



POST-MAO CHINA: WHAT NOW?

Mao Tse-tung

THE DEATH of Mao Tse-tung, and with it, the organized mourning which confined the natural outpouring of grief at the leader's death to the specified times and places, making sure there was no interruption in production, may have created the illusion that unity prevailed in the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, in the Army, in the Peoples' Congress, not to mention "the people of all nationalities." But in fact, 1976 was indeed the year of "troubles under Heaven," by no means limited to the struggle for Mao's mantle.

It began with Chou En-lai's death in January; was followed by the campaign against Teng Hsiao-ping soon after he delivered the eulogy for Chou. Throughout February and March, there were many strikes. The Chinese also showed that they considered the attacks on Teng to be actually directed against Chou himself. An editorial in the March issue of the *People's Daily*, that was definitely under the control of the so-called "radicals," linked the first meteorite shower which hit Kirin Province to another ancient one which had been followed by an historic earthquake that had occurred 300 B.C.: "Some people made use of a meteorite to start the reactionary rumor that 'the land will be divided after death of the First Emperor.'"

Touched off by the removal of the wreaths from the grave of Chou, the masses by the hundreds of thousands poured into Tien An Men Square. So massive, militant and spontaneous a demonstration China had not seen since the Cultural Revolution, and it definitely was in opposition to the so-called "radicals" as well as the "moderates." But the two factions collaborated with the Army and crushed the demonstration, blaming Teng for "conspiring" in it. He was removed from all his posts. Hua Kuo-feng was his replacement.

It was to be Mao's last hurrah; and it tells a great deal about how threadbare was Mao's Thought, what a void there was in any Last Testament, written or unwritten. The "year of troubles under Heaven" was rushing onward as Mao's life was sinking from him.

By July, nature itself erupted: the most devastating earthquake hit China at its most industrial centers. The three main industrial casualties of the Tangshan earthquake were coal, steel and electricity, plus great damage in China's third largest city, Tientsin. For the first time ever in Mao's China, editorials reported looting.

No figures were ever given as to how many people died, but it is thought that there were as many as 100,000. Such a natural disaster, for which the Central Committee is certainly not responsible, nevertheless produced a series of slogans like: "Do not become entangled in old grudges among revolutionary

masses." "Do not engage in organized fighting teams, and still less in struggles by force." In a word, evidently the struggle for power continued unabated. The only thing all rulers agreed on was to demand that the workers "increase production."

There clearly had been quite a bit of unrest in the country, especially among the most militant of the workers. This further intensified the struggle for power at the top. This became clearer still when Mao died on Sept. 9. First, the rulers waited 16 hours before making the announcement. By then it was clear that the mourning would be confined to designated times and places. Then the funeral list which was published revealed that three important leaders were absent — the Director of the Press Agency, the Minister of Education, and most telling of all, Wan Li, the Minister of Railways. The last strikes were in the railways. What was soon to follow was not clear since all other members of the Central Committee and members of Mao's family stood "unified."

THE VERY APPEARANCE of unity of the leadership, of whatever faction, standing together on the specially-built platform in Tien An Men Square while Premier Hua Kuo-feng delivered the eulogy to the million gathered there, was, however, belied by the speech itself which, while proclaiming unity, meant it only for the masses to continue to work and work harder as Hua lashed out against "factionalism."

The unanimity of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on display was hardly to last more than a single day. And it took only a month for Hua Kuo-feng to win over the other fighting heirs. It is the speed of that victory over Chiang Ching, Mao's widow and leader of the so-called radicals, that amazed everyone and got the Western world scurrying about for explanations of this unexpected "miracle." The two opposing "last wills" that surfaced cannot substitute for an analysis of "the Thought of Mao Tse-tung" against the objective situations in the world as they developed since Mao gained state power, especially the last decade he had designated as "The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution." The light they shed is the opposite of what either heir intended.

The rapid victory of Hua Kuo-feng over the major known tendency — Chiang Ching, Wang Hung-wen, Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan — makes his version of Mao's "Will," if any such exists, the one that pours out of all mass media. It is, however, first necessary to look at what Chiang Ching claimed to be the "Will," not because that is necessarily any truer than Hua's version, but because one of these was circulated while Mao was still alive, whether or not he knew about it. Moreover, the circulation came directly after Mao's last hurrah, with his victory over Teng and choice of Hua Kuo-feng as his replacement. It was supposed to have been written in the form of a poem which, far from manifesting estrangement between Mao and Chiang, exuded warm feelings for her: "You have been wronged. Today we are separating in two worlds. May each keep his peace. These few words may be my last message to you."¹

Far from accusing Chiang of "wild ambitions," Mao had allegedly pointed a warning and a way to continue the fight:

"Human life is limited . . . In the struggle of the past ten years, I have tried to reach the peak of revolution, but I was not successful. But you could reach the top . . . If you fail, you will plunge into a fathomless abyss. Your body will shatter. Your bones will break . . . It will be necessary to wage partisan warfare once again."

The final warning was against "foreigners." Just as the collapse of Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang was due to belief in "foreigners," so she must

¹The most complete quotes in English from what Chiang Ching circulated appear in Victor Zorza's "Mao's Last Will and Testament" (*Manchester Guardian*, 11-7-76).

beware of both the U.S. and Russia — "The bird and the northern bear are equally to be distrusted."

Let us for the moment disregard that that seems to fly in the face of the fact that Mao was the one who rolled out the red carpet for Nixon (and that after ridding himself of Lin Piao who evidently opposed that move); that Mao was the one who also invited Schlesinger to China the moment Ford fired him for resisting detente with Russia; and that, in that respect at least, Hua surely carried through Mao's "Will" and now has the U.S. government's promise to sell China the Cyber computer which can easily be used for military purposes.

The will which Hua Kuo-feng refers to as "forged" refers not at all to the "Will" which was circulated back during the summer, at the very time when Teng was removed and Hua was designated as Teng's replacement. Instead, the accusation of forgery against Chiang Ching is based on the fact that she is supposed to have been "arrested while they were forging Mao's will on the transfer of political power. The group of conspirators were surrounded by security forces which, according to another reliable source, were composed of the personal bodyguards of Hua."² Another dispatch said that Chiang brought that "forged" document to the session of the Central Committee on Oct. 6, and was arrested Oct. 7 with the whole Committee voting for Hua as Chairman.

Along with these dispatches from London and New York came one from Peking by the *Le Monde* correspondent, Alain Jacob. It quoted the *People's Daily*, *Red Star*, and *Liberation Daily*, all of which published a common editorial on Oct. 25, to the effect that Mao sent a note to Hua, April 30, in his own handwriting. It read: "It's you who'll be running the show so my mind's at rest." Further, it is claimed Mao "made certain arrangements to settle this problem," that is to say, the question of the "gang of four." Moreover, it is first now reported that, as far back as 1974, Mao appealed to the "small group of four persons" not to set up a "faction." Even more seriously, Mao is supposed to have warned others that "Chiang Ching has crazy ambitions . . . She wants Wang Hung-wen to be Chairman of the People's National Congress Standing Committees, and she herself wants to be Chairman of the Party Central Committee."

WHAT IS A FACT is the disagreement on the Chou-Teng way of carrying out a Five Year Plan, and a long-range 20-year Plan to make China a global economic power. The campaign against Teng was really an attack on Chou En-lai. The Chinese masses evidently had felt all along that Chou En-lai had escaped an unnatural death by dying a natural death. Thus, the April 1976 demonstration was the first spontaneous one since the Cultural Revolution and it was in opposition to the new rulers. Chiang Ching topped that list. But Hua Kuo-feng, as top cop, differed not at all with Chiang in putting down that demonstration. The arrests were followed by the removal of Teng. All, all — Mao himself and Chiang Ching and Hua Kuo-feng — were as one when it comes to hitting out against the Chinese masses.

One provable fact about her "wild ambitions" is that Chiang sat mum at the last National People's Congress, in 1975, and while she was not removed from the Central Committee, neither she, nor her colleagues, had gotten government posts. But then it is also the Congress Mao himself had not attended. At the same time, he made himself visible — and it was not by opposing "foreigners," but the

²The *New York Times* reports (9-30-76, 10-14-76) are from Hong Kong. The *Toronto Globe and Mail* does date from Peking, but I found the most thorough official press report to be the one in the *Le Monde* section of the *Manchester Guardian* (10-31-76). See also the article by Merle Goldman (*Christian Science Monitor*, 10-21-76), and "The Coming Power Struggle" by Tiziano Terzani (*La Repubblica*, Rome), excerpted in *Atlas Report*, November 1976.

very opposite. Far from keeping equidistance from the U.S. and Russia, he was entertaining no less a reactionary than Franz Josef Strauss, and arranging for a Boeing 707 to fly to California for the purpose of bringing Nixon to China.

No doubt Chiang had been viewing herself as leadership ever since the Cultural Revolution started and Mao had chosen her to head the Arts. With Chen Po-ta and Chang, she had become overseer of the Cultural Revolution, though all had to work under the slogan: "Learn from the Army." The fact that she had no historic past, other than being the wife of Mao, could not have diminished her view of herself, since no one else was asked to have had a past for this new venture into this type of revolution, which was not a social revolution, and which both the proletariat and the peasantry were asked to keep away from. It was their duty to keep production going.

Indeed, the fourth member of that overseer group — Wang — who is played up as "worker," and whom Mao and Lin Piao had raised to Central Committee status to prove just how "proletarian" the leadership had become as a result of the Cultural Revolution, was in that Shanghai cotton mill, not as worker but as member of the police force there. He was appointed to trade-union leadership by the "radical Shanghai group," i.e., Chang, Yao and Chiang, because he was so ruthless in breaking strikes by rank-and-file workers demanding pay increases and better conditions of labor, for which he promptly dubbed them "economists." After all, Yao, the press tsar for Mao, had declared the correct treatment for every critic of Mao's Thought as "beat the wild dog to death."

Whether or not the Army thought Chiang had anything to contribute — and that is very doubtful indeed — surely Mao gave her such illusions. In any case, she thought herself so important and, like Mao, so distrustful of anyone else, that without telling either Mao or the Central Committee, she chose a Western historian, Roxanne Witke, to pour her heart out to. It was the beginning of the end for her. I believe it was so, not because the present ruling clique is using it against her and concocting a story of "betrayal of state secrets," but because Mao, judging by all he did to more worthy successors like Liu and Lin, would have resented any Ego parading him or herself as the new type of person to emerge out of China.

There is no point in waiting for the juicy story Roxanne Witke is readying for publication. The point is that the mild flurry of posters against Chiang back in 1973-74, when it became known she told her life's story to a Western historian, had not proceeded further, unless that was the reason behind her not being given a state post in 1975. What has happened since 1974, when Mao first warned Chiang against building factions? None have explained that, or what happened during the whole period between April 30 when Mao wrote Hua, choosing him as successor and warning him of Chiang's "wild ambitions," and Mao's death, Sept. 8, 1976.

THE MASS MEDIA had remained in that faction's hands. Tantalizing is the fact that just before the removal of Teng (but when the campaign against him was already in full swing), there was such total concentration against "capitalist roaders" that Mao once again (March 10, 1976) pinpointed the struggle as one within the Communist Party: "A socialist revolution is being conducted without knowing where the bourgeoisie are. They are in the Communist Party."

Now, however, foreign policy is brought into the campaign against "the gang of four": "At the international level, it was planning to jettison the principle of proletarian internationalism and capitulate to imperialism." Whether Hua Kuo-feng and his cohorts meant to include "social imperialism," meaning Russia, was not clear. But when Brezhnev tried to interpret the Chinese telegram on the anniver-

sary of the Russian Revolution as a "softening" of relations between Russia and China, Hua Kuo-feng promptly called Brezhnev "a liar."

There has always been no small amount of ambivalence on the question thrown in, most deliberately, throughout Mao's campaign of "Russia is Enemy No. 1." That was so during periods when all of the actual activity and relations seemed to favor the U.S. The fact that they want to have it both ways is pure Big Power politicking. We must instead see what flows logically from Mao's legacy. The fact that one can interpret the "Will" (no matter which Will one chooses) any way one pleases, testifies to one thing and one thing only, and it is not just a question of what the interpreter says. Rather it is the many gaping lacunae in Mao's heritage.

What is of the essence is not that he has not designated any one, singly or collectively, as the "inheritors." It is that he has stripped all — and not only those he physically eliminated — of any actual roots in the Chinese Revolution, or its philosophy. Thus, it is not only that those he had first designated as "closest comrade-in-arms" — first Liu Shao-chi as Party, then Lin Piao as Army — he then called traitors. It is that all history has been so rewritten that none exists with any historic past. Since the elimination was achieved, not via an open struggle of "two lines" that had equal access, if not to the mass media, at least to the "cadres" of the Party, or the Army, or the State, but via declaring them to be "capitalist roaders," and to have "always" been that, there is no history other than that of Mao and Mao alone.

In a word, there is no history of the Chinese masses except as an abstraction. The history of the Chinese Revolution is the history of Mao; the thought of that revolution is the Thought of Mao. None who now fight for his mantle have roots in either.

Unity, then, could hardly have meant more than a temporary road to power. As the world has known ever since the days of Stalin, when he unleashed the attack on Trotsky as "egotist" who wanted the mantle of Lenin for himself, while he, humble Stalin, saw the possibility of Lenin's work in a "collective leadership," such collectivity has ever been the path to Single Man Rule. Every revolution seems to devour its own children; the Chinese, Mao made sure, in devouring its children, left One and only One untainted.

Is Hua really the anointed one? Is Hua really that much stronger than Stalin, that he could, in one month, achieve the expulsion of the "radicals," when it took Stalin years to achieve the expulsion of Trotsky and the Left Opposition? It took Stalin another whole decade to eliminate the whole General Staff of the Russian Revolution in the Moscow Frame-Up Trials of 1936-38. Is it that Lenin had left the General Staff of the Revolution intact, while Mao had eliminated all his "closest comrades-in-arms"? And since Mao did so, not by an open clash of ideas of differences in policy, but through out-and-out calumny, hasn't Mao thus laid the political ground for the Minister of Public Security to proceed that recklessly, just because he had no ideological need to prove anything?

The point is that neither the so-called "moderates" headed by Hua, who succeeded at once to get the Army with him, nor the so-called "radicals" headed by Chiang Ching, who had none of either the charisma or the Long March experience, much less the original authorship (philosophy) of Mao Tse-tung Thought, can lay believable claim to "Maoism," its legacy, its totality — philosophy, politics and practice — stretching over nearly a half-century.

WE MUST never forget Mao's penchant for the extreme right-wing world leaders, out of, as well as in power, so long as they saw Russia as Enemy

No. 1. The meeting with Strauss was followed by the sending of a Boeing 707 to California for the sole purpose of bringing the disgraced, Watergate-soaked Richard Milhous Nixon to Peking. Judging by the praise showered on Defense Secretary Schlesinger when Ford dismissed him for opposing such close detente with Russia, it was clear that Mao would have preferred getting Schlesinger to China. And that is exactly what did happen when Mao was already on his death bed and Hua carried through with a lavish welcome to Schlesinger who, in turn, was quick to "learn" all about "people's wars" and, at the same time, speak of the need for "modern weaponry."

Since Russia still remained "Enemy No. 1," Mao did not even exclude a possible alliance with apartheid South Africa. It is true that his support for the African puppets of USA-South Africa-Zaire backfired, and he had to claim that he had cut off all relations with them. What he didn't change was the continuing fight against Russia.

Nevertheless, it is not foreign policy that dominated over the domestic policy, but vice versa, and that was not limited to the years, 1975-76, but was the motivating force for Mao's original philosophy. What, however, is decisive is the actual class struggles between capital and labor, as against those Mao chose to designate as "capitalist roaders." And, what disturbed Mao most about the National People's Congress he didn't attend was the fact that there had been strikes throughout the country, that labor unrest also permeated the countryside, and that the new Constitution had granted them the right to strike as well as some "small plots of land for personal needs" and some private livestock.

Instead of attending the Congress, Mao unloosed a "theoretical" debate on the need to strengthen the "dictatorship of the proletariat." "Economicism" was the designation Mao directed against the workers who demanded better conditions of labor and a raise in their miserly wages. In its place, he demanded "revolutionary energy" which would release untold hours of unpaid labor rather than "give in" to "material incentives." Despite the sameness of clothing between the rulers and the ruled, there are many sufficient inequalities, all tipped against the masses.³ It is not that the rest of the leadership, Teng especially, were not as sharply directed for more and more production. It is that Mao felt he could get it via "rectification" and "politics," "Mao's Thought" in command.

WHAT, THEN, is Mao's legacy? Is it what it appeared to be when he first gained undisputed leadership in the Chinese Communist Party after the Long March and when he first gave his own version of what contradiction is in 1937? Is it what it became in the Cultural Revolution — a fight against his co-leaders of the Long March? Or is it what it was in the last year of his life, after all the original founders of Maoism had been eliminated and he had to reach down to the top cop in the land, Hua Kuo-feng?

Maoism — historically, philosophically, globally — reached its apogee during the Cultural Revolution. Friend and foe alike agree that that is the greatest legacy of Mao Tse-tung Thought. It by no means signifies that it is what its interpreters say it is, whether they be "moderates," or "radicals," or "objective" scholars. It is an historic fact that the legacy does include both the conquest of power and the "continuous revolutions" that are supposed to follow. It is this which became the challenge to the previously-existing world revolutionary center

³For the latest study, see "Inequality and Stratification in China," by Martin King Whyte in *The China Quarterly*, #64 (London, Dec. 1975), pp. 684-711. Besides tracing inequality as best possible when sources are deliberately so meager, the author also points to just how difficult it is to trace the phenomenon of the new class since "the children of a commune Party secretary who rose from poor peasant status at the time of land reform can still claim poor peasant origins."

— Lenin's Russia, not Stalin's, that is to say, the proletarian revolution of 1917, not Stalin's "bloc of four classes." Thereby it also claimed originality, i.e., to be "spokesman" for the Third World.

The most compressed expression of what was new, as Mao saw it, occurred during the Cultural Revolution. It had three central points: (1) Mao's concept of the philosophy of **On Contradiction**; (2) Mao's concept of rectification; and (3) the role of the Army.

Once Mao had gained undisputed leadership in 1935, and in 1937 developed his contribution philosophically — **On Contradiction** — which to this day remains his main "original" contribution, he insisted that it was not true that the economic contradiction between capital and labor was the decisive break, the motive force of revolution. That was the "main aspect" of the contradiction, but, Mao maintained, the "secondary" contradiction, politics, can become the decisive factor. And since primary and secondary contradictions "can" thus change places, politics becomes primary.

What was "just" theory in 1937, permitting Mao nevertheless the practical politics of saving Chiang Kai-shek from the wrath of his troops who had him arrested (once Chiang consented to a united front with Mao) became, in 1957, **On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People**. Or, how, at one and the same time, China could be insulated from a revolt similar to that of the Hungarian Revolution, and: "To increase production, greater, faster, better and more economical must be stressed." Let us never forget the way the word "revisionism" arose in our epoch. It was against the Hungarian revolutionaries who had opposed Russian Communist totalitarianism. It was when Mao and Krushchev acted together to put down that revolt.

Recently, critical documents called **Wan-sui**⁴ that appeared in China in 1967 and 1969 have become available, and give a still different view both of the relations to Stalin's Russia and to the whole question of the primacy of superstructure. It is for this reason that what is most relevant is to also look at superstructure with the eyes of the Cultural Revolution on the question of Mao's relation to Stalin. Much ado was made of his criticism of Stalin in 1959. As against those who cite that to prove Mao's originality, the fact is that Mao followed Stalin's revisions of Marxism on the law of value, disagreeing with him only on Stalin's not giving primacy to the superstructure.

MAO BEGAN his critique of Stalin's last work, **Economic Problems of Socialism in the Soviet Union**, by pointing to this "error": "This book has not a word on superstructure from beginning to end." Otherwise, Mao not only accepted Stalin's revision of Marx's analysis of the law of value as the motive force of capitalism, insisting that it did indeed work both in Russia and in China, though each is a "socialist land," but also insisted that commodity production will continue to operate, and insisted also that to talk of "the abolition of commodity and commodity production and the announcement of ownership by all the people would deprive peasants of their production."

Like Stalin, Mao denied that labor is exploited, and like Stalin's purges, Mao's "rectifications" were said to make the difference in labor's role: "At present in our system, to say that labor is a commodity and the workers are 'hired' is

⁴Mao Tse-tung Ssu-hsiang Wan-sui (Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought), totalling 996 pages, appeared in China in two volumes in 1967 and 1969. It was published in English under the title *Miscellany of Mao Tse-tung Thought (1949-1968)*, Part I, February 20, 1974, and distributed by NTIS, U.S. Department of Commerce, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22151. Modified translations and excerpts appear also in *The World and China, 1922-1972*, by John Gittings, published in Great Britain; and *Chairman Mao Talks to the People: Talks and Letters, 1956-1971*, edited by Stuart Schram and published by Pantheon, New York.

absolute nonsense. After rectification and the anti-Rightist campaigns, labor is no longer a commodity."

Mao's critique of Stalin's underestimation of the peasantry did not refer to economics, but politics: "All these belong to superstructure, to the ideological. Stalin only talked of economics, not politics . . . Some attribute the saying ('all for one, one for all') to Marx, but we do not need to spread it even if Marx did." Moreover (not waiting till 1971 when Lin Piao accused him of being today's Emperor Ch'in), Mao launched into praise of Ch'in Shih-huang (259-210 B.C.), who had been "wrongly branded as an evil man."

What Mao forgot then (1959), and in 1971, and especially in 1976, was that it was precisely that ancient period of unification of the nation and book burning and most brutal oppression of the peasantry that did indeed produce the first great peasant revolt in recorded history.

In the 1959 criticism of Stalin, Mao did not limit it to contradiction but correctly cited its pivotal point to be "negation of negation":

"Things will invariably head toward their opposites. The dialectics of Greece, the metaphysics of the Middle Ages, and the Renaissance . . . It was a negation of negation. China was also like this. The contention of one hundred schools of thought in the period of Warring States was dialectics and the classical learning of feudal times was metaphysics. Now we have returned to talking about dialectics . . . Lenin's dialectics, Stalin's metaphysics, and present-day dialectics. All this is also a negation of negation."

Contrast this 1959 article, "Examples of Dialectics," to the most popular one during the Cultural Revolution, where Mao said quite the opposite in "Talk on Problems of Philosophy." There, Mao took a 180-degree turn-about, decreeing that "there is basically no negation of the negation":

"Engels spoke about the three categories, but I don't believe two of them . . . there is basically no negation of negation . . . there is no such thing as the negation of negation . . . When we speak about the destruction of mankind, we are saying that something more advanced than mankind will be produced."⁵

It was not, however, so much the ending of "continuous revolutions" as directing it all against Russia.

No need now to rehash those three years, 1966-69, which made Mao elevate Lin Piao to "closest comrade-in-arms and successor" to himself, and insert that command directly into the Party Constitution. Mao was too well versed in intra-party leadership squabbles and fights for power and "wearing the Master's mantle," not only in China but in Russia — and there are too many parallels with what happened when Stalin died and this was followed, first by the Beria purge, and then the ouster of Malenkov, and finally Khrushchev's de-Stalinization — to have any illusions on the score of Hua Kuo-feng's ability to withstand the challenges, especially from the masses in the countryside.

In choosing Hua at the end of life, it did not necessarily mean that Hua

⁵The extent to which Mao's "dialectics" have obfuscated thought also in "the West" amidst the Sinologists is nowhere more evident than in the latest work on just these Wan-sui documents by one of the top scholars, Stuart Schram, who sees "Olympian detachment in which he (Mao) looks forward not only to the ultimate supersession of communism itself by a higher social form, but to the extinction of the human race, and to the advent of creatures evolved from horses, cows, sheep or insects. 'When theologians talk about doomsday,' he declared, 'they are pessimistic and terrify people. We say the end of mankind is something that will produce something more advanced than mankind.'" Chairman Mao Talks to the People, Stuart Schram, ed., pp. 26-27. In contrast to current scholars is Chinese Civilization and Bureaucracy (Yale University Press, 1964), the most profound study, by Etienne Balazs, which illuminates the present situation and especially so on Thought and History.

became the anointed one. What never left Mao, however — and that was the Great Delusion — was that all was well once what prevailed was "Mao Tse-tung Thought." Production is not, however, a matter of "Thought" or "superstructure," with the primary and secondary "aspects" of the contradictions changing places on command with "rectification" being the judge.

AFTER ALL is said and done, what sent Mao into another spin was not the "subjective" situation, but the very real objective world developments during the period since he had initiated his own detente with U.S. imperialism. U.S. imperialism had its own reasons for not giving up detente with Russia, when it was not China, but Russia, that had been scoring "victories." It was the possibility of a global realignment that once again led to Mao's revisionist philosophical concept of the primacy of superstructure, this time applying it not only within China, but in the straight capitalistic world, now dubbed the "Second World."

Thus, after China's entry into the UN, with Teng as spokesman (and Mao's Thought dominant), China espoused a new division of the world, designating Western European and Japanese capitalism as "Second World," with which "socialism" could collaborate. NATO seemed to listen — until an actual Portuguese revolution occurred and threatened totally to undermine NATO. Thereupon NATO found and preferred the Second International helping the Portuguese Socialist Party to keep Portugal in line with "the West."

As for the Communist Parties in each country, both the Italian Communist Party and the French, who certainly are departing from the Russian monolith, do so not in order to go with China, but because they themselves, nationalistically, strive for class collaborationism, "sharing power." A state-capitalist world, Balkanized, is in no way ready to move China up to the center of the world.

Thus, in Africa, where Mao's China certainly seemed to make great headway, both with the Tan-Zam railway and concepts of guerrilla warfare, the Angolan revolution was helped so substantially by Russia and Cuba, that Mao could not hope to recapture the momentum of being considered the "most revolutionary," much less of greatest assistance to national revolutionary movements. Indeed, the attempts to work with one of the puppets, even where that was helped by apartheid South Africa, boomeranged; Mao had (so he claimed) withdrawn all aid there.

Thus, what good was it for him to show the Chinese leadership that he, Mao, had been right all along, not to go all out for North Vietnam, when now, right on the doorstep of China, the whole of Vietnam was with Russia. Russia was everywhere "surrounding China," in Southeast Asia, in West Europe, on the southern flank of NATO, in Africa. And in the Arab Middle East, where Mao had always played up that, whereas Russia had recognized Israel, China never had (never mind that Mao's China did not exist then!), China this time had to tell the PLO in the UN Security Council that Russia was "even worse" than Israel!

All these objective events internationally came at the very time when inside the land, the Chou-Teng new Constitution, though constantly "quoting" Mao Tse-tung Thought, had announced the right to strike, the right to small plots of land. And small as they might have been, it was certainly "revisionism" to rely on "material incentives" and to sharpen the division between worker and intellectual, as could be evidenced by having that "capitalist roader," Nieh Jung-chen, heading Science and Technology.

Actually, Mao's last hurrah was itself weak-voiced. He had not unfolded a new banner, or "unified" the classes; and the slogan, "Dig trenches deep," came to the U.S. via the disgraced has-been Nixon. The crisis is world-wide, not just

in Russia, or in China. The whole world is in deep recession with endless nuclear build-up to end civilization. And whom could Mao inspire with Maoisms such as "the end of mankind is something that will produce something more advanced than mankind"?

IT IS PRECISELY the totality of the crisis of the existing world, state-capitalist calling itself Communist as well as private capitalist calling itself welfare, that has produced not only recessions but revolts. The disgust along with the misery will not be done away with by "the West" or "the East" daring to think the unthinkable as "possible" by adding the little adjective, "limited," to nuclear warfare, as if that did not signify the end of civilization as we have known it!

Mao, too, could not "negate" the truth — the masses are not just poor, they are rebellious. He could not forget that calling those rebellious masses "ultra-lefts" and having Lin Piao put them down had not extinguished such manifestos as *Whither China?* by the Sheng Wu-lien.⁶ All it did was drive them underground. The fact that Hua has survived both the "ultra-left" and the "radicals" in no way assures him long life. It only heightens the contradictions within China as its foreign policy has but one principle — Russia is Enemy No. 1 — thus allowing China to play with U.S. imperialism.

After the publication of *Philosophy and Revolution*, those who criticized my analysis of "The Thought of Mao Tse-tung" wrote:

"The Chinese Revolution was not only the greatest revolution to emerge out of World War II, and not only stopped the U.S. in its tracks in Korea; but so much does Mao move from revolution to revolution to revolution that he also initiated the struggle against his own co-leaders and his own Party and his own Army.

"Although these revolutionaries had been with him during the Long March which paved the way for that most original and most massive of revolutions, Mao thinks only of the people, and not in past but present terms. His thought is greater even than Marx and Lenin (and this in a tiny whisper, for my critics don't really wish to be heard on this) and Stalin, because it is our age, it is today, it is the future. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution pointed the way for the world."

For the sake of argument, and that only, let's shut out of our minds the global struggle that is not at all limited to U.S.-Russia, but includes that crucial most massive power on earth — 800 million Chinese. Let's also delude ourselves that that massive power, being part of the Third World that is the real focal point of revolution, can obviate the truth that Mao himself is the head of an existing state power that exploits its own masses, as do all rulers. Let's even be willing, for a moment, to blind ourselves to all reality, and listen, listen, listen only to Mao's Thought, that the Cultural Revolution would put an end, once and for all, to all division between mental and manual labor. Let's take all Mao's undisciplined verbiage for the only, the total truth.

What is that Thought, that philosophy of pure, unadulterated and continuous "great proletarian cultural revolutions"? It is, first, what it had been from the moment Mao started his most original path to military power by taking the peasant army he led on a different path than the proletarian revolution Chiang Kai-shek had just destroyed, after which Chiang continued his endless extermination campaigns against Mao's army. Philosophically, it had blossomed as *On Contradiction*.

⁶The Sheng Wu-lien documents have been printed in *Peking and the New Left: At Home and Abroad*, by Klaus Mehnert, Center for Chinese Studies, Berkeley, Cal., 1968. The most important of these Sheng Wu-lien documents, *Whither China?*, which singles out Hua Kuo-feng as a chief capitalist roader, is reproduced in *Philosophy and Revolution*, p. 278.

Suppose we were willing to forget that, strictly philosophically, it is a vitiation both of Marxian class struggle and Hegelian objectivity of knowledge which emerges through contradiction. Suppose further, we allow Mao to convince us that Japan's invasion of China made it correct to reunite with Chiang Kai-shek (after all, nothing succeeds like success and Mao did win power in 1949). Have we not the right to ask: how does it happen that a decade after the 1949 conquest of power the 1937 *On Contradiction* and the 1957 *How To Handle Contradictions Among the People* are directed, not against a class enemy, but against the very masses who made the revolution?

One other original Mao concept — the "Second World" — is distinctly of the 1970s. This departure from Marxism is spoken of as if it were the needed bringing-up-to-date of Marxism itself, a la Mao's Thought. This Mao Thought of the 1970s was developed after the Cultural Revolution, after Russia had already been declared Enemy No. 1,⁷ after not only the removal of Liu (the Party man), but Lin (the Army man), and this though Lin had been the one who had initiated, carried through, and brought to a climax the Cultural Revolution, for which he was judged to be the "closest comradé-in-arms" of Mao, and named, within the Constitution itself, as the successor to Mao. It was a period when Mao, and Mao alone, had absolute, undisputed, total power.

And what was the apex of the originality which came after all that travail and "continuous revolutions"? It was the concept of the "Second World."

THE RHETORIC notwithstanding, Mao's concept of the Second World vitiates proletarian internationalism, replacing it with the narrowest nationalist "anti-imperialism" with global reach, even as *On Contradiction* vitiated the class struggle and subordinated it to political superstructure. In both historic periods — 1937-49 and 1966-76 — philosophy was transformed from theoretic preparation for social revolution into military strategy and tactics of reaching power.

For all factions now involved in the power struggle for Mao's mantle, including "radicals," Russia is Enemy No. 1. But it isn't just "preparedness" as something that concerns a war; it is military prowess that has always been the predominant concept. After all, hadn't the whole "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" begun — and ended — under the motto, "Learn From the Army"? It is no accident that the "anointed one," Hua, was the Minister of Public Security, and that he knew that to win the kind of battle Chiang Ching was conducting, he needed the Army on his side. Along with the wall posters mounted against the "anti-party plotters," in which Chiang Ching is singled out as "maggot," came a Hsinhua dispatch, saying that Army, Navy and Air Force units Mao had once inspected all vowed to "rally most closely round the party's Central Committee headed by Comrade Hua Kuo-feng and obey the orders of the party's Central Committee in all actions."

The dispatch continued: "Any action undermining unity is a crime . . . We must wage resolute struggles against those who practice revisionism and factionalism and engage in intrigues and conspiracies."

This isn't all there is to the legacy of Mao, but from the very first start of Mao's now legendary Hunan Report, followed by his 1934 Long March to escape the many extermination campaigns of Chiang Kai-shek; through *On Contradiction* and *On Practice*, followed by the rectification campaigns which had led not only

⁷This does not exclude the possibility that there may very well be, among the ruling elite, those who, despite a strong opposition to Russia, would rather not have Russia the enemy tower over U.S. imperialism, preferring equidistance from both. As of this moment, however, Hua surely prefers Schlesinger who returned from his trip to China and reported interest in getting U.S. military hardware for China to bring it up to "competitive strength" with Russia.

to collaboration with Chiang, but also Mao's 1942 rejection of Stalin's proposals to direct his army to the Russian front;⁸ to the concept of the Second World, the military has been the determining factor. Even among Communist countries, China was the only one that had raised the Army, along with the Party, as two focal points of the State.

As a theoretician of guerrilla warfare, as philosopher of contradictions who held that no theory existed outside of practice, Mao somehow spoke of war as if it were a synonym for revolution, though clearly the practice he was talking about was not, was not, the practice of proletarian revolution. What Trotsky wrote of Stalin's theories — "the empiricism of a machine gun" — is even more applicable to Mao.

That empiricism, moreover, is by no means limited to the question of Mao's most famous saying, "Power comes out of the barrel of a gun," which, after all, was also flanked by a "but" — "but politics commands the gun." No, the fatal aspect of empiricism, for revolutionaries, is the separateness of philosophy and revolution, the separability of production, where workers do all the work and "Mao Tse-tung Thought" sets the speed of the line which is ordered to equal "20 years in one day."

Ironic as it may seem, it is no accident whatever that about the only one left from the Long March, Li Hsien-nien — to whom Hua has given one of his hats, that of Premier — is the one who had retorted to the so-called "ultra-left" like Sheng Wu-lien during the Cultural Revolution: "Is earning money a crime? . . . To think that only profit counts is wrong, but to ignore profit completely is also wrong. If one does not make a reasonable profit, one has made a mistake."

Which doesn't mean that the workers will get "profits." But while production for production's sake develops, there will be some let-up in the attack on "material incentives." Like the capitalists' early discovery that piece-work is the best way of exploitation, the new rulers will be "discovering" how to raise productivity by a division of the working class, between skilled and unskilled, under whatever name the ancient "divide and rule" will now be practiced.

THE FACT that Hua Kuo-feng is presently the definitive winner in the struggle for Mao's mantle does not put a "finis" to that power struggle, either internally or in China's external relations. Whatever the consequences of Mao's Cultural Revolution's legacy that Russia is "Enemy No. 1," countering Russia's detente with U.S. imperialism with China's own detente with U.S. globalism reaching into Africa, specifically Angola, rewinding itself via Portugal to Western Europe, the fact is that the Chinese people have not yet had their final say.

Let us not forget that at a time when none outside China paid any attention to him who now rules China — Hua Kuo-feng — the Chinese Left⁹ not only warned against the "Red" capitalist class "in general," but singled out Hua in particular as among those who were behaving as if the Cultural Revolution were no more than a matter of "dismissing officials, or a movement of dragging out people, or a purely cultural revolution," rather than "a revolution in which one class overthrows another." Finally, quoting Lenin — "without a revolutionary theory, there is no revolutionary movement" — Sheng Wu-lien's document held that: "Contemporary China is the focus of world contradictions, and the center of the storm

⁸A Canadian reporter, Mark Gayn, who had been in Yenan, has written that 1942, the year of the first rectification campaign, was the period when Stalin wanted Mao to attack Japan from a direction which would stop any possible attack on Russia. Mao refused, wanting to husband all his forces for the final victory in China (Toronto Star, 9-1-76).

⁹See Sheng Wu-lien's document, *Whither China?*, quoted in Chapter 5 of *Philosophy and Revolution*.

of world revolution."

Post-Mao China further illuminates how right the Sheng Wu-lien was during the Cultural Revolution, assuring the world that Chinese history will not forever remain the history of Mao, constantly rewritten at that, nor just "The Thought of Mao," including "Rectification," the remoulding of thought, and not just of Mao's China, Mao's Party, Mao's Army, but of Marxism itself through the establishment of the "primacy of the superstructure."

The fact that this flies in the face of the Marxism of Marx may not have stopped Mao, but it surely brought about a great deal of questioning by the Chinese masses, and most specifically Sheng Wu-lien's questioning of the choice of Hua Kuo-feng. What became clear was that it was not from revolution to revolution to revolution that Mao travelled, but from superstructure to superstructure to superstructure, that is to say, the reduction of Marx's theory of proletarian revolution to nothingness. Instead, there is the capitulation to the objective pull of state-capitalism as the "next" stage of human development, with the quintessential difference, from Russia's acceptance of that state, that it be China, not Russia, that will "head" that next stage.

The Chinese masses have not yet had their last say. They are sure not to accept the latest (Oct. 17, 1976) nuclear test as the proof of "practicing Marxism," as the present Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party has interpreted it:

"The success of the test was a new victory won by the Chinese workers, People's Liberation Army commanders and fighters, scientists and technicians and revolutionary cadres engaging in the research, manufacture and tests of nuclear weapons who, tremendously inspired by two important decisions . . . are rallying most closely around the Party Central Committee headed by Comrade Hua Kuo-feng, carrying out Chairman Mao's behests, conscientiously . . . preserving the three basic principles: 'Practice Marxism, and not revisionism; unite, and don't split; be open and above-board, and don't intrigue and conspire' . . ."¹⁰

When the Sheng Wu-lien pointed to China as "the focus of world contradictions, and the center of the storm of world revolution," they were manifesting the untapped energies of revolution and Reason inherent in the Chinese masses in opposition to all the world's statist rulers, aiming, instead, to create a society on totally new, truly Humanist foundations.

¹⁰Peking Review, Oct. 22, 1976.

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