APPENDIX A

PRIVATE PROPERTY AND COMMUNISM

Ad. pag. XXXIX. But the opposition between the lack of property and property is still an undifferentiated opposition, an opposition that is not yet in an active relation to its own inner situation. So long as it is not conceived as the opposition between labor and capital, it is not yet a contradiction. In its first form it can express itself where the developed movement of private property is absent (for example, in ancient Rome, in Turkey, etc.). In this form it does not yet appear as the result of private property itself. However, labor, the subjective essence of private property as the moment excluding property, and capital, objective labor as the moment excluding labor—this is private property that has developed to the point of contradiction and, therefore, is the active form driving toward resolution.

(Ad. ibid.) The abolition of self-alienation follows the same course as self-alienation itself. At first, private property is regarded only from its objective aspect—but with labor as its essence. Therefore, the form of its being appears to be capital, "which is to be annihilated as such" (Proudhon). Or a specific form of labor—for example, levelled down, fragmented and, therefore, unfree labor—is regarded as the source of all the pernicious characteristics of private property and of its alienation from human existence. Like the Physiocrats, Fourier also regarded agricultural labor as at least the best form of labor, while St. Simon, on the other hand, considered industrial labor, as such, as the essence of wealth, and desired the exclusive rule by the industrialists, and the improvement of the conditions of labor. Finally, communism is the positive expression of transcended private property, appearing, to begin with, as universal private property. Regarding private property in its universality, communism appears in its form only as its generalization and completion. As such, it has a two-fold form: on the one hand, it overestimates the role and domination of material property to such a degree that it wishes to abolish everything which cannot be possessed by everybody as private property; it wishes by force to eliminate all talents, etc. In its eyes, the sole purpose of life appears to be direct and physical possession. The form of activity of the worker is not here abolished, but merely extended to all men.

The relation of private property remains the relation of the community to the world of things. Finally, this movement of counterposing universal private property to private property is expressed in the animal form that marriage (which, of course, is a form of exclusive private property) is counterposed to having women in common. Hence the woman becomes communal and common property. We might say that this idea of communal women expresses the secret of this quite vulgar and unthinking communism. In the same way that the woman is to abandon marriage for the prostitute, so the whole world of wealth, that is, the material essence of man, goes from the relation of exclusive marriage with the private property owner for the relation of universal prostitution with the community. Prostitutes is only the particular expression of the universal prostitution of the worker and since prostitution takes in not only the prostitute but the procurer (the lowest of all) so the capitalist, etc., falls into this category. Since it completely negates the person of man, this type of communism is only the logical expression of private property, which is just this negation. Universal envy, constituted as power, is only the secret guise in which greed asserts itself and is to be satisfied. The thought of every property owner, such as, is directed—at least against the wealthier one—as envy and a desire to reduce all to a common level, constituting even the essence of competition. The vulgar communist is only the consummation of this envy and this craving to level down, establishing a certain common denominator. He has a definitely limited standard. How little this type of abolition of property is an actual appropriation and enrichment is proved precisely by its abstract negation of the entire cultivated and civilized world: it is only a retrogression to the unnatural simplicity of a poor and needy man,
who not only has not gone beyond the limits of private property, but has not even attained its level.

According to this theory, the community is only a community of labor and the equality of wages which the communal capital, or the community as the universal capitalist, pays out. Both sides of the relationship between capital and labor are elevated into a sham universality; labor as the lot of each member of the community; capital as the real universality and power of the community.

The infinite degradation in which man exists for himself is expressed in this relation to the woman as the spoils and handmaid of communal lust. For the secret of the relationship of man to man finds its unambiguous, definitive, open, obvious expression in the relationship of man to woman, and, in this way, the direct, natural relationship between the sexes. The direct, natural, necessary relationship of man to man is the relationship of man to woman. In this natural relationship of the sexes, the relationship of man to nature is immediately his relationship to man, just as the relationship of man to man is his relationship to nature, his own natural determination. Consequently, in this relation, there is sensuously, in an obviously actual way, disclosed to what extent the human essence of man has become that of nature, or, to what extent nature has become the human essence of man. Therefore, on the basis of this relation we can judge the whole stage of the development of man. From the character of this relation it follows to what degree man, as a species, has become human, and has recognized himself as such. The relationship of man to woman is the most natural relationship of man to man. Consequently, in it is revealed to what degree the natural behavior of man has become human, or to what degree human essence has become his natural essence, to what degree his human nature has become his nature. To what degree the needs of man have become human needs is also seen in this relationship, i.e., to what degree another human being is needed as a human being; to what degree he, in his most individual existence, has at the same time become part of the community. Thus the first positive transcendence of private property, vulgar communism, is only a form of appearance of the

baseness of private property, which seeks to assert itself as the positive social essence.

2) Communism: a) in its political nature, democratic or despotic; b) transcending the state, but representing an uncompleted structure which still preserves private property, i.e., the alienation of man. In both these forms communism already appears as the reintegration, or return of man to himself, as transcendence of human self-alienation. But insofar as it has not yet grasped the positive essence of private property and to the same degree has little understood the human nature of needs, communism still remains under the influence of private property. It has, to be sure, caught hold of the concept of private property, but has not yet grasped its essence.

3) Communism, as the positive abolition of private property, which is human self-alienation, and, therefore, as the actual appropriation of human essence by man and for man, is the return of man to himself as social, i.e., human man, complete, conscious and matured within by the entire wealth of developments to date. Just as completed humanism is naturalism, so this communism, as completed naturalism, is humanism. It is the true solution of the strife between man and nature, and between man and man. It is the true solution of the conflict between existence and essence, between reification and self-affirmation, between freedom and necessity, between individual and species. It is the solution of the riddle of history and it knows itself as this solution.

The whole movement of history is, therefore, on the one hand, its actual act of creation—the act by which its empirical being was born; on the other hand, for its thinking consciousness, it is the realized and recognized process of development. The former, still incomplete communism, evolving out of the historical cultures opposing-private property, seeks a historical justification by seizing upon the particular moments in the process of development (Cabet, Villegar, etc., especially ride this horse) and pointing to these as proof of its historical maturity. Thereby incomplete communism only demonstrates that the disproportionately greater part of the historical movement contradicts its assertions and that if it had once existed, the very fact that it is past refutes its pretensions of being essential.
It is not difficult to see the necessity of this, that in the movement of private property, there is to be found both the empirical and theoretical base not alone of political economy, but of the whole revolutionary movement.

Material, directly sensuous private property is the material, sensuous expression of alienated human living. Its movement, production and consumption, is the sensuous manifestation of the movement of all production up to now, i.e., the realization, or the actuality, of man. Religion, the family, the state, law, morals, science, art, etc., are only particular forms of production, and subordinated to its universal law. The positive transcendence of private property—of this element of human actuality—like the appropriation of human living, is, therefore, the positive abolition of every kind of alienation, i.e., the return of man from religion, the family, the state, etc., to his human, i.e., social existence. Religious alienation, as such, takes place only in the sphere of consciousness, the inner sphere of man, but economic alienation is that of actual life. It is self-evident that the question as to when the movement of different nations first made its appearance depends on how the real recognized life of the people occurs, whether more in consciousness or in the external world; whether it is more ideal or actual. Communism begins at first (Owen) with atheism, but atheism in its first stages is far from being communism as atheism in general is an abstraction. Therefore the philanthropy of atheism is at first only a philosophically abstract philanthropy while the philanthropy of communism is, from the very beginning, really and immediately directed toward action.

We have seen how, by presupposing the positive abolition of private property, man produces man, himself and other men; how the object, which is the immediate assertion of his individuality, is at the same time his own existence for other men, for their existence, and their existence for him. In the same way, both the material of labor and man as subject are equally the result and the starting point of the movement. (And it is precisely the historical necessity of private property that it must be this point of departure.) The social character of the whole movement means its universal character. Just as society itself produces man as man, so it is produced by him. The activity of labor and of spirit, both

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in content and in origin, is social activity and social spirit. The human essence of nature exists only for social man; only in the society of nature is there the link with man, his being for another, and the other for him, only in the society of nature is there the basis of his human existence. Only in society is his natural existence his human existence, and nature become human for him. Thus society is the complete, essential unity of man with nature, the true resurrection of nature, the achieved naturalism of man, and the achieved humanism of nature.

Social activity and social spirit by no means exist merely in the form of direct community activity and direct-community spirit, although community activity and spirit, i.e., activity and spirit which are expressed and asserted directly in actual society with other men, are to be found wherever such a direct expression of sociality is based in the essential content of the activity and correspond to its nature.

However, whenever I am active scientifically, etc., engaged in activity which I myself can pursue alone, without any direct association with others, I act socially nevertheless because I am active as a man. Not only the material of my activity is given to me as a social product—as is the case even with language in which the thinker is active—but my own existence is social activity inasmuch as what I make for myself I make also for society and with the consciousness of myself as a social being.

My universal consciousness is only the theoretical form of the living form, which is the real communal, social existence inasmuch as nowadays universal consciousness is an abstraction from real life and, as such, is hostile to it. Hence also the activity of my universal consciousness, as such, is my theoretical existence as a social being.

We should especially avoid re-establishing society, as an abstraction, opposed to the individual. The individual is the social entity. Therefore his expression of life (although it may not appear in the direct form of a communal-type life carried out simultaneously with others) is an expression and assertion of social living. The individual and the species-life of man are not distinct from one another. Thus, also and of necessity, the mode of existence of an individual life is a more particular or more
universal manner of existence of the species-life, or the species-life is a more particular or universal individual life.

As species-conscious, man asserts his real social life and only recapitulates in thought his actual existence, even as conversely the existence of the species affirms itself in the consciousness of the species, and exists, in its universality, as a thinking being, for itself.

Therefore, although man is a particular individual—and precisely his specificity makes him an individual and an actual, individual communal being—he is the totality, the ideal totality, the subjective existence of society, thought out and experienced for itself. Likewise, he exists in actuality, both in perception and in the actual spirit of social existence, as a totality of the human expression of life.

Thus, although thinking and being are distinguishable from one another, they are, at the same time, in unity with one another.

Death appears as a harsh victory of the species over the individual and as a contradiction of this unity. But the determinate individual is only a determinate species-being and, as such, mortal.

4) Private property is only the sensuous expression of the fact that man at one and the same time becomes objective for himself, becomes an alien and inhuman object. In expressing his life, he alienates his life. His realization is a separation from reality, an alien reality. Hence, the positive transcendence of private property, i.e., the sensuous appropriation of human essence and living, of material things created by and for man is to be conceived not only in the sense of direct, one-sided enjoyment, nor only in the sense of possession, a sense of having. Man appropriates himself as an all-sided essence in an all-sided way; hence, as a whole man. Each of his human relations to the world—seeing, hearing, smell, taste, feeling, thought, perception, experience, wishing, activity, loving—in short, all organs of his individuality, like the organs which exist directly in the form of communal organs, are in their objective relation or in their relation to the object, the appropriation of it. The appropriation of human actuality, its relation to the object, is the affirmation of human actuality. Therefore it is as all-sided as are the essence of man and

the forms of his activity. Human activity and human suffering, regarded in a human way—this is self-enjoyment to man.

Private property has made us so stupid and one-sided that any kind of object is ours only when we have it, i.e., when it exists for us as capital, or when we possess it directly—eat it, drink it, wear it, live in it, etc.—in short, use it. But, from the point of view of private property, all these direct forms of possession, in their turn, exist only as means to life; and the life to which these serve as means is the life of private property—labor and capitalization.

Therefore, in place of all the physical and spiritual senses, there is the sense of possession, which is the simple alienation of all these senses. To such absolute poverty has human essence had to be reduced in order to give birth to its inner wealth! (Regarding the category of possession; see Hess, 21 Bogen).

The transcendence of private property is, therefore, the total freeing of all the human senses and attributes. However, it is this emancipation precisely because these senses and attributes have become human, both subjectively and objectively. The eye has become a human eye when its object is a social human object, created by man for man. Thus the senses, in their immediate practice, have become theoretical. They are related to the thing for the sake of the thing, but the thing itself is an objective human relation to itself, and to man, and vice versa. Therefore, to the extent that utility has become human utility, need or enjoyment have lost their egoistic nature in nature, have lost their bare utility.

In the same way the senses and spirit of other men have become my own appropriation. Therefore, besides these direct organs, social organs are developed in the form of society; thus, for example, activity directly in association with others, etc., becomes an organ of the manifestation of life and a method for appropriating human life.

It is self-evident that the human eye sees differently from that of the crude, non-human eye, that the human ear hears differently from that of the crude ear, etc.

We have seen that man is not lost in his object only if the latter becomes his as a human object or as objective man. This is only possible insofar as it becomes a social object for him, and
he himself becomes a social being even as society exists for him in this object.

On the one hand, therefore, inasmuch as objective actuality becomes everywhere for man in society the actuality of human essential capacities, human actuality, and thus the actuality of his own essential capacities, all objects become for him the objectification of himself, objects affirming and realizing his individuality, his objects, i.e., the objects of himself. How they become his objects depends on the nature of the object, and the nature of the essential capacity corresponding to it. For just the determinate character of this relationship constitutes the specific actual manner of affirmation. For the eye an object has a different form than for the ear, and the object for the eye is different from that for the ear. The uniqueness of every sense is precisely its own essence. Likewise, the unique form of its objectification, its objective, active living being. Therefore, not only in thought, but with all his senses, man is thus affirmed in the objective world.

Let us express this differently, from the subjective point of view: just as music evokes the musical sensitivity of man, while for the unmusical ear the most beautiful music makes no sense, is not an object, because my object can only be the assertion of my own essential capacities; so an object has sense for me (only has sense for a corresponding sensitivity) only insofar as it is my essential capacity because the sense of an object for me goes just as far as my sensitivity goes. Therefore the sensibilities of the social man are other than those of the unsocial. Only thanks to the objectively unfolded wealth of human nature, does the wealth of subjective human sensitivity develop: a musical ear, eyes for the beauty of form, in short, for the first time there will develop senses which are capable of human appreciation, which will assert themselves as human essential senses. Not only the five senses but also the so-called spiritual senses, the practical senses (will, love, etc.), in a word, human sensitivity, the humanity of the senses will be achieved only thanks to the existence of their object, because of their humanized nature. The cultivation of the five senses is the work of the whole history of the world to date. Sensitivity, preoccupied with crude practical necessity, is only limited sensitivity. For the starved man the human form of food does not exist, it exists only in the abstract form of nourishment. It would be just as good placed before him in its crudest form, and it is impossible to say what distinguishes the human activity of nourishment from the animal activity of nourishment. The anxiety-ridden, needy man is incapable of appreciating the most beautiful drama. The tradesman in minerals sees only their monetary value, not the beauty and unique character of minerals; he has no mineralogical sensitivity. Thus, it would be necessary to objectify human essence, both theoretically and practically, in order to make the sensitivity of man human and thus create a corresponding human sensitivity for the appreciation of the whole wealth of human and natural essence.

Just as through the movement of private property and the wealth and poverty it creates—or material and spiritual wealth and property—the developing society finds the formation of all material things, so the developing society produces man as its permanent actuality, with the total wealth of his nature, creates the rich and profoundly sensitive man.

We see how subjectivism and objectivism, spiritualism and materialism, activity and passivity, first lose their character of opposites and therefore their existence as such opposites only under social conditions.

We see that the solution of theoretical oppositions can be accomplished only in a practical way, only through the practical energy of man. Their resolution is, therefore, by no means a task only for knowledge, but a task of actual life. Philosophy cannot solve them precisely because philosophy grasps them only as theoretical problems.

We see that the history of industry and the objectively developed existence of industry are the opened book of human capacities, which, sensuously considered, is human psychology. Up to now industry has not been regarded in connection with the essence of man, but has always been regarded only in terms of external relations, or utility. That is due to the fact that, moving within the framework of alienation, we have looked for the actuality of human essential capacities and activity of the human species only in the universal existence of man in religion, or history in its abstractly universal essence (politics, art, literature, etc.). In ordinary, ma-
rial industry (which can be regarded both as part of the universal movement just mentioned, and also as the specific part of industry since all human activity has up until now been labor, i.e. industry alienated from self-activity) what we are dealing with is sensuous, alien, useful objects as seen within the framework of alienation, that is to say, the objectification of the human capacities of man.

For psychology, this book, i.e., precisely the sensuously most concrete, most accessible part of history, is closed. In general, what should we think of a science which presumptuously abstracts from this enormous section of human labor and does not feel its own inadequacy? What should we think of a science where such an extensive realm of human activity says no more to it than what can be said in one word: "Need," "common need"?

The natural sciences have developed an enormous activity and have appropriated for themselves a constantly expanding subject matter. But philosophy has remained an alien science to them even as they remained alien to philosophy. Their momentary unity was only a fantastic illusion. The will for such a unity was there, but not the capacity. Historical writing itself pays the natural sciences only cursory consideration, as moments of enlightenment, of utility, of individually great discoveries. But the more, in practice, there has been an invasion of human living by natural science through industry, transforming it, the more has there been a preparation for the liberation of humanity, although in its first instance it led to its complete dehumanization. Industry is the actual historical relationship of nature to man, and therefore of the natural sciences to man. Therefore, if it is regarded as the exoteric unfolding of human essential capacities, the human essence of nature and the natural essence of man can also be understood. Then natural science loses its abstract materialistic, or rather idealistic, direction and becomes the basis for human science. Today, it has already become—although in an alienated form—the basis of actual human life. To have one basis for life and another for science is a priori a lie.

Nature, developing in human history—by that act human society was born—is the actual nature of man. Therefore, nature,
5) Being first appears as independent in its own eyes as soon as it stands on its own feet, and it stands on its own feet only when it owes its existence only to itself. A man who lives by the grace of another regards himself as a dependent being. However, I live completely by the grace of another when I owe him not only the maintenance of my life, but when he has produced my life, when he is its source. My life necessarily has such a source outside itself whenever it is not my own creation. Therefore, it is very difficult to dislodge from the consciousness of people the concept of creation. Because it contradicts all the obvious facts of practical life, it is inconceivable to them that nature and man exist through themselves.

The theory of the earth's creation has received a powerful blow from geology, the science which presents the formation and development of the earth as a process of self-production. "Generatio Equivoca" is the only practical refutation of theories of creation.

Now it is certainly easy to say to a single individual what Aristotle has already said: Your father and mother gave birth to you. Hence you are the coupling of two people, i.e., you are the sex act of man, produced by man. You see that man owes his physical existence to man. Thus, you must not only bear in mind the one side, the interminable series which leads you to inquire further: Who has given birth to my father, my grandfather? You must also keep in mind the circular process which is sensuously observable in this progression, according to which a man recapitulates himself in procreation and, consequently, man thus remains the subject. You may reply: I'll grant you this circular process if you will grant me the interminable series which continually drives me further until I ask you who has produced the first man and nature in general. I can only answer you: Your question is itself the product of abstraction. Ask yourself how you arrived at this question; ask yourself whether your question does not occur from a point of view which I cannot answer because it is a senseless one. Ask yourself whether, for reasonable thought, progression exists as such. Whenever you ask about the creation of nature and man, you abstract from man and nature. You presuppose them as non-existing and yet you demand that I prove their existence to you. I now say to you: Abandon your abstraction and you will give up your question. Or, if you hold fast to your abstraction, accept the consequence: Whenever you think of man and nature as non-existent, regard yourself, you who are natural and human, as non-existent. Think not, ask me not, for as soon as you begin to think and ask, your abstraction of nature and man from existence loses all sense. Or are you such an egotist that you recognize the non-existence of everything, wishing at the same time to save your own existence?

You can reply: I do not want to presuppose the non-existence of nature, etc. I ask you about the act of its origin in the same way as I ask the anatomist about the formation of bones, etc.

However, inasmuch as for socialist man, all of history is nothing else than the production of man through human labor, none other than the becoming of nature of man, to that extent he has the obvious, irrefutable proof of his birth through the process of his own birth. Insofar as the essential character of man and nature, that is the existence of man for man as the existence of nature, and of nature for man as the existence of man, has become practical, sensuous and observable, so the question of an alien being, a being beyond nature and man, is a question which involves the confession of the unessentiality of nature and man. Atheism, as the denial of unessentiality, makes no more sense because atheism is a negation of God and the existence of man through this negation. But socialism as socialism no longer needs such mediation. It begins from the theoretical and practical sensuous consciousness of man and nature as the essence. It is the positive self-consciousness of man no longer mediated by the transcendence of religion. Like real life, it is the positive actuality of man no longer mediated like communism by the transcendence of private property. Communism is positive affirmation as negation of the negation and, therefore, the actual moment, necessary for the immediate future historical development, the actual moment of human liberation and reconquest of humanity. Communism is the necessary form and the energizing principle of the immediate future. But communism, as such, is not the goal of human development, the form of human society.
MARX: CRITIQUE OF THE HEGELIAN
DIALECTIC

Feuerbach is the only one who has a serious, critical relation to the Hegelian dialectic. He alone has made genuine discoveries in this sphere and, in general, has truly transcended the old philosophy. The greatness of the accomplishment, and the quiet simplicity with which Feuerbach has given it to the world, stand in striking contrast to the reverse behavior of the Critical Critique.※

Feuerbach's feat consists in the following:

(1) The proof that philosophy is nothing else than religion, translated into thought and worked out logically, that it is only another form and mode of existence of the alienation of human essence, and is, therefore, likewise to be condemned.

(2) To the extent that Feuerbach made the social relation of "man to man" the basic principle of theory, he laid the foundation of genuine materialism and real science.

(3) Feuerbach counterposes the positive, which rests on itself and is positively grounded in itself, to the negation of the negation, which declares itself to be the absolute positive.

Feuerbach explains the Hegelian dialectic (and thereby justifies the departure from the positive, from sense-certainty) in the following manner:

Hegel proceeds from the alienation of substance (logically: the infinite, the abstractly universal), from the alienation of absolute and fixed-absolute abstraction. Popularly speaking his point of departure is Religion and Theology.

Secondly, he transcends the infinite, puts the actual, sensuous, real, finite, particular in its place. (Philosophy, the transcendance of Religion and Theology).

※ See last paragraph of my prefatory note.—R. D.
A. Self-consciousness

I. Consciousness
a) Sense-certainty, or This and Meaning.
   b) Perception, or the Thing with its characteristics and illusion.
   c) Force and understanding, Appearance and the Supersensuous world.

II. Self-consciousness. The Truth of Certainty of Itself.
   a) Independence and dependence of self-consciousness, Lordship and Bondage.
   b) Freedom of Self-consciousness, Stoicism, Scepticism, the Unhappy Consciousness.

   a) Observing Reason: Observation of Nature and of Self-consciousness.
   c) Individuality which is real in and for itself. The Spiritual realm of animals and the fraud or the fact itself. The Law-giving Reason. The law-testing Reason.

B. Spirit

I. The True Spirit: Ethics.
II. The Alienated Spirit, Culture.
III. The Spirit sure of itself, Morality.


D. Absolute Knowledge.

APPENDIX

Hegel’s Encyclopaedia begins with Logic, with pure, speculative thought, and ends with Absolute Knowledge, self-conscious, philosophic, or absolute spirit grasping itself, as philosophic or absolute, i.e., superhuman abstract spirit, therefore the whole Encyclopaedia is nothing but the expanded essence of the philosophic spirit. Feuerbach still regards the negation of the negation, concrete notion, as transcending in thought and, as thought, desiring to be direct contemplation, nature, actuality, the objectification of thought. In an analogous manner, the philosophic spirit is nothing but the alienated spirit of the world, thinking within its self-alienation, i.e., grasping itself abstractly. Logic is the money of the spirit, the abstract expression of the speculative value of the thoughts of man and nature. It has become completely indifferent to all actual determinateness and is, therefore, unactual essence. It is estranged thinking and thus abstracted from Nature and actual man. It is abstract thinking. The externality of this abstract thinking is Nature, as it exists for this abstract thinking. Nature is external to this thinking, the loss of itself, and this thinking also grasps Nature merely in an external way, as abstract thought, but as estranged, abstract thought. Finally, there is Spirit returning to its own source. It first asserts itself as anthropological, then as phenomenological, psychological, ethical, artistic, religious spirit until it finally finds itself as absolute knowledge, and relates the new absolute, i.e., abstract spirit, to itself, and thus attains its conscious and appropriate existence. For its actual existence is abstraction.

There is a double error in Hegel:

The first appears most clearly in the Phenomenology as the source of the Hegelian philosophy. When, for example, Hegel considers Wealth, State, Power, etc., as Essences alienated from Human Essence, he does so only in their alienated thought form. They are alienated essences and, therefore, merely an alienation of pure, i.e., abstract philosophical thought. The whole movement, therefore, ends with Absolute Knowledge. It is precisely abstract thinking from which these objects are alienated and to which they stand opposed with their pretension of reality. The philosopher, who is, himself, an abstract form of alienated man, establishes himself as the yardstick of the alienated world. Therefore
the whole history of estrangement, the whole transcendence of this estrangement is nothing else than the history of abstract, that is, absolute thinking, logical, speculative thinking. Hence, the alienation—which forms the real interest of this externalization, and the transcendence of this externalization, is the opposition between Being-in-itself, and Being-for-itself, between consciousness and self-consciousness, between object and subject, i.e., the opposition between abstract thinking and sensuous actuality, or actual sensuousness, within the process of thinking itself. All other oppositions and movements of these oppositions are only the semblance, the veil, the exoteric form of these oppositions which are the solely interesting ones and which constitute the intrinsic meaning of the other profane oppositions. What is regarded as the essence of alienation, which is posed and to be transcended, is not the fact that human essence materialized itself in an inhuman manner in opposition to itself, but the fact that it materializes itself from, and in opposition to, abstract thinking. Thus, the appropriation of the essential capacities of man which have become objects, and alien objects at that, is, in the first place, an appropriation which proceeds in consciousness, in pure thinking, that is, in abstraction. It is an appropriation of these objects as thoughts and as movement of thought. Hence, despite its thoroughly negative and critical character, and despite the criticism actually contained in it, which often far surpasses the later developments, there is already in the Phenomenology, hidden in embryo, the latent potentiality and secret of uncritical positivism and equally uncritical idealism of the later Hegelian works—philosophic disintegration and resurrection of extant Empiricism.

Secondly. The demand for the vindication of the objective world for men, e.g., the knowledge that the sensuous consciousness is no abstractly sensuous consciousness but a humanly sensuous consciousness, that Religion, Wealth, etc., are only the alienated actuality of deeds and, therefore, only the road to true human actuality—this appropriation, or the insight into this process, therefore, appears in Hegel in such a way that sensuousness, religion, state, power, etc., are spiritual essences. For in Hegel only the spirit is the true essence of man, and the true form of the spirit is the thinking spirit, the logical speculative spirit. The humanity of Nature, and of the Nature produced by history, the products of men appear in it as products of the abstract spirit, and thus as spiritual moments, alienated essences.

The Phenomenology is, therefore, the hidden, still unclear even to itself, and mystifying critical philosophy. However, to the extent that it holds fast the alienation of Man—even if Man appears only in the form of Spirit—to that extent all elements of criticism lie hidden in it and are often already prepared and worked out in a manner extending far beyond the Hegelian standpoint. The sections on “Unhappy Consciousness,” the “Honorable Consciousness,” the spirit of the noble and downtrodden consciousness, etc., etc., contain the critical elements—although still in an alienated form—of whole spheres like Religion, the State, Civic Life, etc. Just as the essence is the object, alienated, so the subject is always consciousness, or self-consciousness. Or, rather, the object appears only as abstract consciousness, man only as self-consciousness. The different forms of alienation which appear in the Phenomenology are, therefore, only different forms of consciousness and self-consciousness. Just as abstract consciousness in itself—as that by which the object is grasped—is merely a differentiating moment of self-consciousness, so the identity of self-consciousness with consciousness appears as the result of the movement, Absolute Knowledge, which no longer goes outside, but merely continues within its own process of abstract thinking. That is, the dialectic of pure thought is the result.

The greatness of Hegel's Phenomenology, and of its final result—the dialectic of negativity as the moving and creating principle—lies in this, that Hegel comprehends the self-production of man as a process, regards objectification as contra-position, as externalization, and as the transcendence of this externalization; that he, therefore, grasps the essence of labor and conceives objective man, true, actual man as the result of his own labor.

The true, active relating of man to himself as species-essence, that is, as human essence, is possible only because man actually produces all the capacities of his species—and this again is only possible thanks to the collective activity of man, is possible only as a result of history—and he relates himself to it as well as to the...
objects, which is again at first possible only in the form of alienation.

We will now present in a detailed fashion the one-sidedness and the limitation of Hegel in the concluding chapter of the Phenomenology, in Absolute Knowledge, a chapter which contains both the summation and the quintessence of the Phenomenology, and contains the relation of the Phenomenology to the speculative dialectic, and the view of Hegel regarding their mutual and many-sided relationship.

In a preliminary way, we will remark only the following: Hegel stands on the basis of modern political economy. He regards labor as the essence, as the self-preserving essence of man. He sees only the positive side of labor and not its negative side. Labor—man's becoming-for-self within the limits of externalization—is externalized man. Hegel knew and acknowledged only one form of labor, that is, abstractly spiritual labor. Therefore, what Hegel recognized as the essence of philosophy, and it is this, in general, which constitutes its essence, is the externalization of man knowing himself, or externalized science thinking itself. And it is for this reason that he is capable of summarizing the preceding philosophy in terms of its particular moments and presenting his philosophy as the philosophy. From the very nature of the activity of philosophy Hegel knows what all other philosophers have done—viz., that they have conceived particular moments of Nature and of human life as moments of self-consciousness, or rather of abstract self-consciousness; therefore his science is absolute.

We will now proceed to the question of Absolute Knowledge—the last chapter of the Phenomenology.

The essence of the matter is that the object of consciousness is none other than self-consciousness, or that the object is only objectified self-consciousness, self-consciousness as object. (Man=Self-consciousness). Therefore, it is necessary to transcend the object of consciousness. Objectivity, as such, has the force of alienated relationship of man, not corresponding to the human essence, to self-consciousness. That means that the reappropriation of the objective essence of man as alien and produced under the determination of alienation, serves not only to transcend alienation, but also to transcend objectivity, i.e., man is regarded as an un-objective, spiritual essence.

Hegel describes the movement of transcending the object of consciousness in the following way:

The object does not show itself only as returning to the Self. (That is, according to Hegel, a one-sided comprehension of that movement which grasps merely one aspect of it.) Man is equal to Self. The Self, however, is only man abstractly conceived and abstractly produced. Man is Self-ish. His eyes, his ears, etc., are Self-ish. Each of his essential capacities has in him the character of Selfishness. But on this account it is now quite false to say: Self-consciousness has eyes, ears, essential capacities. Human nature is not a quality of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is, rather, a quality of human nature, of the human eye, etc.

The Self, abstracted for itself and fixed, is man as abstract egotist, egotism in its pure abstraction, elevated to the level of thinking. (We will return to this point later.)

Hegel regards human essence, Man, as equal to self-consciousness. All alienation of human essence is, therefore, no more than alienation of self-consciousness. The alienation of self-consciousness is not regarded as an expression of the actual alienation of human essence. Rather, the actual alienation, which appears as real, is—according to its innermost concealed essence, first revealed through philosophy—nothing but the appearance of the alienation of actual human essence, of self-consciousness. The science which comprehends this is, therefore, called Phenomenology. All reappropriation of the alienated objective essence appears, therefore, as an incorporation into his self-consciousness. Man, insofar as he is taking possession of his essence, is only self-consciousness taking possession of the objective essence; return of the object to the self is, therefore, the reappropriation of the object.

If we are to express the all-sided transcendence of the object of consciousness, it consists of the following:

1) the object, as such, presents itself to the self as a vanishing factor;
2) the emptying of self-consciousness itself establishes thinghood;
3) this externalization of self-consciousness has not only negative, but positive, significance;
4) significance not merely for us or per se, but for self-consciousness itself.
5) The negativity of the object, or its cancelling its own existence, gets for self-consciousness a positive significance. Or self-consciousness knows this nothingness because self-consciousness externalizes itself, for, in doing so, it establishes itself as object, or, by reason of the indivisible unity characterizing its self-existence, sets up the object as its self.
6) On the other hand, there is also the other moment in the process, that self-consciousness has just really cancelled and superseded this externalization and objectification and, consequently, has resumed them into itself as such.
7) This is the movement of consciousness and is, therefore, the totality of its moments.
8) Consciousness, at the same time, must have taken up a relation to the object in all its aspects and phases, and have grasped its meaning from the point of view of each of them. This totality of its determinate characteristics makes the object per se, or inherently, a spiritual essence, and it becomes so in truth for consciousness when the latter apprehends every individual one of them as self, i.e., when it takes up toward them the spiritual relationship just spoken of.

ad. 1. That the object, as such, presents itself to consciousness as vanishing is the above mentioned return of the object to the self.

ad. 2. _The externalization of self-consciousness_ posits the category of thingness. Since man is self-consciousness, his externalized, objective essence, or thingness, equals externalized self-consciousness, and thingness is posited through this externalization. (Thingness is that which is object for him, and object is truly for him only what is essentially object, which is thus his objective essence. Since it is not actual man, and likewise not Nature as such,—man is human nature—which is made the subject, but only the abstraction of man, namely, self-consciousness, thingness can only be externalized self-consciousness.)

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What is absolutely true is that a living natural being, endowed and gifted with objective, i.e., material essential capacities, also possesses actual and natural objects of its own essence, and it is just as natural that his self-externalization should be the determination of an actual objective world, which appears under the form of externality and not belonging to his essence and is more powerful than the objective world. There is nothing inconceivable and perplexing in this. Rather the reverse would be perplexing. But it is just as clear that self-consciousness, i.e., its externalization, could only posit thingness, i.e., again only an abstract thing, a thing of abstraction, and not an actual thing. It is further evident that thingness, therefore, is not at all independent and essential over against self-consciousness, but is a mere creature, something posited by consciousness; and that which is posited, instead of being something which confirms itself, is only a confirmation of the act of positing, which momentarily fixes its energy in the form of a product and in appearance apportions to it the role—but only for one moment—of the independent actual being.

When actual corporeal Man, standing on firm and well rounded earth, inhaling and exhaling all natural forces, posits—thanks to his externalization—his actual objective essentia capacities as alien objects, it is not the act of positing which is the subject. It is the subjectivity of objective essential capacities, whose action must, therefore, also be objective. Objective essence works objectively, and it would not work objectively if objectivity did not inhere in the determination of its essence. It creates, posits only objects because it is posited through objects, because fundamentally it is Nature. That means that in the act of positing, it does not depart from its "pure activity" in order to create the object, but its objective product confirms merely its objective activity, its activity as an activity of an objective natural essence. We see here how thoroughgoing Naturalism, or Humanism, distinguishes itself both from Idealism and Materialism, and is, at the same time, the truth uniting both. We see, at the same time, how only Naturalism is capable of grasping the act of world history.

Man is directly a natural being. As a natural being, and especially as a living natural being, he is endowed partly with natural forces, with living forces, he is an active, natural being. These
forces exist in him as dispositions and capabilities, as "instincts."
As natural, corporeal, sensuous, objective being he is, like an animal
and a plant, a "distressed," conditioned, and limited being. That
is, the objects of his instincts exist outside him, as objects inde-
pendent of him. But these objects are objects essentially serving
his needs, essential objects indispensable to the action and confirma-
tion of his own essential capacities. That man is a corporeal, natural,
living, actual, sensuous, objective being means that he has actual
sensuous objects as objects of his essence of his expression of life,
or that he is capable of expressing his life only in actual, sensuous
objects. It is the same thing to be objective, natural and sensuous,
or to have object, nature, sense outside oneself, or even to be object,
nature, sense for a third being. Hunger is a natural necessity.
Therefore, in order to satisfy and appease it, one requires a nature
outside oneself, an object outside oneself. Hunger is the objective
need of a body for another, for an object outside itself, indispens-
able to its integration and expression of its life. The sun is
object for the plant, an object indispensable to it, confirming its
life. In the same way, the plant is an object to the sun, as expres-
sion of the life-producing power of the sun, of the objective
essential forces of the sun.

A being, which does not have its nature outside itself is not a
natural being; takes no part in the essence of nature. A being
which has no object outside of itself is not an objective being.
A being which is not itself object for a third being has no being
for its object, that is, does not behave objectively; its being is not
objective.

A non-objective being is a monstrous being.
Suppose there was a being neither itself an object nor having
an object. Such a being would, first of all, be the only being. There
would exist no other being outside of it. It would exist alone and
solitary. For as soon as there are objects outside of myself, as soon
as I am not alone, I am an Other, another actuality than the object
outside of me. For this third object I am thus an actuality other
than it, i.e., its object. A being which is not object to another being
presupposes thus that no objective being exists. As soon as I have an
object, this object has me for its object. But an un-objective being
is an unactual, unsensuous being, merely thought, i.e., only a
fancied, abstract being. To be sensuous, i.e., to be actual, is to be an
object of sense, to be a sensuous object; therefore, to have sensuous
objects outside oneself, to have objects for one's sensuousness. To be
sensuous is to be suffering.

Therefore man as an objective sensuous being is a suffering
being and since he is a being experiencing his suffering he is a
passionate being. Passion is the essential power of man striving
energetically toward his object.

However, man is not merely a natural being, but he is also a
human natural being, i.e., a being which is for itself; therefore,
a species-being. As such, he must confirm and affirm himself both
in his being and in his knowing. Human objects are, therefore, not
those objects of nature which offer themselves immediately. In
the same way, human sense, insofar as it is direct and objective, is
objectively, nor Nature, taken subjectively, is immediately ade-
quate to human essence. And just as all natural things must emerge,
man also must have his act of emergence—history. This, however,
is for him a known act of emergence and, therefore, an act of
emergence which is transcended in consciousness. History is the
true natural history of Man.

Thirdly. Since this positing of nothingness is itself only an ap-
pearance, an act of contradicting the essence of pure-activity, so
it must also again be transcended. Thinghood must be negated.

ad. 8, 4, 5, 6.

3) This striving toward consciousness has not only negative,
but also positive, meaning: and 4) this positive meaning is not
only for us, or, in itself, but for it itself, for consciousness. 5) The
negativity of the object, its transcendence of itself, has, for con-
sciousness, a positive meaning, that is, it knows this nothingness
because it externalizes itself. For in this externalization, it knows
its own self as object, or the object for the sake of the inseparable
unity of its for-itselfness. 6) On the other hand, the other Moment
is herein implied, namely, that it has also transcended and with-
drawn into itself this externalization and objectivity, and that,
accordingly, it is in its own otherness, as such.

We have already seen that, for Hegel, the appropriation of
alienated objective essence, or the transcendence of objectivity
under the determination of alienation—which is to develop from indifferent strangeness into actually hostile alienation—has, at the same time, or even mainly, the significance of transcending objectivity because the stumbling-block in the alienation is not the *determinate* character of the object, but its *objective* character. The object is, therefore, something negative, something transcending itself, a *nothingness*. For consciousness, this *nothingness* of the object has not only a negative, but also a *positive* meaning; for this nothingness of the object is the self-affirmation of *un*objectivity, of *abstraction* of itself. For *consciousness itself*, the nothingness of the object has, therefore, a positive meaning, namely, that it knows this nothingness, the objective essence as its self-externalization, that it knows that it only exists through its self-externalization: The way in which consciousness exists and in which something exists for it is knowledge. Knowing is its sole act. Therefore, something exists for it to the extent it knows this thing. Knowledge is its single objective relation. Consciousness knows the nothingness of the object, i.e., the essence of distinction of the object from it, the not-being of the object for it; to the extent that it knows that the object is its self-externalization, i.e., it knows itself—knowledge as object—because the object is only the appearance of an object, an artificial vapor and, in its essence, no other than knowledge, which is counterposed to itself and therefore has counterposed to itself a nothingness, something which has no objectivity outside of knowledge. In other words, knowledge knows that only to the extent that it is related to an object is it outside of itself, does it externalize itself, that it itself appears to itself as object, or that what appears to it as object is only itself. 

On the other hand, in the words of Hegel, there is also here contained the other Moment, namely, that it has likewise transcended and withdrawn into itself this externalization and objectivity. Hence, that in its otherness, it is as such by itself.

All the illusions of abstract, speculative thinking are concentrated in this judgment.

Firstly: consciousness, self-consciousness is with itself in its otherness as such. It is thus—or, if we abstract here from the Hegelian abstraction; and substitute for self-consciousness the self-consciousness of men—it is by itself in its otherness as such. In

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this is implied, on the one hand, that consciousness—knowledge as knowledge, thinking as thinking—pretends to be nothing else than the other of itself, pretends to be sensuousness, actuality, life. Thinking surpasses itself in thinking (Feuerbach). This aspect is here implied insofar as consciousness as mere consciousness meets an obstruction, not in alienated objectivity, but in objectivity as such.

Secondly, what is implied here is that self-conscious man, insofar as he has recognized the spiritual world—or, the spiritual universal existence of this world—nevertheless, confirms himself again in this alienated form and proclaims it to be his true existence, restores it and pretends to be with himself in his otherness, as such. Thus, after transcending, for example, religion, after the recognition of religion as a product of self- alienation, he still finds himself confirmed in religion as religion. Here we have the root of the false positivism of Hegel, or his only apparently critical position, which Feuerbach characterizes as positing, negating and the restoring of religion or theology—which is, however, to be conceived more generally. Thus reason is by itself in unreason as unreason. Man who has recognized in law, politics, etc., he is leading an alienated life, pursues in this alienated life, as such, his true human life. In this way, true knowledge and life are self-affirmation and self-confirmation in contradiction with itself, both in regard to knowledge and to the essence of the object. Thus nothing more need be said of Hegel's adaptation to religion, the state, etc., for this lie is the lie of his principle.

When I know that religion is alienated human self-consciousness, I therefore know that in it; as religion, I confirm, not my self-consciousness, but my alienated self-consciousness. I therefore know my self-consciousness, belonging to itself and to its essence, is confirmed not in religion but, on the contrary, in a religion that has negated, transcended.

In Hegel, the negation of negation is, therefore, not the confirmation of true essence, namely, through negation of apparent essence, but the confirmation of apparent essence, or of alienated essence in its denial, or the denial of this apparent essence as an objective essence existing outside man and independent of him, and its transformation into the subject. Therefore, transcendence
plays a peculiar role, in which both negation, and preservation or affirmation are united.

Thus, for example, in Hegel's Philosophy of Right, transcended private right is morality; transcended morality is the same as family; transcended family the same as civil society; transcended civil society the same as the state; transcended state the same as world history. In reality, however, private right, morality, family, civil society, the state, etc., remain in existence. Only they have become moments, forms of existence of men, which are not valid in their isolation, which resolve and produce one another, etc. Moment of the movement.

In their actual existence their moving essence is concealed. It appears and is revealed only in thought, in philosophy. That is why my own true religious existence is my religious-philosophical existence, my true political existence my existence in the philosophy of right, my true natural existence my existence in the philosophy of nature, my true artistic existence my existence in the philosophy of art, my true human existence my philosophic existence. In the same way, the philosophies of religion, nature, thestate, and art are the true existence of religion, state, nature, and art. If, however, the philosophy of religion, etc., is for me the only true existence of religion, I am truly religious only as a philosopher of religion, and thus I deny actual religiousness and the actually religious man. But at the same time I affirm them, partly within my own existence or within alien existence with which I counterpose them, for this is only their philosophic expression; partly, in their peculiar original form, for to me they are valid only as apparent otherness, as allegories, as configurations hidden under sensuous husks of their own true existence, which is my philosophic existence. In the same way, transcended quality is the same as quantity; transcended quantity the same as measure; transcended measure the same as essence; transcended essence the same as appearance; transcended appearance the same as actuality; transcended actuality the same as notion; transcended notion the same as objectivity; transcended objectivity the same as absolute idea; transcended absolute idea the same as nature; transcended nature the same as subjective spirit; transcended subjective spirit the same as ethical, objective spirit; transcended ethical spirit the same as art; transcended art the same as religion; transcended religion the same as absolute knowledge.

On the one hand, this transcendence is a transcendence of essence insofar as it is thought, and hence, private property, as thought, is transcended in thoughts of morality. And because thinking fancies itself to be directly the other of itself, sensuous actuality, therefore, its action seems to it also to be sensuously actual. Thus, this transcendence through thinking which permits its object to remain in actuality, believes it has actually overcome the object. And, on the other hand, because the object has now become for it a moment of thought, this object is also taken by it in its actuality, as the self-confirmation of itself, or self-consciousness, or abstraction.

In one respect, therefore, the existence which Hegel transcends in philosophy is not actual religion, the state, nature, but religion as an object of knowledge, as a dogmatism. The same is true of jurisprudence, the science of the state, the science of nature. On the other hand, he opposes both the actual essence and direct unphilosophic science, or the unphilosophic notions of this essence. He therefore contradicts their accepted notions.

In another respect, the religious, etc., man can find in Hegel his final confirmation.

Now we must try to grasp the positive moments of the Hegelian dialectic, within the limits of the category of alienation.

a) Transcendence, as objective movement, withdrawing externalization into itself. This is the insight, expressed within alienation, of the appropriation of objective essence through the transcendence of its alienation, the alienated insight into the actual objectification of man, into the actual appropriation of his objective essence through the destruction of the alienated determination of the objective world, through its transcendence in its alienated existence. Just as atheism, as transcendence of God, is the becoming of theoretical humanism, and communism, as transcendence of private property, is the vindication of actual human living as its own property, which is the becoming of practical humanism, so atheism is humanism mediated by transcendence of religion, and communism is humanism mediated by the transcendence of private property. Only by the transcendence of this mediation, which is
nevertheless a necessary presupposition, does there arise positive Humanism, beginning from itself.

Thus Hegel, in so far as he grasps the meaning of the positive sense of the negation related to itself, even if in an alienated way, conceives self-alienation, externalization of essence, contraposition and the separation of men from reality as a process of self-conquest, alteration of essence, objectification and realization. Briefly, within an abstract framework, he considers labor to be the self-productive act of man, the relation of himself as an alien essence, and its manifestation as alien essence, as the developing consciousness and life of the species.

b) In Hegel, apart from, or rather as a consequence of the perversity already described, this act appears firstly as formal because it is abstract, because human essence itself is regarded only as an abstract thinking essence, as self-consciousness.

Secondly, because the conception is abstract and formal, transcendence of alienation becomes confirmation of alienation. But as this movement of self-production, or self-objectification, as self-externalization and self-alienation is, for Hegel, the absolute, therefore its self-purpose, resting in itself and arrived at its essence, is the final expression of human life. This movement, in its abstract form as dialectics, is therefore, regarded as truly human living. Yet, because it is an abstraction, an alienation of human life, it is regarded as a divine process, hence as the divine process of man, a process carried out, in distinction from himself, by its abstract, pure, absolute essence.

Thirdly, this process must have a bearer, a subject, but the subject emerges only as a result. This result, the subject knowing itself as absolute self-consciousness, is, therefore, God, absolute spirit, the Idea, knowing and affirming itself. Actual man and actual nature become mere predicates, symbols of this concealed, unactual man, and this unactual nature. Subject and predicate, therefore, have a relation of absolute inversion to each other, mystical subject-object, or a subjectivity extending beyond the object, the absolute subject as a process, a subject alienating itself and returning to itself from this alienation, but returning it at the same time into itself and the subject as this process, the pure restless circling within itself. We have a formal and abstract conception of the human act of self-production or the act of self-objectification of man.

Since Hegel supposes man to be the same as self-consciousness, the alienated object, the alienated actual essence of man is nothing else than consciousness, is only the thought of alienation, its abstract and, therefore, empty unactual expression, negation. Therefore, the transcendence of this externalization is likewise only an abstract empty transcendence of the former- empty abstraction, the negation of the negation. The full living sensuous, concrete activity of self-objectification, therefore, becomes its mere abstraction, absolute negativity, an abstraction which is, again, fixed as such and is thought as an independent activity, as simply activity. Because this so-called negativity is nothing but the abstract, empty form of the former actual living act, its content also can be merely formal content produced by the abstraction, from all content. Therefore, the abstract formulas, forms of thought, logical categories torn away from actual spirit and from actual nature are the universal forms of abstractions, pertaining to every content and, therefore, indifferent to all content and for that reason applicable to any content. (Further down we will develop the logical content of absolute negativity.)

The positive contribution which Hegel has made in his speculative Logic is this: The definite concepts, the universal, fixed forms of thought represent, in their independence of nature and spirit, the necessary result of the universal alienation of human essence and, hence, also of human thinking. And therefore Hegel has presented and collected them together as moments of the process of abstraction. For example, transcended being is essence, transcended essence is notion, transcended notion is the Absolute Idea. But what, then, is the Absolute Idea? It, in its turn, transcends itself, if it is not going to carry out again the whole previous act.
of abstraction, and if it is not going to be satisfied with being a totality of abstractions, or the abstraction grasping itself. But the abstraction grasping itself as abstraction knows itself as nothing. It must abandon the abstraction and arrive at an essence which is its very opposite, i.e., Nature. The whole Logic is, therefore, the proof that abstract thinking is nothing for itself, that the Absolute Idea is nothing for itself until nature is something.

The Absolute Idea, the abstract Idea which "when viewed on the point of this, its unity with itself, is Intuition." (Hegel, Encyclopaedia, 3, Ans. p. 22). Which, "in its own absolute truth ... resolves to let the 'moment' of its particularity or of the first characterization and other-being, the immediate idea, as its reflected image, go forth freely as Nature." This whole Idea, behaving in such a strange and baroque way, which has caused the Hegelians tremendous headaches, is nothing else than mere abstraction, i.e., the abstract thinker who, made clever by experience and enlightened beyond its truth, has decided under many false and still abstract conditions, to abandon himself and to substitute his otherwise, the particular, the determined, for his self-contained being, his nothingness, his universality and his indeterminateness. It decides to release freely from itself Nature, which it had concealed within itself only as an abstraction, as a thing of thought, i.e., to abandon abstraction and to observe Nature free from abstraction. The abstract Idea which becomes immediate intuition is nothing but abstract thinking which abandons itself and decides to intuit. This whole transition from the Logic to the Philosophy of Nature is merely the transition from abstraction to intuition, a transition difficult for the abstract thinker to execute and, therefore, described by him in such a fantastic fashion. The mystical feeling which drives the philosophers from abstract thinking into intuition is boredom, the yearning for a content. The mystical feeling which drives the philosophers from abstract thinking into intuition is boredom, the yearning for a content. The mystical feeling which drives the philosophers from abstract thinking into intuition is boredom, the yearning for a content. 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abstractions of the determinations of Nature. The whole of Nature thus repeats for him the logical abstractions, except in a sensuous external form. He again analyzes it, and these abstractions. Thus his conception of Nature is only the act which confirms his abstraction from the observation of Nature, the generative process of his abstraction consciously repeated by himself.

We will in a moment examine the Hegelian determination and the transition from Nature to Mind.

"Nature, as idea, has resulted in the form of Otherness," the course of this abstraction.

In this way, for example, time is like the negativity which relates itself to itself, (p. 288, n.c.). Transcended becoming of something corresponds in natural philosophy to the transcended movement as matter. Light is the natural form of reflection in itself. Body, as moon and comet, is the natural philosophical form of the opposition which according to the Logic is, on the one hand, the positive resting in itself, on the other, the negative resting in itself, etc. The earth is the natural philosophical form of logical ground, as the negative unity of opposites, etc.

Nature as Nature, i.e., insofar as it still distinguishes itself sensuously from the above-mentioned secret meaning hidden in it, Nature, separated and distinguished from these abstractions, is nothing, a nothing preserving itself as nothing. It is senseless or has only the sense of an externality which has been transcended.

"In the finite-teleological standpoint, we find the correct presupposition, that Nature does not contain in itself an absolute purpose." (P. 225) Its purpose is the confirmation of abstraction. Nature has shown itself to be the Idea in the form of otherness. Since the Idea thus exists as the negative of itself or external to itself, Nature likewise is not external, except relative to this Idea, but Externality constitutes the determination under which the Idea is as Nature." (P. 227) Externality is here not to be understood as sensuousness expressing itself and revealed in light and to sensuous man. Externality is to be taken here in the sense of externalization, of a lack, of an inadequacy which ought not to be. For the true is still the Idea. Nature is only the form of its otherness. And since abstract thinking is the essence, whatever is outside of it is, according to its essence, only external. The abstract thinker acknowledges at the same time that sensuousness is the essence of Nature, externality in opposition to self-sufficient thinking.

But at the same time he expresses this opposition in the following way, that this externality of Nature is its opposition to thinking, the latter's deficiency, and thus that insofar as it is distinguished from abstraction, it is a deficient being, a being which is not only deficient for me, in my eyes, but a self-deficient being which has something outside itself which it lacks, i.e., its essence is something other than itself. Therefore, for the abstract thinker, Nature must transcend itself, since it is presupposed by him as an essence potentially transcended.

"From our point of view, Mind has for its presupposition Nature, of which it is the truth, and for that reason its absolute prin. In this, its truth, Nature has vanished, and mind has resulted as the 'idea' entered into possession of itself, whose object as well as subject is the concept. This identity is absolute negativity—because in Nature the concept has its completely external objectivity which has however transcended its externalization and it has in this become identical with itself. Thus at the same time it is this identity only so far as it is a return out of nature." P. 392 (par. 381)*

"Revelation, which as the abstract idea is an immediate transition, the becoming of nature, is as revelation of spirit, which is free, the positing of nature as its world; a positing which as reflection is at the same time presupposition of the world as independent nature. Revelation in the concept is creation of nature as its being, in which it gives itself the affirmation and truth of its freedom.

"The Absolute is spirit; this is the highest definition of the Absolute." (par. 384)

* Philosophy of Mind. Pars. 381 and 384 are the only reference in Marx's Essay to the Philosophy of Mind. It is clear that this essay of Marx's is unfinished.