

APPENDIX B

First English Translation
of

V. I. LENIN: ABSTRACT OF HEGEL'S
SCIENCE OF LOGIC

Translator's Note: This *Abstract of Hegel's Science of Logic* is the central part of Lenin's *Philosophical Notebooks*. Lenin wrote these comments as he was reading and copying many sections of Hegel's *Werke* in 1914. The *Abstract* was first published in Russian in the *Lenin Miscellany*, Volume IX, by the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute in 1929. The *Philosophic Notebooks* were then published as a separate volume and it is from the 1947 edition by the Institute that the present translation is made.

This translation does *not* include the extracts from Hegel. The translator merely indicates alongside which passages in Hegel Lenin wrote his comments. He used the 1888 edition of Hegel's *Werke*, published in Berlin. The pages cited in the present translation, however, refer *not* to the edition Lenin used, but to the pages in the standard English translation of Hegel's *Science of Logic* by W. H. Johnston and L. G. Struthers (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1929 and 1951; London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1951). The present translator has excerpted the greater part of these comments, and has also included a few excerpts from Lenin's comments on Hegel's other works: *Encyclopaedia*, and the *History of Philosophy*. These were first published in the *Lenin Miscellany*, Vol. XII, 1930, and republished in the above-mentioned 1947 edition.

—R. D.

(Volume I, page 45*)

Logic is the doctrine not of external forms of thought but of the laws of development "of all material, natural and spiritual things," i.e., of the development of the total, concrete content of the world and of its knowledge, i.e., the result, sum, conclusion of the *history* of the knowledge of the world.

(Volume I, page 46)

How should one understand this?
Man is faced with a *web* of the phenomena of nature. Instinctive man, a savage, does not separate himself from nature. Conscious man draws out categories, the essence of the steps of separation, i.e., the knowledge of the world, the nodal points in the web, which enable him to understand and master it.

(Volume I, page 66)

Hegel poses two fundamental premises:
1) the necessity of connection
2) the immanent origination of distinctions

Very important!! This is what it means in my opinion:

1) Necessary is the connection, the objective connection of all sides, forces, tendencies, etc. of the given sphere of phenomena.

* Unless otherwise stated all volume and page references are to Hegel's *Science of Logic*.

2) "the immanent *origination* of distinctions"—the inner, objective logic of the evolution of the struggle of the distinctions in a polarity.

(Volume I, page 67)

#

Is not this the thought, that appearance is also objective, since it is *one of the aspects* of the objective world? Not only Essence, but also Appearance is objective. Even the distinction between subjective and objective has its limits.

(Volume I, page 69)

// Cf. *Capital*.

A beautiful formula: "not a mere abstract" universal, but a universal which comprises in itself the wealth of particular, individual, separate (all the wealth of the particular and separate)!! Tres bien!

(Volume I, page 135)

Dialectic is the doctrine of the *identity of opposites*—how they can be and how they become—under which conditions they become identical, transforming one into the other—why the mind of man must not take these opposites for dead, but for living, conditioned, mobile, transforming one into the other. *En lisant Hegel...*

(Volume I, page 142)

Acute and profound! Hegel analyzes concepts which usually appear dead, and he shows that there is movement in them. The finite? That means *movement* has come to an end! Something?—That means not what Other is.—Being in general?—That means such indeterminateness that being=Not-Being. All-sided universal flexibility of concepts—flexibility reaching to the identity of opposites.—That is the essence. This flexibility, subjectively applied=eclecticism and sophistry. When this flexibility is *objectively applied*, i.e., reflects the all-sidedness of the material process and its unity, then it is dialectic; it is the correct reflection of the eternal development of the world.

NB

(Volume I, pages 173-6)

The idea of the transformation of the ideal into the real is *profound*. Very important for history. But also in the personal life of man it is evident that there is much truth in this. Against vulgar materialism. NB. The difference of the ideal from the material is also not unconditional, not excessive.

(Volume I, page 182)

Evidently Hegel draws his self-development of concepts, of categories, from the whole history of philosophy. This gives yet a *new side* to the whole of the *Logic*.

(Volume I, pages 386-90)

In the *Observation*, as everywhere, Hegel brings in facts, examples, the concrete (Feuerbach therefore dares once to assert that Hegel reduced *Nature* to *Observation*, Feuerbach, *Works*, p.?)

||| Leaps!

||||| Interruptions in gradualness

||| Leaps!

||| Leaps!

Further: Transition of Being to Essence is analyzed doubly obscurely.

End of Volume I.

(Volume II, page 31*)

Thus here also Hegel accuses Kant** of *subjectivism*. This *NB*. Hegel is for the "objective validity" (*sit venia verbo*) of show, "of the immediate given" (the term, *given*, is common with Hegel in general.) The little philosophers dispute whether one should take as basis essence or the immediately given. (Kant, Hume, all Machists). Hegel substitutes "and" for "or," and explains the concrete content of this "and".

(Volume II, pages 65-66)

Observation 2. Law of the Excluded Middle.

This is very profound and true. Every concrete thing, every concrete something stands in diverse and often contradictory relation to all others, ergo, it is itself and others.

* Volume II of the English translation includes what Hegel called Book II of Volume I: *Doctrine of Essence*.—Tr.

** The reference is to Kant's *Critique of Judgment*.—Tr.

(Volume II, pages 66-70)

Observation 3 (End of Chapter 2, Part 1, Book II of the *Logic*). Law of *Contradiction*.

Movement and "self-movement" (this *NB!* arbitrary (independent) spontaneous, *internally-necessary* movement,) "change," "movement and life," "the principle of every self-movement," "impulse" (*Trieb*) to "movement" and "activity"—opposite of "dead being."—Who would believe that this is the core of "Hegelianism," of abstract and abstruse (difficult, absurd?) Hegelianism?? It is necessary to reveal, to understand, to save, to release, to purify this kernel—which is precisely what Marx and Engels have done.

The idea of universal movement and change (1813, *Logic*) was disclosed before its application to life and society. It was proclaimed in reference to society (1847)* earlier than in relation to man (1859)**.

NB

(1) Ordinary perception grasps the difference and the contradiction, but not *the transition* of one to the other, *but this is the most important*.

(2) Intelligent reflection and mind. Reflection grasps the contradiction, *expresses* it, brings things in relation to one another, compels the "concept to

* The reference is to the *Communist Manifesto*.—Tr.

** The reference is to the *Origin of Species*.—Tr.

shine through the contradiction" but does not *express* the concept of things and their relation.

(3) Thinking reason (Mind) sharpens the blunted difference of variety, the mere manifold of imagination, to the *essential* difference, to *Opposition*. Only when the contradictions reach the peak does manifoldedness become regular (*regsam*) and lively in relation to the other—acquire that negativity which is the *inner pulsation of self-movement and life*.

(Volume II, pages 93-94)

The transition from Ground into Condition.

And a "purely logical" working out? It coincides. It *must* coincide as do induction and deduction in *Capital*.

If I'm not mistaken, there is much mysticism and empty pedantry here in the conclusions of Hegel. But the basic idea is magnificent: all-world, all-sided *living* connection of everything with everything else, and of the reflection of this connection—standing Hegel materialistically on his feet—in the concept of man, which must be so polished, broken-in, flexible, mobile, relative, mutually-tied-in, unified in opposition, as to embrace the world. The continuation of the work of Hegel and Marx must consist in the *dialectical* working out of the history of human thought, science, and technology.

(Volume II, page 105)

"When all the Conditions of a Fact are present, it enters into Existence."

Very good! What have the Absolute Idea and Idealism to do with this?

Remarkable this "derivation" . . . of existence.

(Volume II, pages 131-132)

NB Law is the persistent (remaining) in appearance.

Law is the identity in appearance.

NB Law—the quiescent reflection in appearance.

NB

This is remarkably materialistic and remarkably pointed (in a word, "quiescent") determination. Law takes the quiescent—and therefore law, every law is narrow, incomplete, an approximation.

(Volume II, page 140)

The essence is that both the World of Appearance and the world which is in itself are essentially *moments* of the knowledge of nature by man, steps, *changes* in (or deepening of) knowledge. The shift of the world in itself ever further and further *from* the world of appearance—that is what is not yet visible in Hegel. *NB*. Do not the "moments" of notion with Hegel have the significance of "moments" of transition?

(Volume II, pages 173-187)

Section Three, Actuality

Regarding the question of "Possibility" Hegel notes the emptiness of this category and in the *Encyclopaedia** writes:

"Whether a thing is possible or impossible depends altogether on the subject matter: that is, on the sum total of the elements in Actuality which, as it opens itself out, discloses itself to be a necessity."

"The sum total of the elements in actuality, which, as it opens itself out, discloses itself to be a necessity."

The unfoldment of the whole totality of moments of actuality NB=essence of dialectic knowledge.

(Volume II, page 192)

On the one hand, we must deepen the knowledge of matter to the knowledge (to the notion) of substance, in order to find the causes of appearance. On the other hand, actual knowledge of causes is the deepening of knowledge from externality of appearance to substance. Two types of examples should explain this: 1) out of the history of natural sciences, and 2) from the history of phil-

* The reference is to *The Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, the English translation of which, by William Wallace, has been published as *The Logic of Hegel*, in 1892 and reprinted in 1931. London and New York: Oxford University Press, page 262. Hereafter all references to the *Encyclopaedia* will be to this edition, which is also known as "The Smaller Logic."--Tr.

osophy. More precisely: not "examples" —*comparaison n'est pas raison*—but the *quintessence* of the one and the other plus the history of technology.

Cause and effect, ergo, only moment of every kind of interdependence, connection (of the universal), the concatenation of events are only links in the chain of the development of matter.

(Volume II, page 193)

NB

All-sidedness and all-embracing character of world connection are only one-sidedly, desultorily and incompletely expressed by causality.

NB

(Volume II, page 196)

This "inner spirit"—Cf. Plekhanov—is the idealistic, *mystical*, but very profound indication as to the historic causes of events. Hegel *fully* leads up to history under causality and 1,000 times more deeply and richly understands causality than the crowd of the "learned" now.

(Volume II, page 197)

What we ordinarily understand by Causality is only a small part of the universal connection, but (a materialistic addition) the small part is not subjective but the objectively real connection.

(Volume II, page 204)

When you read Hegel on Causality it seems strange at first sight why he stops so comparatively briefly on this theme loved by the Kantians. Why? Because for him causality is only *one* of the determinations of the universal connection, which he has earlier grasped in a much deeper and all-sided manner, in *all* its development, has from the very beginning and *always* emphasized this connection (reciprocal transitions), etc. etc. It would be very instructive to put alongside of the "t r a v a i l" of neo-empiricism (respective* physical idealism) the decisions, more accurately, the dialectic method of Hegel.

(Volume II, page 205)

At the end of Book II of the Logic, before the transition to the Notion, a definition is given: "*the Notion*, the realm of Subjectivity or of Freedom":

NB Freedom=subjectivity
("or")
goal, consciousness, striving NB

(Volume II, pages 221-222)

Book Three: Subjective Logic
The Doctrine of the Notion

Hegel is *essentially* completely right against Kant. Thought, emerging from the concrete to the abstract, does not separate—if it is *correct* (NB) (and Kant,

* The word "respective" appears in English in Lenin's text.—Tr.

like all philosophers, speaks about correct thinking)—*from* truth, but goes toward it. Abstraction of *matter*, of natural *law*, abstraction of *value*, etc., in a word, all scientific (correct, serious, not nonsensical, not absurd) abstractions reflect nature more deeply, truly, *fully*. From living observation to abstract thinking, *and from this to practice*—such is the dialectic road to knowledge of *truth*, the knowledge of objective reality. Kant degrades knowledge in order to make place for belief; Hegel elevates knowledge, believing that knowledge is knowledge of God. The materialist elevates knowledge of matter of nature, throwing God and the philosophic rabble defending Him into the dungheap.

(Volume II, page 224)

Here too Hegel is essentially *right*; *value* is a category which is "devoid of the stuff of sensuality," but it is *truer* than the law of supply and demand. Only Hegel is an idealist; therefore the nonsense of "constitutive," etc.

(Volume II, pages 233-300)

Section One: Subjectivity

The dialectic of movement of "Notion"—from purely "formal" notion at the beginning—to the *Judgment*, then to *Syllogism* and finally to transformation, from subjectivity of notion to its *Objectivity*.

First distinctive characteristic of notion—Universality. NB: Notion came

out of *Essence*, which came out of *Being*.

The further development of *Universality*, *Particularity* and *Individuality* is abstract and *abstruse* in the highest degree.

En lisant...
these parts of
the work should
be called: a best
means for get-
ting a head-
ache.*

Kuno Fischer explains these "abstruse" arguments very poorly, taking the easier examples from the *Encyclopaedia*, adding nonsense (against the French Revolution. Kuno Fischer, Vol. 8, 1901, p. 530), etc., but he does not show the reader *how* to search for the key to the difficult transitions, shades, overflows, ebbs of the Hegelian abstract notions.

Or all this is
the old, formal
logic? Yes! And
also the debt—
the debt of mys-
ticism = i d e a l-
ism

Voilà an a-
bundance of
"definitions"
and of defini-
tions of Notion
in this part of
the *Logic*!

Apparently here too what is important for Hegel is *to mark* the transitions. From a certain point of view, under certain conditions, the universal is the particular, the particular is the universal. Not only (1) the *connection*, and an indissoluble connection, of all notions and judgments, but (2) *transitions* of one into the other, and not only transition, but also (3) *identity of opposites*. This is what is important to Hegel. But this only "pierces through" the *mist* of analysis of the "arch-abstruse." The history of thought from the point of view of development and application of universal notions and categories of the *Logic*—voilà ce qu'il faut!

* This sentence is in English in Lenin's text.—Tr.

(Volume II, page 307)

"All things are a Syllogism." NB
Hegel's analysis of the Syllogisms (I-P-U, "individual, particular, universal," P-I-U, etc.) is reminiscent of Marx's imitation of Hegel in Chapter I.

(Volume II, page 309)

The forming of (abstract) notions and their utilization *already include* the presentation, the conviction, the *consciousness* of the law of the objective world connections. It is absurd to single out causality from this. It is impossible to reject the objectivity of notions, the objectivity of the universal in the particular and in the individual. Consequently, Hegel considerably more profoundly than Kant and others, investigates the reflection of the movement of the objective world in the movement of notions.

Just as the simple value form; the individual act of exchange of a given commodity with another, already includes, in undeveloped form, *all* major contradictions of capitalism,—so the simplest *generalization*, the first and simplest forming of *notions* (judgments, syllogisms, etc.) signifies the ever-deeper knowledge of the *objective* world connections. It is necessary here to seek the real sense, significance and role of Hegelian *Logic*. This NB.

NB
The question
of the true sig-
nificance of
Hegel's *Logic*

One must re-
turn to Hegel
in order to
analyze, step by
step, every kind
of current logic
and *theory of
knowledge*, of
Kantianism, etc.
NB: "Converse-
ly": Marx has
applied the dia-
lectic of Hegel
in its rational
form to polit-
ical economy.

Regarding the question of the criticism of contemporary Kantianism, Machism, etc.

Two aphorisms:

1) Plekhanov criticises Kantianism (and agnosticism in general) more from the vulgar materialistic than the dialectic materialistic point of view, *insofar* as he only *a limine* rejects their argumentation and does not *correct* them (as Hegel corrected Kant), by deepening, generalizing, broadening them; showing the *connections* and *transitions* of all and every notion.

2) (At the beginning of the 20th century) Marxists criticized the Kantians and Humists more in a Feuerbachian (and Buchnerian), than in a Hegelian, manner.

(Volume II, page 329)

Aphorism: It is impossible fully to grasp Marx's *Capital*, and especially its first chapter, if you have not studied through and understood the *whole* of Hegel's *Logic*. Consequently, none of the Marxists for the past 1/2 century have understood Marx!

Aphorism

Hegel actually demonstrated that the logical forms and laws are not an empty shell, but a *reflection* of the objective world. More precisely, did not demonstrate, but guessed brilliantly.

Very profound and wise! The laws of logic are the reflection of the objective in the subjective consciousness of man.

(Volume II, pages 343-394)
Section Two. *Objectivity*.

(Volume II, page 380)

Materialist dialectic

The laws of the external world, of nature, the subdivisions of *Mechanism* and *Chemism* (this is very important) are the bases of the *totality* of the activity of man.

In his practical activity man has before him the objective world, depends on it, and his activity is determined by it.

From this point of view, from the point of practical (end-positing) activity of man, the mechanical (and the chemical) causality of the world (of nature) appears as something *external*, secondary, hidden.

2 forms of the *Objectivity* of the process: nature (mechanical and chemical) and *end-depositing* activity of man. The relationship of these forms. The aims of man seem at first alien ("other") in relationship to nature. Consciousness of man, of science ("notion") reflects essence, the substance of nature. But at the same time this consciousness is external in relationship to nature (not at once, not simply coinciding with it).

MECHANICAL AND CHEMICAL TECHNIQUE PRECISELY FOR THIS REASON SERVES THE AIMS OF MEN. ITS CHARACTER (ESSENCE) CONSISTS IN THE FACT THAT IT IS DETERMINED BY EXTERNAL CONDITIONS (LAWS OF NATURE).

(Volume II, pages 381-3)

In reality the aims of man are generated by the objective world and presuppose it, find it as the given, existent. But it *appears* to man that his aims are taken outside of the world, independent of the world ("free").

((NB: All this relates to the "Subjective End" NB))

(Volume II, pages 387-8)

"Insofar as the Means is higher than the finite Ends of external usefulness: the *plot* is more honorable than are immediately those enjoyments that are procured by it, and are Ends. The instrument is preserved, while the immediate enjoyments pass away and are forgotten. *In his tools man possesses power over external NATURE, EVEN THOUGH, ACCORDING TO HIS ENDS, he frequently is subjected to it.*"*

Hegel and historical materialism

(Volume II, pages 386-394)

All this is in "the Realized End."

Historical materialism is one of the applications and developments of the ideas of a genius which, in seed, in embryo, are to be found in Hegel.

* The emphasis is Lenin's, not Hegel's.—Tr.

When Hegel tries—sometimes even strains himself and worries to death—to subsume the purposeful activity of man under the categories of logic, saying that this activity is the "syllogism," that the subject plays the role of some sort of "member" in the logical "figure" of the syllogism, etc., *then this is not only a strain, not only a game.* There is here a very deep content, purely materialistic. It is necessary to turn this around: The practical activity of man, repeated billions of times, must lead the consciousness of man to the repetition of the various logical figures in order that these can achieve the significance of an *axiom.* *This nota bene.*

NB

The categories of *Logic* and the practice of man

NB

Remarkable: Hegel goes *through* the practical, end-positing activity of man, to get to the "Idea" as correspondence of the notion with the object, to the Idea as *truth.* A close approach to this, that man by his *practice* demonstrated the objective correctness of his ideas, notions, knowledge, science.

From subjective notion and subjective end to *objective truth.*

(Volume II, pages 395-486)

Section III: The Idea

(Volume II, pages 395-400)

In general the introduction to The Idea of Part II of the *Logic* (Subjective Logic) and the corresponding paragraphs in the *Encyclopaedia* is nearly the very best description of the dialectic.

Here, then, the correspondence, so to speak, of logic and gnoseology is demonstrated in a remarkably inspired manner.

(Volume II, pages 399-400)

Idea (read: knowledge of man) is the correspondence (conformance) of the notion and objectivity ("the universal"). This firstly.

Secondly, the idea is the *relationship* of subjectivity (=man) existing for itself (=as if independent) to objectivity *distinct* (from this idea).

Subjectivity is the *striving* to abolish this separation (of idea from the object).

Knowledge is a *process* of submersion in inorganic nature (of mind) for the sake of subordinating to it the power of the subject and generalization (of the knowledge of the universal in phenomena) . . . Correspondence of thought with the object is a *process*. Thought (=man) must not present to itself thought in the form of a dead repose, in the form of a simple picture (image) of the pale (spent) thought, without impulse or motion, as a genii, a number, as an abstraction.

Knowledge is eternal, infinitite approachment of thought to object. The *reflection* of nature in the thought of man must be understood not in a "dead," not in an "abstract" manner, *not without motion, not without contradictions, but in an eternal process of movement, emergence* of contradictions and their solution.

(*Encyclopaedia*, pages 302-4)

The *totality* of all sides of a phenomenon, of actuality and their (mutual) *relation*—this is out of what truth is formed. Relations (= transitions=contradictions) of notions—the main content of logic, and moreover these notions (and their relations, transitions, contradictions) are shown as reflections of the objective world. The dialectic of *things* creates the dialectic of *ideas*, and not the reverse.

#One must express this aphorism more popularly, *without* the word, dialectic: thus: Hegel brilliantly *guessed* in change, in the inter-relations of *all* notions, in the *identity of opposites*, in the *transitions* of one notion into another, in eternal change, of movement of notions *just such a relation of things, of nature*.

=
interdependence of concepts
< of all >
without exception
transitions of concepts of one into the other < of all > without exception
relativity of the opposition between concepts . . . identity of oppositions between concepts.

Hegel as a genius *guessed* the dialectic of things, phenomena, the world (nature), in the dialectic of notions.#

Precisely *guessed*, and no more.

In what does the dialectic consist?

=NB

Every concept finds itself in a certain *relation*, in a certain connection with *all* the rest.

(Encyclopaedia, pages 352-5)

Truth is a process. From the subjective idea man goes to objective truth through "practice" (and technique).

Idea is "truth" (paragraph 213). The Idea, i.e., truth as a process—because truth is a *process*—goes through three steps in its *development*: 1) life; 2) process of knowledge, including *practice* of man and *technique* (see above); 3) the step of the absolute idea (i.e., full truth).

Life gives birth to brain. Nature is reflected in the brain of man. Man, by verifying and applying in practice and in technique the correctness of these reflections, arrives at objective truth.

(Encyclopaedia, pages 360-361)

"The inorganic nature which is subdued by the vital agent suffers this fate, because it is *virtually* the same as what life is *actually*."

Conversely—pure materialism. Splendid, profound, true! And also NB: demonstrates the extreme correctness of the terms "in itself" and "for itself"!!!

(Volume II, page 429)

The logical notions are subjective so long as they remain "abstract," in their abstract form, and at the same time express also the thing-in-itself. Nature and concreteness and abstractness and phenomenon and essence and moment and relation. Man's cognition is subjective in its abstractness and separateness but objective as a whole, in the process, in the result, in the tendency, in the source.

(Volume II, page 460)

Theoretic cognition must give the object in its necessity, in its all-sided relations, in its contradictory movement in and for itself. But man's understanding "definitively" grasps this objective truth of cognition, discerns it, masters it only when cognition becomes "being for itself" in the sense of practice, i.e., the practice of man and humanity is the verification, criterion of objectivity of knowledge. Is that the thought of Hegel? One must return here.

Hegel about practice and the objectivity of cognition.

All this is in the chapter on "The Idea of Cognition" (Chapter II) in the transition to "The Absolute Idea" (Chapter III), i.e., undoubtedly practice in Hegel stands as a link in the analysis of the process of cognition and precisely as a transition to the objective ("absolute," according to Hegel) truth. Marx, consequently, clings to Hegel, introducing criteria of practice into the theory of knowledge. Cf. *Theses on Feuerbach*.

Practice in the theory of cognition.

Alias:

Man's cognition not only reflects the objective world, but creates it.

(Volume II, page 463)

NB

"Syllogism of action." For Hegel *action*, practice is the *logical conclusion* of the figure of logic. And this is true! Of course, not in the sense that the figure of logic has by its Otherness the practice of man (=absolute idealism) but vice versa: the practice of man, repeated billions of times, fastens itself in the consciousness of man by the figures of logic. The figures have the solidity of a prejudice, an axiomatic character precisely (and only) because of this billion times repetition.

1st postulate: *good End* (subjective aim) *versus actuality* ("external actuality")

NB

2nd postulate: external means (weapon) (objectivity)

3rd postulate: namely, the conclusion: the correspondence of subject and object, the verification of subjective ideas, the criteria of objective truth.

(Volume II, page 465)

NB

The activity of man, composing for itself an objective picture of the world, *changes* the external activity, transcends its determinateness (=changes these or other of its aspects, qualities) and thus takes away from it the traits of show, externality and nullity, gives it being-in-itself and for itself (=objective truth).

(Volume II, pages 466-486)

Chapter III. "The Absolute Idea"

(Volume II, page 466)

The unity of theoretic ideas (cognition) and *practice*—this NB—and this unity *precisely in theory of knowledge* for the result is the "Absolute Idea" (and Idea="objective truth").

(Volume II, page 473)

We can, if you please, present these elements of the dialectic in a more detailed way, thus:

1) The *objectivity* of the analysis (not examples, not digression, but the thing in itself).

2) The whole totality of the manifold *relations* of this thing to the others.

3) The *development* of this thing (respective appearance), its own movement, its own life.

4) The internally contradictory *tendencies* (and sides) of this thing.

5) The thing (the appearance, etc.) as sum and *unity of opposites*.

6) The *struggle* respective* the unfolding of these opposites; the contradictions of the impulses, etc.

7) The unity of analysis and synthesis,—disintegration of the particular parts of the totality, the summation of these parts together.

Elements of the dialectic.

* The word "respective" was in English in Lenin's text.—Tr.

8) The relation of *each* thing (appearance, etc.) is not only manifold but general, universal. Each thing (appearance, process, etc.) is connected with *every* other.

9) Not only unity of opposites but *transitions of every* determination, quality, characteristic, side, feature into *every* other (into its opposite).

10) Infinite process of unfolding of *new* sides, relations, etc.

11) Infinite process of the deepening of man's cognition of things, appearances, processes, etc., from appearance to essence, and from the less profound to the more profound essence.

12) From co-existence to causality and from one form of connection and of mutual dependence to another, deeper and more universal.

13) The repetition at a higher stage of certain features, characteristics, etc., of the lower, and

14) The apparent return to the old (*the negation of the negation*).

15) The struggle of the content with the form and the reverse. The shedding of the form, the transformation of the content.

16) The *transition* of quantity into quality and *vice versa*. ((15 and 16 are examples of 9))

Briefly the dialectic can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. Thereby is the kernel of the dialectic grasped, but that demands explanation and development.

(Volume II, pages 473-474)

Further there follows an interesting, clear, important *sketch of dialectic*.

(Volume II, page 476)

Not a bare negation, not a random negation, not a *sceptical negation*, vacillation, doubt, which is characteristic and existent in the dialectic—which, undoubtedly, contains in itself the element of negation and as the most important element at that—no, but a negation as a moment of connection, as a moment of development, retaining the positive, i.e., without any vacillation, without any eclecticism.

Here is what is important:

1) the characteristic of the dialectic: self-movement, source of activity, movement of life and spirit; correspondence of notions of the subject (man) with reality;

2) objectivism to the highest degree ("the most objective moment").

NB: In the smaller logic (The *Encyclopaedia*, page 379) the last phrase of the book is: "but this Idea which has Being is Nature."

(Volume II, page 485)

This phrase on the last* page of the *Logic* is extraordinarily remarkable. The transition of the logical idea to *nature*. Stretches a hand to materialism. Engels was right when he said that the system of Hegel is materialism turned upside down. This is not the last phrase of the *Logic*, but what follows to the end of the page is not important.

End of the *Logic*. December 17, 1914.

Supplementary Quotations from the *Encyclopaedia* (pages 364-379)

Plan of the Dialectic (Logic) Contents
Page of the Smaller Logic (*Encyclopaedia*)

Cognition (knowledge) in Being (in the immediate phenomena) reveals the essence (law of cause, identity, difference, etc.)—such actually is the *universal course* of all of man's knowledge (of all of science) in general. Such is the course also of *natural science* and *political economy* (and of history). So precisely is the dialectic of Hegel the generalization of the history of thought.

Extremely productive seems to be the task to follow this through more concretely, in greater detail, regarding the *history of individual sciences*. In the

* In the English edition the phrase referred to, "it is Nature," is on the page before the last.—Tr.

Logic the history of thought *must*, in general and as a whole, correspond with the laws of thought.

If Marx did not leave a *Logic* (with a capital letter), he left the *logic of Capital*, and this should be especially utilized on the given question. In *Capital*, the logic, dialectic and theory of knowledge of materialism (3 words are not necessary; they are one and the same) are applied to one science, taking all that is valuable in Hegel and moving it forward.

Commodity—money—capital

- production of absolute surplus value
- production of relative surplus value

The history of capitalism and the analysis of the *notions* summing it up.

The beginning—the most simple, ordinary, obvious, immediate "being": an individual commodity ("being" in political economy). Its analysis, as a social relation. The analysis is a *dual* one, deductive and inductive,—logical and historical (forms of value). Verification of facts respective* the practice is here in *every* step of the analysis.

* The English word "respective" is in Lenin's text.—Tr.

Cf. regarding the question about essence versus appearance

- price and value
- demand and supply versus "value"
(="crystallized labor")
- wages and price of labor power

Excerpts from Lenin's Abstract of Hegel's *History of Philosophy*

Intelligent idealism is nearer to intelligent materialism than is stupid materialism.

Dialectical idealism instead of intelligent; metaphysical, undeveloped, dead, vulgar, static, instead of stupid.

NB

Work out:

Plekhanov wrote probably nearly 1,000 pages (Belov + against Bogdanov + against Kantians + basic questions, etc., etc. on philosophy (dialectic).

There is in them *nil* about the Larger Logic, its thoughts (i.e., dialectic *proper*, as a philosophic science) nil !!

NB

Aristotle's critique of "the ideas" of Plato is a critique of *idealism as idealism in general*: because wherever notions, abstractions are, there are also "the law," and "necessity," etc. The idealist Hegel in a cowardly fashion goes around the fact that Aristotle (in his criticism of the Ideas of Plato) undermined the *foundations* of idealism.

Materialism is always the victor when *one* idealist criticizes the foundations of *another* idealist. Cf. Aristotle vs. Plato, etc. Hegel versus Kant, etc.

Hegel, the adherent of the dialectic, was incapable of understanding *dialectically* the transition *from matter to movement, from matter to consciousness*—especially the second.

Marx corrected the mistake (or weakness?) of the mystic.

NB

Not only is the transition from matter to consciousness dialectical, but so is it from feeling to thought, etc.