out concretizing and deepening the dialectic for one's own age created. That the historic continuity with Marx seemed to have ended with 1848 revolution, rather than extending it to the 1850 Address on “revolution in permanence,” first emerged in the 1905 Revolution. By 1907, the International Congress of the Second International didn't even have that revolution on the agenda, [it] signified, as I expressed it in Marxism, "The Beginning of the End of the Second International." I have every right to call attention to the fact that clarification was with eyes of 1957. It certainly is true that the combination of hind and the fact that, with the eruption of the [1956] Hungarian Revolu came also the placing on the historic stage of Marx's 1844 humanism, could not but reopen the relationship of philosophy to revolution. By then, did Lenin's return to the Hegelian dialectic in 1914 lead post-Marxist "Western Marxists" to skip that new ground from which to sum up briefly, what remains of the essence is, at one and the same time to relate historic continuity, the return to Marx's Marxism as a reason to the discontinuity of the ages and, with it, to be able to meet the challenges. As a precondition for that I hold it imperative to reconsider Marx Marxism, measure it against Marx's Marxism and, far from skipping what had been created by Lenin's great divide philosophically, to take account of it.

It is a re-reading of Karl Korsch's Marxism and Philosophy has illuminated the dialectic needs extension to the dialectics of the Party, which is charted in Critique of the Gothic Program, and which even Lenin, freshly re-created [the Critique] on the question of the need to absolute and, with the revolution, proceeded to a new form of power that "men's state" [LCW 25, p. 424], didn't have time dialectically to what happens after, though he certainly did leave us jumping off which] must be worked out by this age. A first step toward that task is sure that not only is there no division between philosophy and but also not one between philosophy and organization. Con demand the relationship of organization to Marx's theory of on in permanence." It is with that mind that I entitled the third chapter of Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation, and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution, "The Philosopher of Permanent Revolution Creates Sound for Organization." It is only then that the final chapter on new moments," including his Ethnological Notes and our age's world, disclosed the trail to the 1980s. That doesn't mean we have the answer all signed and sealed. It does mean [that] working this out demands a challenge to post-Marxist Marxists.


This lecture was delivered on January 1, 1983, shortly after the publication of Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation, and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution, and shortly before Dunayevskaya embarked on an intensive national lecture tour during the period of the centenary of Marx's death. It focuses on how the completion of this third work of what she termed her "trilogy of revolution" shed new illumination upon both the 40-year development of Marx's Humanism and the four-decade-long development of her concept of Marxist-Humanism. The first two parts of this four-part presentation are reproduced here. The original can be found in The Raya Dunayevskaya Collection, p. 7639.

Introduction: Where and How to Begin Anew?
The reason that we begin, not objectively as usual, but subjectively, is that the "here and now" demands a deeper probing into the creative mind of Marx.

The warp and woof of the Marxian dialectic, the unchained Hegelian dialectic, the dialectic of the revolutionary transformation is, after all, true objectively and subjectively. Yet part III of Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation, and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution begins the probing of Marx before he fully broke with bourgeois society, when he worked on his doctoral thesis "On the Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature." Thus began his very first critique of Hegel, in 1841, as it appeared in the Notes that were known only to himself. What did appear in the doctoral thesis itself was what pervaded those Notes, i.e., the question: How to begin anew?

The reason that question reappears here is not to emphasize how it antedated Marx's discovery of a whole new continent of thought and revolution, but rather because it reappeared in its true profundity in Marx's own greatest work, Capital (I'm referring to the definitive French edition, 1875) as well as in the very last decade of his life, in what we now call Marx's "new moments" of discovery.

Let me rephrase this. The crucial truth is that the question: How to begin anew? informed the whole of his dialectic methodology—even after his discovery of a whole new continent of thought, even after the publication of the first edition of Capital as well as the 1875 edition, after the Paris Commune,
when he took issue with Mikhailovsky who had written what turned out to be what all post-Marx Marxists likewise accepted as the climax of the work, that is, the “Historical Tendency of Capitalist Accumulation” as a universal. Marx, on the other hand, held that that summation of Western capitalist development was just that—the particular development of capitalism—which need not be the universal path of human development. Here we have the unique way Marx practiced summation as a new beginning.

The concept of totality as new beginning was true also on the organizational question: How to begin a new organization when it is to express a whole philosophy of revolution. Marx answered that question in his letter to Bracke, in which he enclosed what he modestly called “Marginal Notes” to the “Program of the German Workers’ Party.” That was the letter in which he noted also that finally the French edition of Capital was out and he was sending it to Bracke. The fact that no post-Marx Marxists saw that inseparable relationship of organization to philosophy of revolution is the more remarkable when you consider that Marx’s closest collaborator, Frederick Engels, was not only still alive but worked with Marx very closely in sending letters to the various so-called Marxist leaders as Marx tried to stop the unification of the Eisenachists and Lassalleans on the basis of the Gotha program. Beyond the per adventure of a doubt, the Critique of the Gotha Program formulated a totally different basis for the establishment of a Marxist “Party.”

It becomes necessary once again to emphasize that year, 1875, as not only the year in which both the French edition of Capital was completed and the Critique of the Gotha Program was written. That year also predates by two years the letter Marx wrote on Mikhailovsky (but never sent), criticizing his concept of the “historical tendency” as a universal, insisting that it was the summation of capitalist development in Western Europe and that “the Russians” could “find a path of development for their country different from that which Western Europe pursued and still pursues”—and that, in fact, if Russia didn’t find that different path “she will lose the finest chance ever offered by history to a people and undergo all the fatal vicissitudes of the capitalist regime” [MECW 24, p. 199].

Think again about the question of how faithful Engels was to the Gotha Program critique, not only in the letters written when Marx was alive, but in the fact that he kept at the German Social-Democrats for a full 15 years after the Party did not publish that criticism, and only in 1891 did get it published.

The tragic truth is that it didn’t make any difference when they did publish it. It didn’t become ground for the new openly Social-Democratic organization. Nor was any parallel drawn by anyone, including Frederick Engels, between organization and Marx’s whole philosophy, though clearly, definitively, this was what Marx’s Critique aimed at. And just as clearly, Marx’s covering letter warned against the unification because there was to be “no bargaining about principles.” Quite the contrary, he “and Engels would make clear” that they had “nothing in common with it” (the Gotha Program) [MECW 24, p. 78].

In a word, it wasn’t only the Eisenachists and Lassalleans who knew how to misuse the fact that Karl Marx and Frederick Engels didn’t make public their break with the Gotha Program and the German Workers’ Party. The truth is that the German Social-Democrats, who did consider themselves “orthodox” under its leading “Marxist” theoretician, Karl Kautsky, did the very same thing later. This time the reason rested in the claim that, since they adhered to Marx’s “theories,” their Party was the organization of vanguard socialism. They succeeded in so twisting the very concept of vanguardism that they made “the Party” read “the vanguard Party.” That was not Marx’s concept, as we shall see in a moment as we turn to the third new moment in Marx on organization. It is high time for Marxist-Humanists to concretize “Where and how to begin anew” for our age by looking at those “new moments” in Marx as the trail to the 1980s.

I. The Four New Moments in Marx That Are the 1980s Trail

The first new moment that was not grasped by the first post-Marxist generation was due not merely to the fact that Engels had omitted the paragraph from the French edition of Capital, which had been definitively edited by Marx, when Engels transferred Marx’s additions to the German. Marx’s point in that omitted paragraph on further industrialization (as it covered the whole nation) and, with it, the predominance of foreign over internal trade, was that although the world market annexed “vast lands in the New World, in Asia, in Australia,” that wouldn’t abate the general crisis of capitalism. On the contrary. The new development in capitalism meant that the ten-year cycle he had originally cited as the crisis that regularly follows capitalism’s growth would occur more often.

What wasn’t grasped by a less creative mind than Marx’s was that, far from the climactic “Historical Tendency of Capitalist Accumulation” signifying universality for all technological development, it characterized only Western Europe while “the Russians” could choose a different path. Post-Marx Marxists failed to grasp this because they separated economic laws from the dialectics of revolution. For Marx, on the other hand, it was just this concept of revolution which changed everything, including economic laws. He rejected the fact of Western capitalist development as a universal for all, delved into the
latest anthropological studies, and then wrote to Vera Zasulich stressing the possibility for revolution to erupt in a technologically backward country like Russia "ahead of the West." In this letter to Zasulich he had made direct reference to the "American" (he was referring to [Henry Lewis] Morgan's Ancient Society) whose studies of pre-capitalist societies, Marx thought, further proved that the peasant commune form of development could lead Russia, if the historic conditions were ripe and it was working with West Europe, as well, to initiate revolution.\(^{50}\)

To make sure that none misunderstood his concept of revolution and the prediction of revolution in the "East" ahead of the "West," he (this time with Engels) had written a new Introduction to the Russian edition of nothing less important than his Communist Manifesto. There he publicly spelled out that prediction. That was 1882!

This was not the only new moment Marx discovered which post-Marx Marxists didn't grasp. The second new moment again related to theory. This time it was a new interpretation of the dialectic itself in two crucial areas in the transformation of reality. Everyone knows the 1850 Address [to the Communist League], which ended with the call for "revolution in permanence," though hardly anyone has related it to Marx's continuing concretization of the dialectic of negativity, as the dialectics of revolution.\(^{51}\) None seem to have even begun to grapple with what it meant for Marx, as he was already completing economic analysis of capitalism (and pre-capitalist societies) in the Grundrisse in 1857, to have so fully integrated the dialectic and the economics as to articulate that the socialism that would follow the bourgeois form of production signified "the absolute movement of becoming" [MECW 28, pp. 411–12].* What an Hegelian expression to use to describe that full development of all the talents of the individual that would mark the new socialist society!

That the question of individual self-development and social, revolutionary, historical development would thus become one manifests itself in the Grundrisse. It is no accident that it was there where Marx stopped speaking of only three universal forms of human development—slave, feudal, and capitalist—and included a fourth universal form: the "Asiatic mode of production." That post-Marx Marxists failed to have that as ground for working out the reality of their age and thus anticipate what we now call a whole new Third World is exactly what this age is still suffering from.

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*Marx was rereading Hegel's Logic as he worked on the Grundrisse and wrote to Engels on January 16, 1858, that this chance rereading was a great help to him in creating a new form for presenting his economic studies [MECW 40, p. 249]. That "new form" of integrating dialectics and economics further[more] led Marx to working the first draft, Grundrisse, into the final form, Capital.

The third new moment—that on organization—was not only not grasped, but actually rejected. Post-Marx Marxists were always "proving" that, because Marx had not worked out a "theory" of organization, while Lassalle knew how to build a mass party, he left them no model to practice. The First International, they said, had included so many contradictory tendencies that Karl Marx was forced to "consign it to die in the United States." Indeed, all of them were quick to twist the whole concept of "vanguardism" as if it meant, simply and only, "the party." Neither "Leninists" nor opponents of Lenin have been willing to acknowledge that the ground for [Lenin's] What Is To be Done? was, precisely, the ground of the German Social-Democracy. And that includes Rosa Luxemburg, despite all her great achievements on the actuality of spontaneity. While Lenin rejected any type of "half-way dialectic" on the National Question, he did not see that same type of "half-way dialectic" in himself on the question of the "vanguard party."

The whole truth is—and that is first and foremost—Marx never separated organization forms from his total philosophy of revolution. Indeed, as was shown when we kept stressing the year, 1875, Marx had worked out his whole theory of human development in Capital and in the organizational document, The Critique of the Gotha Program—because his principle, a philosophy of revolution, was the ground also of organization. In a word, it was not only the state which Marx held must be destroyed, totally uprooted. He showed that the proletarian organization likewise changed form. Thus, the First International, Marx said, "was no longer realizable in its first historical form" (Critique of the Gotha Program) [MECW 24, p. 90].

This, history shows, was not understood by the first post-Marx Marxists. It would take nothing short of the German Social-Democracy's betrayal at the outbreak of World War I before Lenin totally broke with them, and first saw Marx's Critique of the Gotha Program as most relevant for his day. It was then also that he spelled out most concretely how revolutionaries could not just "take over" the bourgeois state machinery. That had to be smashed to smithereens. Lenin made that revolutionary message both more concrete and more comprehensive—a true concrete Universal—when he saw, as inseparable, Marx's theory of revolution and his theory of human development, concluding, "The whole theory of Marx is an application of the theory of development."\(^{52}\) Yet, as we know, Lenin still left the concept of the vanguard party in its old (though modified) form.

A new historic age was needed to work out all the ramifications. A new movement from practice as a form of theory had to emerge and be recognized before a new attitude could be worked out, and that meant, far from freeing the movement from theory of its responsibilities, the movement from prac-
tice was demanding that theory, too, undergo self-development so that it could concretize for a new age Marx’s revolutionary dialectical philosophy, which he had called a “new Humanism.” By the time, in 1956, that the Hungarian Revolution brought Marx’s philosophy onto the historic stage, we had developed that new Humanism in the United States. By 1960, the Third World theorist Frantz Fanon had developed his liberation philosophy and called it “a new Humanism.” By the 1970s Marx’s Ethnological Notebooks were finally transcribed so that Marx’s Marxism could be seen as a totality. It is this which Rosa Luxemburg, Women’s Liberation, and Marx’s Philosophy of Revolution is rooted in when it takes a new look at Marx’s 1875 Critique. The new book devotes a whole chapter to the Critique, entitling that chapter: “The Philosopher of Permanent Revolution Creates Ground for Organization.” This sums up that third new moment in Karl Marx on organization in his age and in ours.

The fourth new moment which opened with the Ethnological Notebooks (finally transcribed in the 1970s) reveals itself equally and even more urgently relevant to our age for Women’s Liberation. It is this work which enables us to see with new eyes that Marx’s 1844 concept of Man/Woman*—far from being something that only the allegedly “utopian” young Marx had articulated—was deepened throughout his life.

Thus, in 1867, as he was preparing the first edition of Capital for the press, and Dr. Kugelmann had given him his early essays, Marx wrote to Engels: “We have nothing to be ashamed of.” Marx also related these early essays to the 1867 debates around Capital, holding that “the feminine ferment” was inherent in revolutions throughout history. From his activities in the Paris Commune, we know how Marx had laid the ground in establishing the Union des Femmes, following this through by making it a principle that the First International establish autonomous women’s organizations. Finally, with his last work, the Ethnological Notebooks, he further enshrined this new attitude by showing the revolutionary presence of women throughout history, from the Iroquois women to the Irish women before British imperialism conquered Ireland.

Clearly, all four new moments, in theory and practice, in organization and spelling out “the new passions and new forces” for the reconstruction of society on new, Humanist beginnings—first naming the proletariat as Subject; then working out the revolutionary role of the peasantry, not only as in Engels’ Peasant Wars but as in the peasant communal form in the 1880s; and always

*One so-called independent Marxist, Hal Draper, dared to refer to these 1844 Essays as being no more than “the lucubrations of this new-fledged socialist.”

singling out youth and then women as Reason as well as forces of revolution—have laid new paths of revolution, a whole trail for the 1980s.

Surely, as Marxist-Humanists, now that we do have “three books, not one,” as well as all the pamphlets on the new voices from below, worldwide as well as in the United States—ranging from Workers Battle Automation, Freedom Riders Speak for Themselves and Afro-Asian Revolutions to People of Kenya Speak for Themselves and Frantz Fanon, Soweto and American Black Thought—we can now measure up to Marx’s second new moment, both as a possible new path of revolution as well as the dialectics of the “absolute movement of becoming”... It is, indeed, the trail to the 1980s that we have been working out for three full decades.

II. The Unchained Dialectic in Marx, 1843–1883, and in Marxist-Humanism, 1953–1983

It was Marx who unchained the Hegelian dialectic by demystifying the “negation of negation,” designating it as a “new Humanism” in 1844, and as “revolution in permanence” in 1850, while in 1857 recreating Hegel’s “absolute movement of becoming” as integral to what would follow capitalism when revolutionary socialism came to full bloom. Nor did Marx stop in 1867 when he finished his greatest work, Capital, where he recreated the dialectic as “new passions and new forces” [MCJF, p. 928; MCIK, p. 845]. In the last decade of his life the creative nature of the mind of Marx, founder of a whole new continent of thought and of revolution, was still discovering “new moments.”

These new revolutionary moments of human development became ground for organization. So integral were organizational forms and revolutionary principles that, as we have seen, he concluded that the form of the First International which he had headed was “no longer realizable in its first historical form after the fall of the Paris Commune.” The point was not to “bargain about principles.” Only the “all-around development of the individual” would prove that humanity reached the end of the division between mental and manual labor. Then the new society could operate on the new principle “from each according to his ability, to each according to his need.” In a word, both the destruction of the State and the end of the division between mental and manual labor must be achieved for the principle of “the absolute movement of becoming” to become reality—when practiced as the “all-around development of the individual.” Nothing less than that could be called Communism.

When the Russian Revolution did not succeed in extending itself internationally, when world capitalism regained life and Stalin was victorious in
new form of state-capitalism, post-Marx Marxists proved incapable of following Marx's Promethean vision.

We who did fully break with Trotskyism and felt compelled to analyze the new reality of state-capitalism—and the Johnson-Forest Tendency did represent a great theoretical advance in that respect—nevertheless failed to work out what the Tendency was for instead of only what it was against. In a word, it had not reached Marxist-Humanism except in the merest embryo form—rejection of state-capitalism and looking with new eyes at labor's creativity in working out new forms of revolt. Nevertheless, were we to skip over the State-Capitalist Tendency's challenge to Trotskyism, we would leave an historic loophole on the quintessential relationship between philosophy and revolution, between theory and practice, not to mention the search for the link to the absolutely indispensable creative mind of Marx. The historic link must be reestablished if we are serious about revolution in our age. That new beginning came before establishment of organization—News and Letters Committees, 1955.

Before the establishment of the Committees we had, when still a part of the State-Capitalist Tendency, broken through philosophically on the Absolute Idea. That happened in 1953. It is this, just this, catching of the new in our age that laid the ground for seeing the link of continuity with Marx. It becomes necessary to stay a little longer on those two years, 1953 to 1955, to work out, in full, our own contributions, not just as against Trotskyism but also against Johnsonism.

Here, again, we need to return to what Hegel called "The Three Attitudes to Objectivity." Actually it is four attitudes, but the fourth, the dialectic, being the whole, is not given a number since it occupies all the works of Hegel, and is Hegel and Marx. It is the "attitude" that is most relevant here. It is the relationship of subjectivity to objectivity when that subjectivity is not mere Ego, but the historic-philosophic subjectivity which, in place of stopping at first negation or mere reaction, goes on to second negation—i.e., absolute negativity which alone reveals totality by developing it as a new beginning. That new beginning relates all the four new moments in Marx to the question of philosophy of revolution as ground of organization.

Let's catch our breath right here because the "new Humanism" for our age that we represent must not be "taken for granted." It is the re-creation of Marx's new Humanism at a time when. But this "when" means both a "before" and "after," that is to say, it is the "when" that is our age. It signifies the stage of human development which was brought onto the historic stage of today by actual revolutions in East Europe, in the Middle East, in Africa, in the West; and in multi-colors of Black, Yellow and Brown and Red; with a whole new generation of Youth and of Women's Liberationists—as well as by a movement from theory that, though not from the same origins or as total as ours was nevertheless as philosophic as Frantz Fanon's Wretched of the Earth. Far from being taken for granted, our "new Humanism" must be so fully internalized as to become a second negativity type of "instinct"—that is, reappear at all historic turning points spontaneously.

This being so, we have to take a deeper look at our break from James and see that far from taking it for granted it happened "by no accident whatever." The break was not only because we were the opposite of the Johnsonism to which C. L. R. James tried to reduce the Johnson-forest Tendency, but because the Marxist-Humanism we became is so new that the Great Divide in Marxism that Lenin represents in history became a point for further theoretic departure. Note that I say this not in the sense of a single issue as I did when I considered how wrong is Lenin's concept of the vanguard party for our age. This time the point of reference is to philosophy itself, which Lenin did finally see as "dialectic proper" but nevertheless stopped his Abstract of Hegel's Science of Logic half a paragraph short of the end of the Absolute Idea. It is on that point that I first took issue with his Abstract [of Hegel's Science of Logic] in the Philosphic Notebooks. It is true that I explained my "daring" as being necessitated by the objective situation which followed his death, so that whereas he saw Stalinism only in embryo, we had to suffer through a whole quarter-century of it. But that had not stopped me from refusing to remain only on the "political" scene. Instead I went on my own to the Philosophy of Mind, and afterward discovered that I had also gone past where Marx broke off in his "Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic."

Marx, unlike Lenin, had, naturally, not dismissed the rest as inconsequential. The totality of the Hegelian dialectic "in and for itself" had not only been fully inwardized, but Marx had recreated it in the fact that by then he had discovered a whole new continent of thought and of revolution which has remained the ground for Marxists, and will continue to be our ground until we have finally and totally uprooted capitalism.

Nevertheless, it is a fact that our age had to return to Hegel in order to work out that which Marx had not "translated." What had not become concrete for the other age had become imperative and urgent for ours. For our age, however, that philosophical mediation became alive as forces of revolution as Reason rather than needing any further abstract development as that middle which first creates from itself a whole. I'm referring not to the general question of absolute negativity, which Marx had fully worked out as revolution in permanence, but to the specifics of the final three syllogisms [in the Philosophy of Mind] that Hegel himself had worked out only the year before his death.
Even more specifically I'm limiting myself to the final paragraph (577) of Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind*, which states "it is the nature of the fact, the Notion, which causes the movement and development. Yet this same movement is equally the action of cognition." We worked this out after we rejected Lenin's stopping on the Absolute Idea before that final paragraph of the *Science of Logic*, which warned the readers that the "Absolute" has not finished its journey which must still be tested in the *Philosophy of Nature and Philosophy of Mind*. It was when we turned to the latter that we broke through on the Absolute Idea not only as both not being in the stratosphere and signifying a new unity of theory and practice, but also as disregarding the Party and instead facing the new society. By seeing the new unity as a new *relationship*—which demanded that the new beginning must rest in the movement from practice that is itself a form of theory, so that theory must first then work out how to reach the heights of philosophy and depth of actual revolution—we succeeded not only in the breakthrough on the Hegelian Absolute, but in reconnecting with Marx's "revolution in permanence."

This meeting of the spontaneous outburst of the masses and hearing the voices from below as one form of theory occurred six weeks before the actual revolt in East Germany on June 17, 1953—the first ever from under totalitarian Communism which found its voice once the incubus of Stalinism was removed from its head by Stalin's death.

**NOTES**

1. See p. 12, note 15.

2. This refers specifically to the syllogism "Universal-Particular-Individual," discussed by Hegel in the last book of his *Science of Logic*, "The Doctrine of the Notion." For one of Dunayevskaya's discussions of Hegel's syllogism, see this volume, chapter 6.

3. In Hegel's *Science of Logic* the chapter on Judgment directly precedes that on the Syllogism.

4. Lee's 1951 letter has not been found. However, Dunayevskaya made excerpts from it in notes that are now included in the *Supplement to the Raya Dunayevskaya Collection*, pp. 14678–79. She there quotes Lee as writing: "I suspect that the historical content of the logical forms of Universality, Particularity, and Individuality is: U = Christianity; P = Bourgeois Democracy; I = Socialism. I suspect also that in the development from Judgment to Syllogism is combined the development of the party of 1902 to Soviets of 1917... the Syllogism destroys the opposition between subjectivity and objectivity. The polemic in the realm of the Notion... is against elevating the U into a fixed particular (i.e., the U must be posited as P, but if the P is posited as U, the difference becomes isolated and fixed) and also against destroying the individuality of the modes by getting to the Absolute like a shot out of a pistol."

5. Lenin actually made this comment about 10 pages into his notes on the Doctrine of the Notion, as he began summarizing the first section, "Subjectivity." See LCW 38, p. 176.

6. "The Idea" is Section III of the Doctrine of the Notion.

7. See the Letter of May 20, 1953, in chapter 2, above.

8. Lee's letter of May 22, 1953 can be found in The *Raya Dunayevskaya Collection*, p. 2466.

9. In his 1844 "Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic," Marx attacks Feuerbach because the latter "regards the negation of the negation only as the contradiction of philosophy with itself." Marx points instead to "the dialectic of negativity as the moving and creating principle" in Hegel's philosophy [MECW 3, pp. 329, 332].

10. Dunayevskaya's Perspectives Thesis, a presentation given yearly to the national gathering of News and Letters Committees, was presented on September 4, 1982, under the title, "What to Do: Facing the Depth of Recession and the Myriad Global Political Crises as well as the Philosophic Void." It can be found in The *Raya Dunayevskaya Collection*, pp. 7515–38.

11. The full text of this letter can be found in the *Raya Dunayevskaya Collection*, p. 7503.


13. These as well as other paragraphs added to *Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation, and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution* after it was completed can now be found in the University of Illinois Press edition (1991) in an introductory section entitled, "New Thoughts on Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation, and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution" (pp. xxxiii–xxviii).

14. The full text of this letter of August 20, 1982, can be found in the *Supplement to the Raya Dunayevskaya Collection*, p. 15320.

15. The remainder of this addition can also be found in the Introduction to the 1991 edition of *Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation, and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution*, pp. xxxvii–xxxviii.

16. David Ryzanov, who worked editing Marx in Soviet Russia in the 1920s, including beginning the Complete Writings of Marx and Engels (MEGA), made these remarks in a 1923 report to the Communist Academy. While the speech has not been translated into English, it is quoted and critiqued in *Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation, and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution*, pp. 177–78.


20. In his Wretched of the Earth, trans. Constance Farrington (New York: Grove Press, 1966 [orig. 1961]), Fanon writes that after liberation, "this new humanity . . . cannot do otherwise than define a new humanism both for itself and for others" (p. 197).
24. Some of these letters to James are included in the appendix to this volume.
25. These articles can be found in The Raya Dunayevskaya Collection, pp. 1477–83. The article on the miners' wives was reprinted in Women's Liberation and the Dialectics of Revolution, pp. 29–30. See also Phillips and Dunayevskaya, The Coal Miners' General Strike of 1949–50 and the Birth of Marxist-Humanism in the U.S.
26. In the Johnson-forest Tendency, James designated Lee as the specialist in philosophy, and Dunayevskaya the specialist in economics.
28. See the letter of May 20, 1953, in chapter 2, above.
29. See this volume, p. 185
30. Marx broke off his "Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic" (1844) with a quotation from §384 of Philosophy of Mind. The final three syllogisms begin with §575, nearly 300 pages later in Hegel's text.
31. Korsch, a leading member of the German Communist Party during the years 1920–26, published the first edition of his Marxism and Philosophy in 1923. After Lenin's death, at the Fifth Congress of the Communist International in June/July 1924, both Korsch and Lukács were condemned as "revisionists" by Comintern leader Grigory Zinoviev, and the Comintern program explicitly condemned "idealism." After his expulsion from the German Communist Party two years later, Korsch continued to write on Marxism, most notably in his Karl Marx (1938). For more background on Korsch, see Douglas Kellner's introduction to Karl Korsch: Revolutionary Theory (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979) and Patrick Goode, Karl Korsch (London: Macmillan, 1979).
32. In his History and Class Consciousness (1923).
34. Dunayevskaya developed this point in chapter 3 of Philosophy and Revolution, "The Shock of Recognition and the Philosophic Ambivalence of Lenin."
35. Maurice Merleau-Ponty coined the phrase "Western Marxism" in his Adventures of the Dialectic (1955), in posing thinkers such as Lukács and Korsch as an alternative to the "orthodox Marxism" of Lenin and the Bolsheviks.
36. An apparent reference to Lawrence Krader, whose edition of The Ethnological Notebooks of Karl Marx (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1972) was "dedicated to the memory of Karl Korsch."
37. In Marxism and Philosophy Korsch commented on Hegel's statement about German idealist philosophy (from his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Vol. 3, p. 409), that "revolution was lodged and expressed as if in the very form of their thought." Korsch wrote that "Hegel was not talking of what contemporary bourgeois historians of philosophy like to call a revolution in thought—a nice, quiet process that takes place in the pure realm of the study and far from the crude realm of real struggles. The greatest thinker produced by bourgeois society in its revolutionary period regarded 'revolution in the form of thought' as an objective component of the total social process of a real revolution." See Marxism and Philosophy (London: New Left Books, 1970), pp. 38–39. Quoted by Dunayevskaya in Philosophy and Revolution, p. 295.
38. This statement from Lenin serves as the opening epigraph quote in Korsch's Marxism and Philosophy. See also LCW 33, p. 324.
39. In citing this passage from Kant, as published in vol. 1 of Politische Literatur der Deutschen im 18. Jahrhundert, ed. Geimann, pp. 121ff., Korsch noted that "Kant also likes to use the expression 'revolution' in the realm of pure thought, but one should say that he means something much more concrete than the bourgeois Kantians of today" (p. 39).
40. This quotation is from Engels' Anti-Dühring [MECW 25, p. 26].
42. Luxemburg issued this defense of the dialectic during her 1898 polemic with Eduard Bernstein, who had advocated "removing the dialectical scaffolding" from Marxism. See Luxemburg, Reform or Revolution? in Rosa Luxemburg Speaks (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1970), p. 86.
43. Dunayevskaya's analysis of the failure of the Second International to take account of the 1905 Russian Revolution is found in chapter 9 of Marxism and Freedom, pp. 156–60.
44. Marx's notes to his dissertation, the "Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy," can be found in MECW 1, pp. 403–509. The dissertation, entitled "Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature" can be found in MECW 1, pp. 25–108.
45. During Marx's lifetime, Vol. I of Capital appeared in three successive editions, each of which involved substantial changes from the previous one: the 1867 first German edition, the 1872 second German edition, and the 1872–75 French edition. As Marx wrote in a letter of April 28, 1875, published as a Postface to the French edition, "Whatever the literary defects of this French edition may be, it possesses a scientific value independent of

46. N. K. Mikhailovsky’s article “Karl Marx on trial before Mr. Zhukovski,” which appeared in the Russian journal *Otechestvennye Zapiski* in 1877, argued that Marx held that the “historical tendency of capitalist accumulation” traced in *Capital* was universally applicable to all societies. Marx took sharp issue with this interpretation of his work in his “Letter to the Editorial Board of Otechestvennye Zapiski” [MECW 24, pp. 196–201].

47. This refers to Marx’s 1875 *Critique of the Gotha Program*. For the text of the covering letter to Bracke, see MECW 24, pp. 77–78.

48. Eisenachists was the popular name of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, founded in the city of Eisenach in 1869; many Eisenachists were followers of Marx. Lasallean was the followers of Ferdinand Lassalle, whom Marx sharply opposed. The two groups united at Gotha in 1875, leading Marx to write his *Critique of the Gotha Program*.

49. This refers to the paragraph, added to chapter 25 of the French edition of *Capital*, in which Marx refers to how “the world market had successively annexed extensive areas of the New World, Asia and Australia.” Left out of the supposedly definitive 1890 fourth German edition by Engels, it appears as a footnote to p. 786 of the Ben Fowkes translation of *Capital*, Vol. I [MCIF, p. 786].

50. Marx referred to Morgan in the first draft of his letter to Zasulich [MECW 24, p. 350]. For the actual letter sent to Zasulich on March 8, 1881, see MECW 24, p. 370.

51. Marx’s March 1850 “Address to the Communist League” can be found in MECW 10, pp. 277–87.

52. This is a quote from Lenin’s *State and Revolution* [LCW 25, pp. 462–63].

53. In a letter of April 24, 1867, Marx says, “I also found The Holy Family again; [Kugelmann] has presented it to me and will send you a copy. I was pleasantly surprised to find that we do not need to be ashamed of this work, although the cult of Feuerbach produces a very humorous effect upon me now” [MECW 42, p. 360].

54. In a letter to Kugelmann of December 10, 1868, Marx wrote: “Everyone who knows anything of history also knows that great social revolutions are impossible without the feminine ferment” [MECW 43, p. 185].

55. The Union des Femmes Pour la Défense de Paris et les Soins aux Blessés, the women’s section of the First International, was organized by Elizabeth Dmitrieva at the suggestion of Marx. In the “Resolutions of the Conference of Delegates of the International Working Men’s Association” of September 21, 1871, Marx and Engels proposed “the formation of female branches among the working class” [MECW 22, p. 424].


57. This refers to Dunayevskaya’s “trilogy of revolution”—*Marxism and Freedom* (1958), *Philosophy and Revolution* (1973), and *Rosa Luxemburg, Women’s Liberation, and Marx’s Philosophy of Revolution* (1982).

58. See Marx’s 1875 *Critique of the Gotha Program* [MECW 24, pp. 87, 90].

59. A reference to Dunayevskaya’s 1953 letters, included in part I, above.

60. The theories of C. L. R. James.

61. For Dunayevskaya’s discussion of this, see her “Notes on the Smaller Logic” in chapter 5, above.