hegel put it, to accept a category at face value is an "uninstructed and barbarous procedure." But it is also a fact that the single dialectic process upsurges from thought as well as from actuality, and it would be equally "uninstructed" for philosophers to act as if the relationship of theory to practice is a "job for politicians." Just as the objective world and the elemental quest for universality have a crucial meaning for students of the dialectic, so do the students of the dialectic have for the movement from practice.

10Two of the chapters of the Dialectic of the Concrete have been published in English in Telos, Fall, 1968, and Fall, 1969. Where, in the latter issue, Kosík contrasts the empty absolutes of Schelling to those of Hegel who characterized the absolutes of the Romantics as having got to the Absolute "like a shot out of the pistol," in the 1968 issue, Kosík wrote: (Marx's beginning his analysis of Capital with "Commodity" means) "It can be characterized in Hegelian terms, as the unity of being and non-being, of distinction and similarity, of identity and non-identity. All further determinations and richer definitions are characterizations of this 'absolute' of capitalist society. The dialectic of interpretation or of exegesis cannot eclipse the central problem: how does science reach the necessary beginning of the exposition... The dialectic is not a method of reduction, but the method of spiritual and intellectual reproduction of reality." The only one in the academic world in Hegel studies in the West who has dealt seriously, not with existing, given, established, state Communism, but with Marx himself and sees the transformation of the commodity as phenomenon into Notion, is Karl Lashw, From Hegel to Nietzsche.

11I have limited myself to East Europe, but of course I mean really the East, the Orient, and Mao's perversion of Hegelian dialectics, especially the concept of Contradiction, with which I dealt elsewhere (See Ch. 5, "The Thought of Mao Tse-tung," pp. 128-150, Philosophy and Revolution).

12Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, Grove Press, N.Y., 1966, p. 33.

13See T. M. Knox's "Notes to Hegel's Philosophy of Right," especially the one relating to this phrase, "impending world revolution."