APPENDIX B

First English Translation of V. I. LENIN: ABSTRACT OF HEGEL'S SCIENCE OF LOGIC

Translator's Note: This Abstract of Hegel's Science of Logic is the central part of Lenin's Philosophical Notebooks. Lenin wrote these comments as he was reading and copying many sections of Hegel's Werke in 1914. The Abstract was first published in Russian in the Lenin Miscellany, Volume IX, by the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute in 1929. The Philosophic Notebooks were then published as a separate volume and it is from the 1947 edition by the Institute that the present translation is made.

This translation does not include the extracts from Hegel. The translator merely indicates alongside which passages in Hegel Lenin wrote his comments. He used the 1883 edition of Hegel's Werke, published in Berlin. The pages cited in the present translation, however, refer not to the edition Lenin used, but to the pages in the standard English translation of Hegel's Science of Logic by W. H. Johnston and L. G. Struthers (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1929 and 1951; London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1951). The present translator has excerpted the greater part of these comments, and has also included a few excerpts from Lenin's comments on Hegel's other works: Encyclopaedia, and the History of Philosophy. These were first published in the Lenin Miscellany, Vol. XII, 1930, and republished in the above-mentioned 1947 edition.

—R. D.
2) "the immanent origination of distinctions"—the inner, objective logic of the evolution of the struggle of the distinctions in a polarity.

(Appendix, page 142)

Acute and profound! Hegel analyzes concepts which usually appear dead, and he shows that there is movement in them. The finite? That means movement has come to an end! Something?—That means not what Other is.—Being in general?—That means such indeterminateness that being=Not-Being. All-sided universal flexibility of concepts—flexibility reaching to the identity of opposites.—That is the essence. This flexibility, subjectively applied=eclecticism and sophistry. When this flexibility is objectively applied, i.e., reflects the all-sidedness of the material process and its unity, then it is dialectic; it is the correct reflection of the eternal development of the world.

(Notes, page 173-6)

The idea of the transformation of the ideal into the real is profound. Very important for history. But also in the personal life of man it is evident that there is much truth in this. Against vulgar materialism. NB. The difference of the ideal from the material is also not unconditional, not excessive.

(Volume I, page 182)

Evidently Hegel draws his self-development of concepts, of categories, from the whole history of philosophy. This gives a new side to the whole of the Logic...
In the Observation, as everywhere, Hegel brings in facts, examples, the concrete (Feuerbach therefore dares once to assert that Hegel reduced Nature to Observation, Feuerbach, Works, p.?)

Leaps!

Interruptions in gradualness

Leaps!

Leaps!

Further: Transition of Being to Essence is analyzed doubly obscurely.

End of Volume I.

Thus here also Hegel accuses Kant of subjectivism. This NB. Hegel is for the "objective validity" (sit venia verbo) of show, "of the immediate given" (the term, given, is common with Hegel in general.) The little philosophers dispute whether one should take as basis essence or the immediately given. (Kant, Hume, all Machists). Hegel substitutes "and" for "or," and explains the concrete content of this "and".

Observation 2. Law of the Excluded Middle.

This is very profound and true. Every concrete thing, every concrete something stands in diverse and often contradictory relation to all others, ergo, it is itself and others.

* Volume II of the English translation includes what Hegel called Book II of Volume I: Doctrine of Essence.—Tr.

** The reference is to Kant's Critique of Judgment.—Tr.

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Movement and "self-movement" (this NB! arbitrary (independent) spontaneous, internally-necessary movement,) "change," "movement and life," "the principle of every self-movement," "impulse" (Trieb) to "movement" and "activity"—opposite of "dead being."—Who would believe that this is the core of "Hegelianism," of abstract and abstruse (difficult, absurd?) Hegelianism? It is necessary to reveal, to understand, to save, to release, to purify this kernel—which is precisely what Marx and Engels have done.

The idea of universal movement and change (1813, Logic) was disclosed before its application to life and society. It was proclaimed in reference to society (1847)* earlier than in relation to man (1859)**.

NB

(1) Ordinary perception grasps the difference and the contradiction, but not the transition of one to the other, but this is the most important.

(2) Intelligent reflection and mind. Reflection grasps the contradiction, expresses it, brings things in relation to one another, compels the "concept to

* The reference is to the Communist Manifesto.—Tr.

** The reference is to the Origin of Species.—Tr.
shine through the contradiction" but does not express the concept of things and their relation.


APPENDIX

(Volume II, page 105)

“When all the Conditions of a Fact are present, it enters into Existence.”

Very good! What have the Absolute Idea and Idealism to do with this?

Remarkable this “derivation” . . . of existence.

(Volume II, pages 131-132)

NB Law is the persistent (remaining) in appearance.

Law is the identity in appearance.

NB Law—the quiescent reflection in appearance.

This is remarkably materialistic and remarkably pointed (in a word, “quiescent”) determination. Law takes the quiescent—and therefore law, every law is narrow, incomplete, an approximation.

(Volume II, page 140)

The essence is that both the World of Appearance and the world which is in itself are essentially moments of the knowledge of nature by man, steps, changes in (or deepening of) knowledge. The shift of the world in itself ever further and further from the world of appearance—that is what is not yet visible in Hegel. NB. Do not the “moments” of notion, with Hegel have the significance of “moments” of transition?
(Volume II, pages 173-187)

Section Three, Actuality

Regarding the question of "Possibility" Hegel notes the emptiness of this category and in the Encyclopedia* writes:

"Whether a thing is possible or impossible depends altogether on the subject matter: that is, on the sum total of the elements in Actuality which, as it opens itself out, discloses itself to be a necessity."

"The sum total of the elements in actuality, which as it opens itself out, discloses itself to be a necessity."

The unfoldment of the whole totality of moments of actuality NB = essence of dialectic knowledge.

(Volume II, page 192)

On the one hand, we must deepen the knowledge of matter to the knowledge (to the notion) of substance, in order to find the causes of appearance. On the other hand, actual knowledge of causes is the deepening of knowledge from externality of appearance to substance.

Two types of examples should explain this: 1) out of the history of natural sciences, and 2) from the history of phil-

* The reference is to The Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, the English translation of which, by William Wallace, has been published as The Logic of Hegel, in 1892 and reprinted in 1951. London and New York: Oxford University Press, page 262. Hereafter all references to the Encyclopaedia will be to this edition, which is also known as "The Smaller Logic."— Ty.

APPENDIX

osophy. More precisely: not "examples"—comparaison n'est pas raison—but the quintessence of the one and the other plus the history of technology.

Cause and effect, ergo, only moment of every kind of interdependence, connection (of the universal), the concatenation of events are only links in the chain of the development of matter.

(Volume II, page 198)

NB

All-sidedness and all-embracing character of world connection are only one-sidedly, desultorily and incompletely expressed by causality.

(Volume II, page 196)

This "inner spirit"—Cf. Plekhanov—is the idealistic, mystical, but very profound indication as to the historic causes of events. Hegel fully leads up to history under causality and 1,000 times more deeply and richly understands causality than the crowd of the "learned" now.

(Volume II, page 197)

NB

What we ordinarily understand by Causality is only a small part of the universal connection, but (a materialistic addition) the small part is not subjective but the objectively real connection.
When you read Hegel on Causality it seems strange at first sight why he stops so comparatively briefly on this theme loved by the Kantians. Why? Because for him causality is only one of the determinations of the universal connection, which he has earlier grasped in a much deeper and all-sided manner, in all its development, has from the very beginning and always emphasized this connection (reciprocal transitions), etc. etc. It would be very instructive to put alongside of the “trivial” of neo-empiricism (respectively physical idealism) the decisions, more accurately, the dialectic method of Hegel.

At the end of Book II of the Logic, before the transition to the Notion, a definition is given: “the Notion, the realm of Subjectivity or of Freedom”:

NB Freedom = subjectivity
("or")
goal, consciousness, striving

Hegel is essentially completely right against Kant. Thought, emerging from the concrete to the abstract, does not separate—if it is correct (NB) (and Kant,

Here too Hegel is essentially right; value is a category which is “devoid of the stuff of sensuality,” but it is truer than the law of supply and demand. Only Hegel is an idealist; therefore the nonsense of “constitutive,” etc.

The dialectic of movement of “Notion”—from purely “formal” notion at the beginning—to the Judgment, then to Syllogism and finally to transformation, from subjectivity of notion to its Objectivity.

First distinctive characteristic of notion—Universality. NB: Notion came
out of *Essence*, which came out of *Being*.

The further development of *Universality, Particularity* and *Individuality* is abstract and *abstract* in the highest degree.

*Kuno Fischer explains these "abstract" arguments very poorly, taking the easier examples from the *Encyclopædia*, adding nonsense (against the French Revolution. Kuno Fischer, Vol. 8, 1901, p. 530), etc., but he does not show the reader how to search for the key to the difficult transitions, shades, overflows, ebbs of the Hegelian abstract notions.*

*Or all this is the old, formal logic? Yes! And also the debt—the debt of mysticism to idealism.*

*Voilà an abundance of definitions and of definitions of Notion in this part of the *Logie*!*

*This sentence is in English in Lenin's text.—Tr.*

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**APPENDIX**

(Volume II, page 307)

"All things are a Syllogism." NB Hegel's analysis of the Syllogisms (1-P-U, "individual, particular, universal," P-I-U, etc.) is reminiscent of Marx's imitation of Hegel in Chapter I.

(Volume II, page 309)

The forming of (abstract) notions and their utilization already include the presentation, the conviction, the consiousness of the law of the objective world connections. It is absurd to single out causality from this. It is impossible to reject the objectivity of notions, the objectivity of the universal in the particular and in the individual. Consequently, Hegel considerably more profoundly than Kant and others, investigates the reflection of the movement of the objective world in the movement of notions.

Just as the simple value form, the individual act of exchange of a given commodity with another, already includes, in undeveloped form, all major contradictions of capitalism,—so the simplest generalization, the first and simplest forming of notions (judgments, syllogisms, etc.) signifies the ever-deeper knowledge of the objective world connections. It is necessary here to seek the real sense, significance and role of Hegelian Logie. This NB.
Two aphorisms:

1) Plekhanov criticises Kantianism (and agnosticism in general) more from the vulgar materialistic than the dialectic materialistic point of view, insofar as he only a *limine rejects* their argumentation and does not *correct* them (as Hegel corrected Kant), by deepening, generalizing, broadening them, showing the *connections* and *transitions* of all and every notion.

2) (At the beginning of the 20th century) Marxists criticized the Kantians and Humanists more in a Feuerbachian (and Buchnerian), than in a Hegelian, manner.

(A Volume II, page 329)

*Apohorism:* It is impossible fully to grasp Marx’s *Capital,* and especially its first chapter, if you have not studied through and understood the whole of Hegel’s *Logic.* Consequently, none of the Marxists for the past ½ century have understood Marx!

Hegel actually demonstrated that the logical forms and laws are not an empty shell, but a *reflection* of the objective world. More precisely, did not demonstrate, but guessed brilliantly.

Very profound and wise! The laws of logic are the reflection of the objective in the subjective consciousness of man.
(Volume II, pages 381-3)

In reality the aims of man are generated by the objective world and presuppose it, find it as the given, existent. But it appears to man that his aims are taken outside of the world, independent of the world ("free").

(NB: All this relates to the "Subjective End" NB)

(Volume II, pages 387-8)

"Insofar as the Means is higher than the finite Ends of external usefulness: the"plough" is more honorable than are immediately those enjoyments that are procured by it, and are Ends. The instrument is preserved, while the immediate enjoyments pass away and are forgotten. In his tools man possesses power over external NATURE, EVEN THOUGH, ACCORDING TO HIS ENDS, he frequently is subjected to it."*

(Volume II, pages 386-394)

All this is in "the Realized End."

Historical materialism is one of the applications and developments of the ideas of a genius which, in seed, in embryo, are to be found in Hegel.

* The emphasis is Lenin's, not Hegel's.—Tr.

APPENDIX

When Hegel tries—sometimes even strains himself and worries to death—to subsume the purposeful activity of man under the categories of logic, saying that this activity is the "syllogism," that the subject plays the role of some sort of "member" in the logical "figure" of the syllogism, etc., then this is not only a strain, not only a game. There is here a very deep content, purely materialistic. It is necessary to turn this around: The practical activity of man, repeated billions of times, must lead the consciousness of man to the repetition of the various logical figures in order that these can achieve the significance of an axiom. This note bene.

NB

The categories of Logic and the practice of man.

Remarkable: Hegel goes through the practical, end-posing activity of man, to get to the "Idea" as correspondence of the notion with the object, to the Idea as truth. A close approach to this, that man by his practice demonstrated the objective correctness of his ideas, notions, knowledge, science.

From subjective notion and subjective end to objective truth.

(Volume II, pages 395-486)

Section III: The Idea

(Volume II, pages 395-400)

In general the introduction to The Idea of Part II of the Logic (Subjective Logic) and the corresponding paragraphs in the Encyclopaedia is nearly the very best description of the dialectic.
Here, then, the correspondence, so to speak, of logic and gnoseology is demonstrated in a remarkably inspired manner.

(Volume II, pages 399-400)

Idea (read: knowledge of man) is the correspondence (conformance) of the notion and objectivity ("the universal"). This firstly.

Secondly, the idea is the relationship of subjectivity (=man) existing for itself (= as if independent) to objectivity distinct (from this idea).

Subjectivity is the striving to abolish this separation (of idea from the object).

Knowledge is a process of submersion in inorganic nature (of mind) for the sake of subordinating to it the power of the subject and generalization (of the knowledge of the universal in phenomena). . . . Correspondence of thought with the object is a process. Thought (=man) must not present to itself thought in the form of a dead reposes, in the form of a simple picture (image) of the pales (spent) thought, without impulse or motion, as a genii, a number, as an abstraction.

Knowledge is eternal, infinite approach of thought to object. The reflection of nature in the thought of man must be understood not in a "dead," not in an "abstract" manner, not without motion, not without contradictions, but in an eternal process of movement, emergence of contradictions and their solution.

(Encyclopaedia, pages 302-4)

The totality of all sides of a phenomenon, of actuality and their (mutual) relation—this is out of what truth is formed. Relations (= transitions=contradictions) of notions—the main content of logic, and moreover these notions (and their relations, transitions, contradictions) are shown as reflections of the objective world. The dialectic of things creates the dialectic of ideas, and not the reverse.

#One must express this aphorism more popularly, without the word, dialectic: thus: Hegel brilliantly guessed in change, in the inter-relation of all notions, in the identity of opposites, in the transitions of one notion into another, in eternal change, of movement of notions just such a relation of things, of nature.

Precisely guessed, and no more.

In what does the dialectic consist?

Every concept finds itself in a certain relation, in a certain connection with all the rest.
Truth is a process. From the subjective idea man goes to objective truth through "practice" (and technique).

Idea is "truth" (paragraph 213). The idea, i.e., truth as a process—because truth is a process—goes through three steps in its development: 1) life; 2) process of knowledge, including practice of man and technique (see above); and 3) the step of the absolute idea (i.e., full truth).

Life gives birth to brain. Nature is reflected in the brain of man. Man, by verifying and applying in practice and in technique the correctness of these reflections, arrives at objective truth.

"The inorganic nature which is subdued by the vital agent suffers this fate, because it is virtually the same as what life is actually."

Conversely—pure materialism. Splendid, profound, true! And also NB: demonstrates the extreme correctness of the terms "in itself" and "for itself"!

The logical notions are subjective so long as they remain "abstract," in their abstract form, and at the same time express also the thing-in-itself. Nature and concreteness and abstractness and phenomenon and essence and moment and relation. Man's cognition is subjective in its abstractness and separateness but objective as a whole, in the process, in the result, in the tendency, in the source.

Hegel about practice and the objectivity of cognition.

All this is in the chapter on "The Idea of Cognition" (Chapter II) in the transition to "The Absolute Idea" (Chapter III), i.e., undoubtedly practice in Hegel stands as a link in the analysis of the process of cognition and precisely as a transition to the objective ("absolute," according to Hegel) truth. Marx, consequently, clings to Hegel, introducing criteria of practice into the theory of knowledge. Cf. Theses on Feuerbach.

Practice in the theory of cognition.

Alias:

Man's cognition not only reflects the objective world, but creates it.
(Volume II, page 465)

The activity of man, composing for itself an objective picture of the world, changes the external activity, transcends its determinateness (=changes these or other of its aspects, qualities) and thus takes away from it the traits of show, externality and nullity, gives it being-in-itself and for itself (=objective truth).

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(NB)

"Syllogism of action." For Hegel action, practice is the logical conclusion of the figure of logic. And this is true! Of course, not in the sense that the figure of logic has by its Otherness the practice of man (=absolute idealism) but vice versa: the practice of man, repeated billions of times, fastens itself in the consciousness of man by the figures of logic. The figures have the solidity of a prejudice, an axiomatic character precisely (and only) because of this billion times repetition.

1st postulate: good End (subjective aim) versus actuality ("external actuality")

2nd postulate: external means (weapon) (objectivity)

3rd postulate: namely, the conclusion: the correspondence of subject and object, the verification of subjective ideas, the criteria of objective truth.

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(NB)

Elements of the dialectic.

(Appendix, pages 466-486)

Chapter III. "The Absolute Idea"

(Volume II, page 466)

The unity of theoretic ideas (cognition) and practice—this NB—and this unity precisely in the theory of knowledge for the result is the "Absolute Idea" (and Idea—"objective truth").

(Volume II, page 473)

We can, if you please, present these elements of the dialectic in a more detailed way, thus:

1) The objectivity of the analysis (not examples, not digression, but the thing in itself).

2) The whole totality of the manifold relations of this thing to the others.

3) The development of this thing (respective appearance), its own movement, its own life.

4) The internally contradictory tendencies (and sides) of this thing.

5) The thing (the appearance, etc.) as sum and unity of opposites.

6) The struggle respective the unfolding of these opposites, the contradictions of the impulses, etc.

7) The unity of analysis and synthesis—disintegration of the particular parts of the totality, the summation of these parts together.

* The word "respective" was in English in Lenin's text.—Tr.
8) The relation of each thing (appearance, etc.) is not only manifold but general, universal. Each thing (appearance, process, etc.) is connected with every other.

9) Not only unity of opposites but transitions of every determination, quality, characteristic, side, feature into every other (into its opposite).

10) Infinite process of unfolding of new sides, relations, etc.

11) Infinite process of the deepening of man's cognition of things, appearances, processes, etc., from appearance to essence, and from the less profound to the more profound essence.

12) From co-existence to causality and from one form of connection and of mutual dependence to another, deeper and more universal.

13) The repetition at a higher stage of certain features, characteristics, etc., of the lower, and

14) The apparent return to the old (the negation of the negation).

15) The struggle of the content with the form and the reverse. The shedding of the form, the transformation of the content.

16) The transition of quantity into quality and vice versa. ((15 and 16 are examples of 9))

APPENDIX

Briefly the dialectic can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. Thereby is the kernel of the dialectic grasped, but that demands explanation and development.

(Volume II, pages 473-474)

Further there follows an interesting, clear, important sketch of dialectic.

(Volume II, page 476)

Not a bare negation, not a random negation, not a sceptical negation, vacillation, doubt, which is characteristic and existent in the dialectic—which, undoubtedly, contains in itself the element of negation and as the most important element at that—no, but a negation as a moment of connection, as a moment of development, retaining the positive, i.e., without any vacillation, without any eclecticism.

Here is what is important:

1) the characteristic of the dialectic: self-movement, source of activity, movement of life and spirit; correspondence of notions of the subject (man) with reality;

2) objectivism to the highest degree ("the most objective moment").
This phrase on the last* page of the Logic is extraordinarily remarkable. The transition of the logical idea to nature. Stretches a hand to materialism. Engels was right when he said that the system of Hegel is materialism turned upside down. This is not the last phrase of the Logic, but what follows to the end of the page is not important.

End of the Logic. December 17, 1914.

Supplementary Quotations from the Encyclopaedia (pages 364-379)

Plan of the Dialectic. (Logic) Contents Page of the Smaller Logic (Encyclopaedia)

Cognition (knowledge) in Being (in the immediate phenomena) reveals the essence (law of cause, identity, difference, etc.)—such actually is the universal course of all of man's knowledge (of all of science) in general. Such is the course also of natural science and political economy (and of history). So precisely is the dialectic of Hegel the generalization of the history of thought.

Extremely productive seems to be the task to follow this through more concretely, in greater detail, regarding the history of individual sciences. In the

* In the English edition the phrase referred to, "it is Nature," is on the page before the last.—Tr.

APPENDIX

Logic the history of thought must, in general and as a whole, correspond with the laws of thought.

If Marx did not leave a Logic (with a capital letter), he left the logic of Capital, and this should be especially utilized on the given question. In Capital, the logic, dialectic and theory of knowledge of materialism (3 words are not necessary: they are one and the same) are applied to one science, taking all that is valuable in Hegel and moving it forward.

Commodity—money—capital

→ production of absolute surplus value
→ production of relative surplus value

The history of capitalism and the analysis of the notions summing it up.

The beginning—the most simple, ordinary, obvious, immediate "being": an individual commodity ("being" in political economy). Its analysis, as a social relation. The analysis is a dual one, deductive and inductive,—logical and historical (forms of value). Verification of facts respective* the practice is here in every step of the analysis.

* The English word "respective" is in Lenin's text.—Tr.
MARXISM AND FREEDOM

Cf. regarding the question about essence versus appearance
—price and value
—demand and supply versus "value"
(="crystallized labor")
—wages and price of labor power

Excerpts from Lenin's Abstract of Hegel's History of Philosophy

Intelligent idealism is nearer to intelligent materialism than is stupid materialism.

Dialectical idealism instead of intelligent; metaphysical, undeveloped, dead, vulgar, static, instead of stupid.

Work out:
Plekhanov wrote probably nearly 1,000 pages (Beltov + against Bogdanov + against Kantians + basic questions, etc., etc. on philosophy (dialectic).

There is in them nil about the Larger Logic, its thoughts (i.e., dialectic proper, as a philosophic science) nil!!

NB
Aristotle's critique of "the ideas" of Plato is a critique of idealism as idealism in general: because wherever notions, abstractions are, there are also "the law," and "necessity," etc. The idealist Hegel in a cowardly fashion goes around the fact that Aristotle (in his criticism of the Ideas of Plato) undermined the foundations of idealism.

APPENDIX

Materialism is always the victor when one idealist criticizes the foundations of another idealist. Cf. Aristotle vs. Plato, etc. Hegel versus Kant, etc.

Hegel, the adherent of the dialectic, was incapable of understanding dialectically the transition from matter to movement, from matter to consciousness—especially the second.

Marx corrected the mistake (or weakness?) of the mystic.

NB
Not only is the transition from matter to consciousness dialectical, but so is it from feeling to thought, etc.