OCTOBER 1982

ON THE BATTLE OF IDEAS:
Philosophic-Theoretic Points of Departure as Political Tendencies Respond to the Objective Situation

Dear Colleagues:

This welcome to the new NEB includes, of course, all its members and not only those who have become NEB members for the first time. It is being written on the centenary of Marx’s discovery of still newer moments of development in life and in thought, as he read Morgan’s Ancient Society; 2) visited Algeria and became aware of what we now call the Third World; and 3) projected the idea that “The Historical Tendency of Capitalist Accumulation” — so characteristic of technologically developed Western capitalism — need not be the only path for the so-called backward countries. On the contrary, concluded Marx, a backward country like Russia could achieve a revolution ahead of the West and thereby hew out still another path to “revolution in permanence.”

I wish to develop this in the context of Hegel’s Absolutes on the one hand, and, on the other hand, new forces of revolution and Reason for our age. Here are the three subheadings: I. The Syllogism in the Doctrine of Notion and its Impact on Lenin in 1914, and on the Johnson-Forest Tendency in 1950-53; II. Dialectic Mediation and Absolute Negativity; III. Hegel’s Absolute Mind (paras. 575, 576, 577 of Philosophy of Mind); the Forces of Revolution as Reason, as they are analyzed in Rosa Luxemburg, Women’s Liberation and Marx’s Philosophy of Revolution.

I am taking advantage of the fact that we do not yet have the new book in hand, which will plunge us into so many activities that we’re bound to forget “abstract” philosophic points of departure. Ironic or otherwise, the truth is that I have suddenly become enmeshed in those points of departure, not because I was reading Hegel, but because I felt the inadequacy of the section on the Youth in the Perspectives Thesis. Because I felt that I had “shortchanged” them, I suddenly thought that if the three central categories of the Syllo-
gism -- Universal, Particular, Individual -- could be worked out with N&L as the Universal, the PTC as the Particular, and Ida Fuller as the Individual, as a new woman columnist for the Youth Page, it would "solve my problem." It is true that I decided it would be wrong to do any such thing, since we would have to have a minimum of one year's actual experience and testing against the objective situation. Moreover, new aspects will surely emerge as the paper undergoes a development under the impact of the new book. I did, however, find new divergences from Grace on the politicization of the Syllogism, an analysis which originally had thrilled me greatly when, in 1951, Grace had said that it signified the end of the opposition between objective and subjective. I related this expression to what Lenin had experienced as he read that section during World War I. It had led to the Great Divide in Marxism.

I. THE SYLLOGISM IN THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION AND ITS IMPACT ON LENIN IN 1914, AND ON THE JOHNSON-FOREST TENDENCY IN 1950-53

Grace's 1951 philosophic letter read: "I suspect also that in the development from Judgement to Syllogism is contained the development from the party of 1902 to the Soviet of 1917. The Syllogism destroys the opposition of subjectivity and objectivity,"

I must have disregarded the phrase "from the party of 1902 to the Soviets of 1917" -- i.e. Grace's politicization on the question of the Party as paralleling the central categories in the Doctrine of the Notion -- but went the distance with the sentence "the Syllogism destroys the opposition of subjectivity and objectivity," especially as it related to the way Lenin had worked it out. The self-development of Lenin on that section of the Logic and its central categories, Universal, Particular, Individual (which I have developed both in Marxism and Freedom and in Philosophy and Revolution) illuminates the whole question of process. Let's follow that:

1) Lenin's first comment on reaching Doctrine of Notion was: "A good way to get a headache."

2) In plodding through it nevertheless, he then found only one thing with which to agree with Hegel -- Hegel's attack on the superficial way philosophers have of expressing U-P-I as: "All men are mortal, Gaius is a man, therefore Gaius is mortal."
But 3) Lenin no sooner reached the final section on the Syllogism than out poured tremendous aphorisms as seen in the statement: "None of the Marxists for the past ½ century have understood Marx!!" Indeed he followed-up these Notebooks with an article "On Dialectics" where he also took issue with Engels, though he forgave his not overly profound penetration of the dialectic by stating that Engels did so for "popularization" goals.

Grace's politicization of the movement in the Doctrine of the Notion, as paralleling the movement from the vanguardist party concept, 1902, to the recognition of the spontaneity of the masses in creating the Soviets, 1917, did not answer the problem that she thought she was answering; that is, whether Lenin was breaking with the vanguardist concepts. By skipping over the question of the Party, we can neither understand the tragedy as the early bureaucratization of the workers state unfolded, nor grapple with why Lenin was still relying on the "thin stratum" -- Lenin's own expression -- of the Bolshevik Party, despite all the criticisms he levelled against the leadership in his Will.

It is this I had in mind as I worked on the Perspectives Thesis. I returned to the exact quotation in Hegel where Grace had made her comments, and found that it was from Section I (Subjectivity) of Doctrine of the Notion, and that Hegel then subjected the Syllogism to the experience of Section II (Objectivity), and only then arrives at the Idea. That is to say, dialectical mediation becomes the key to all the "experiences" the Syllogism goes through. Indeed, when I worked out the Syllogism in 1953, it was not as it was developed in the Science of Logic but as it appeared in the Philosophy of Mind.

II. DIALECTIC MEDIATION AND ABSOLUTE NEGATIVITY

In my Letters on the Absolute Idea, in which four pages are devoted to the Philosophy of Mind, here is what I wrote:

"Here, much as I try not once again to jolt you by sounding as if I were exhorting, I'm too excited not to rejoice at what this means for us. But I'll stick close to Hegel and not go off for visits with Lenin and Marx. Hegel says that
the two appearances of the Idea (to us: Socialism in the form of either the Commune or the Soviets) characterize both its manifestation and this, precisely, is "a unification of the two aspects."* 

I then quoted para. #577: "The self-judging of the Idea into its two appearances (#575,576) characterizes both as its (the self-knowing reason's) manifestations; and in it there is a unification of the two aspects: -- it is the nature of the fact, the notion, which causes the movement and development, yet this same movement is equally the action of cognition...

It becomes necessary to stress here, over and over again, that I had not a single word to say then about the Party or the Soviets or any form of organization. On the contrary. Here is what I then concluded: "We have entered the new society."

Philosophically, what happened was that Grace had been so enthusiastic about that May 20 letter, and had grasped how new, historically new, had been my singling out of the movement from practice to reach the new society, that she plunged into one of her hyperboles to say that what Lenin's Philosophic Notebooks had done in creating the Great Divide in Marxism in World War I, my letters on the Absolute Idea had achieved for our age. It was evidently at that point that all hell broke loose as CLR James not only did not answer my letters but ordered Grace, who was in California, and who had hailed those letters so enthusiastically, to return to New York at once. They both then decided that I should not demand any discussion of the letters "for the time being," and that I was to start the practical

* I should call attention to the fact that those letters, dated May 12 and May 20, 1953, use the expression Absolute Idea for all references to the Absolute. While that is acceptable in general, it is necessary here to be more precise by differentiating the Absolute: in the Phenomenology, Hegel used the expression Absolute Knowledge; in the Science of Logic, it is articulated as Absolute Idea; and in the Philosophy of Mind, it emerges as Absolute Mind. It is especially important to stress this here because the first letter on the Absolute Idea (May 12) is where I took issue with Lenin for having said that the final paragraph in the Science of Logic doesn't matter. Grace then took issue with my "exhortation", which concerned me enough not to continue the criticism of Lenin. Instead I followed Hegel's advice. That is, I realized that Hegel had not finished the totality of his philosophy and had advised his reader that he must now go to Philosophy of Nature and Philosophy of Mind to grasp that totality. So -- Archives on deposit at Wayne State University: Volume III, Section I, E. (#1797) and Vol III, Section I, C. (#595).
preparations for the July Convention. He seemed to do likewise. But since he had to leave for England, he called the "faithful" to him there and they began preparations to split Johnson and Forest.

It is necessary now to trace what dialectic mediation achieves — precisely because it was in the middle, between the movements from practice and from theory; how it requires a double negation before it can reach a new society. All of it is seen first in the final syllogisms of Absolute Mind, not as any sort of God, or as evasion of all responsibility by dumping all responsibility on "the masses."

II. HEGEL'S ABSOLUTE MIND (paragraphs #575, 576, 577 of Philosophy of Mind): THE FORCES OF REVOLUTION AS REASON, AS ANALYZED IN ROSA LUXEMBURG. WOMEN'S LIBERATION AND KARL'S PHILOSOPHY OF REVOLUTION

Paragraph #575 seems merely to state the obvious, the sequence of the books Hegel wrote — Logic, Nature, Mind. The second paragraph (#576) is Nature, Mind, Logic. And since Mind is the mediation there, you first get the full impact of Hegel's concept of mediation as he lunged out against "systems" and for mediation, because philosophic mediation is the middle that first creates from itself the whole.

In a word, Hegel has now departed from both the system as well as spontaneity, or practice, or nature as if these were the whole. He could still keep away from making his dialectic into any sort of system because, in the final paragraph (#577), he doesn't finish that as a syllogism, that is to say, he refuses to follow the "sequence" which would have led to Logic being the mediation. What we are confronted with, as replacement for Logic, is the self-determination of the Idea and the self-bringing forth of liberty. In a word, in each case, mediation, as a transition point to something else, stops as we have reached the totality of both inwardizing and spontaneity (Nature). Hegel replaces Logic, but will not tell us what to do.
Self-knowing reason (#577) is that self-bringing forth of liberty which is concrete, which is everywhere present, which is constantly developing.

For any to whom it may seem incongruous to have included "Forces of Revolulion as Reason" in this Section III on Hegel's Absolute Mind, it becomes necessary to return to Marx's 1844 Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic to see why Marx refused to stop where Feuerbach allowed Hegel to chain the dialectic* by refusing to recognize the revolutionary nature of "negation of negation." Marx unchained that most revolutionary dialectic -- "negation of negation -- by de-mystifying it and revealing its objectively revolutionary nature. As Marx kept developing his own continent of thought and of revolution, he situated "negation of negation" by declaring that the 1848 Revolution needed further development as a "revolution in permanence." It is this which Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution declared to be "the absolute challenge to our age." This Section III on Absolute Mind extends this by disclosing how the Self-Thinking Idea is moving toward a new unity with the Self-Bringing Forth of Liberty -- that movement from practice that is itself a form of theory and thus becomes a revolutionary force that is Reason.

Where forces of revolution are Reason, Marx's demystification of double negation and its articulation as "revolution in permanence" demands that it not be left just in the field of theory but becomes ground for a new organizational form -- indeed, for self-development of the Individual. It is for this reason that in all three books -- Marxism and Freedom and Philosophy and Revolution as well as Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution -- I traced those forces of revolution through three decades, as they centered around a new generation of revolutionaries, both as Youth and as Labor from under totalitarianism calling itself Communism; or the Black dimension in the U.S. and in Africa; or a whole

* I felt Hegel deserved one little escape after creating so historic a revolution in philosophy, so I didn't include, when I quoted #577, that final sentence, which read: "The eternal Idea, in full fruition of its essence, eternally sets itself to work, engenders and enjoys itself as absolute mind."
new Third World; or the new world force of revolution — Women's Liberation, having leaped from an Idea whose time has come to a Movement.

Hold this in mind, dear comrades, as you reread this year's Perspectives Thesis. As preparation for our Convention, I addressed, first, a letter to the youth on August 16 which asked them:

How will you show the world that "Hobo Thumb, Will Travel", far from remaining only in its hobist origins, is the actual roadway locally, nationally and internationally, to get to the future? A future that will be non-exploitative, non-sexist, non-racist, with truly and totally new human relations...

Take such a simple date as the early 1950s...which saw also the very first revolution in Latin America, Bolivia's, from Western imperialism. How do you propose to project that into the struggles against Reaganism in El Salvador in the U.S? For that work with the Spanish-speaking dimension, we have both Marxismo y Libertad and Filosofia y Revolucion as well as our bilingual pamphlet on the "Unfinished Latin American Revolutions" and much more.

The following week this was followed with suggesting to the Women's Liberation-News & Letters Committees the addition of a new paragraph to Chapter 8 of the new book on "The Task that Remains to be Done: the Unique and Unfinished Contributions of Today's Women's Liberation Movement." I asked that, to the third paragraph from the end, which criticizes the old concept of woman as "helpmate," we add:

Quite the contrary. History proves a very different truth, whether we look at February 1917, where the women were the ones who initiated the revolution; whether we turn further back to the Persian Revolution of 1906-11, where the women created the very first women's soviet; or whether we look to our own age in the 1970s in Portugal, where Isobel do Carmo raised the totally new concept of apartheidismo. It is precisely because women's liberationists are both revolutionary force and Reason that they are crucial. If we are to achieve success in the new revolutions, we have to see that the uprooting of the old is total from the start.

And in the penultimate paragraph, which ends with "do not separate practice from theory," I asked that we add:

Which is what Luxemburg meant when she defined "being human" as "joyfully throwing your life on the scales of destiny."
My letter to the WL-N&L Committees then continued:

My point in making these two suggestions for additions is that this sort of thing must be in each one's mind very nearly every time they speak on the new book. Each one must not only concretize the book further, day in and day out, between now and when you embark on your journeys of "Have Thumb, Will Travel," for it's only in that way that the projection of Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution will result not only in organizational growth, but, indeed, in helping to lay the ground for the American Revolution.

This was followed by including, directly in the Perspectives Thesis, "What to Do...", presented on September 3, one more paragraph to add to the final page of the final chapter XII of the new book. It would come directly after the last sentence of the penultimate paragraph and would read:

This is the further challenge to the form of organization which we have worked out as the committee-form rather than the "party-to-lead." But, though committee-form and "party-to-lead" are opposites, they are not absolute opposites. At the point when the theoretic-form reaches philosophy, the challenge demands that we synthesize not only the new relations of theory to practice, and all the forces of revolution, but philosophy's "suffering, patience and labor of the negative," i.e. experiencing absolute negativity. Then and only then will we succeed in a revolution that will achieve a class-less, non-racist, non-sexist, truly human, truly new society. That which Hegel judged to be the synthesis of the "Self-Thinking Idea" and the "Self-Bringing-Forth of Liberty," Marxist-Humanism holds, is what Marx had called the new society...

(See the Perspectives Thesis for the rest of the addition.)

Finally, with all this in mind, I just reread the Introduction to that new work and decided on still another new paragraph. Please insert it directly after the one ending with the imperial incursions into the Orient and the carving up of Africa as Marx was studying the latest empirical anthropological studies, such as Morgan's Ancient Society.

That seems to have been the first point so misunderstood by post-Marx Marxists, beginning with Frederick Engels, who, without having known of the massive Ethnological Notebooks Marx had left behind, undertook to write his own version of Morgan's work -- his Origin of the Family -- as a "bequest" of Marx. When Ryazanov discovered these notebooks, he rushed, before he ever had a chance to decipher them, to characterize them as "inexcusable pedantry." If an Engels, who was a close collaborator of Marx and without whom we could not have had...
Volumes II and III of Capital, could nevertheless suddenly have gotten so overconfident about his own prowess of interpreting Marx as to assume he was speaking for Marx; if an archivist-scholar like Ryazanov could, at a time when he was actually publishing those magnificent early essays of Marx (the 1844 Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts), spend a good deal of his first report on the Archives of Marx in asking for 20 to 30 people to help him sort these manuscripts out, and yet pass judgement before he dug into them—it says a great deal about literary heirs but nothing whatsoever about so great an historic phenomenon as Marx's Marxism.

Isn't it time to challenge all of the post-Marx Marxists when even those who have achieved great revolutions—and none was greater than the 1917 Russian Revolution—did not, in thought, measure up to Marx? Isn't it time to dig into what Marx, who had discovered a whole new continent of thought, had to say for himself? (Chapter XII concentrates especially on the last writings of Marx in which this author found a trail to the 1980s.)

Just as this addition signifies that, from the very start, in the Introduction itself, I point to our challenge to all post-Marx Marxists, so it is necessary for all of us now to concretize it daily in our activities as in our meetings, in our "Have Thumb, Will Travel" adventures as in the sales of "three books, not one," as a way of building new relations.

What adds urgency to the necessity of relating both Marxism and Freedom and Philosophy and Revolution to the new book, Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution, is not only the actual movement from practice, as it developed during those three decades since 1953, but also the fact that civilization itself is under threat of nuclear annihilation. The fact that I made a category of that movement from practice—six weeks before the very first historic movement from under Communist totalitarianism on June 17, 1953, in East Germany—actually made possible the link of continuity to Marx. What opened the way for Marx to discover a whole new continent of thought and revolution was not only that he saw, and singled out as Subject, the proletariat (which was unreachable to Hegel because it was not fully developed as a class "in and for itself" during the French Revolution); it was that Marx, two years before he broke with bourgeois society, grounded in the Hegelian dialectic, was looking for a new beginning, and thereby experienced "the shock of recognition" in the proletariat as the new Universal. (See "Prometheus Bound, 1841-1843" in Chapter 9 of the new book.)
Once I saw that movement from practice as a philosophic category, which was not alone for our age but for Marx's as well, I could structure the whole of Marxism and Freedom in the context of the movement from practice, beginning with the age of revolutions -- industrial, political, philosophic -- and subtitling the whole work: "From 1776 until Today." Part I, "From Practice to Theory: 1776 to 1848", thus paved the way for confronting the different tendencies within the new proletarian revolutionary movement, as the intellectuals (specifically Marx and Lassalle) encountered the nature of the new bourgeois state. Part II, then, was entitled "Worker and Intellectual at a Turning Point in History: 1848 to 1861."* Because Marx's Capital reveals Marx's Marxism as a "Unity of Theory and Practice," (the title of Part III), deeply rooted in history as it was happening, from the Civil War in the U.S. to the Paris Commune in France, it created ground for analysis of our age of state-capitalism and and workers' revolts.

What followed the publication of Marxism and Freedom for the Marxist-Humanists of the 1960s was News & Letters creating a form for all the new voices to be heard, as well as for the manifestation of our unique combination of worker and intellectual. News & Letters published both pamphlets of the new voices -- from Workers Battle Automation to Freedom Riders Speak For Themselves to The Free Speech Movement and the Negro Revolution -- and our unique combination of worker and intellectual in the form of the National Editorial Board Statement, American Civilization on Trial, as well as my pamphlet on the Afro-Asian Revolutions. By 1968, however, when the historic activities of that tumultuous decade -- which had subordinated theory to activity and more activity and more activity, holding it could catch theory "en route" -- ended in an aborted revolution, it was all too clear, even to those who rejected theory, that even the new movement from practice that was itself a form of theory was insufficient once theory didn't reach philosophy. It became imperative to dig back into the development of Marx's own roots in the Hegelian dialectic in the mid-19th century as well as Lenin's com-

*I should add here that I was most proud that some Iranian revolutionaries chose that chapter to translate into Farsi in 1979, as the Iranian Revolution was unfolding.
impulsion to return to the Hegelian dialectic in the early 20th century as the outbreak of WWI saw the collapse not only of private capitalism but also of established Marxism.

The writing of Philosophy and Revolution -- from Hegel to Sartre and from Marx to Mao had still newer foundations because a new voice from the Third World and from theory was heard in the person of Frantz Fanon. He, too, was calling for a "new Humanism." That affinity of ideas for a new Humanism which was circling the globe from East Europe to Africa was reflected in the collaboration I received from East European colleagues (who had to remain unnamed) in the writing of Chapter 8: "State Capitalism and the East European Revolts."

The fact that I insisted on relating Part III, on "Economic Reality and the Dialectics of Liberation" (which included not only "The African Revolutions and the World Economy" and "State Capitalism and the East European Revolts" but also "New Passions and New Forces," whether that be the Black Dimension, the Anti-Vietnam War Youth, Rank-and-File Labor, or Women's Liberation) to Part I of the work, "Why Hegel? Why Now?" -- and especially to Chapter 1, "Absolute Negativity as New Beginning," which dealt with Hegel's works, in and for themselves -- is what drew the sharpest critique from academic circles. Thus, George Armstrong Kelly, in his Hegel's Retreat from Eleusis (pp. 238-240), accused me of proposing "to substitute an unchained dialectic, which she baptises 'Absolute Method,' a method that 'becomes irresistible...because our hunger for theory arises from the totality of the present global crisis.'" To this writer, the critique did not appear accidental. Just as 1970, as the 100th anniversary of the birth of Lenin and the 200th of Hegel's, brought a renewed interest in both Hegel and Lenin, so 1983, as the centenary of Marx's death, will create new interest in Marx's Marxism and Hegel's Absolutes. Academia is forever trying to save Hegel from Marx's subversion.

The fact that in my latest work, Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution, I trace a trail to the 1980s from the 1880s and focus on Marx's "translation" of absolute negativity as the revolution in permanence, calling that the
absolute challenge to our age, will draw still greater criticism from academia and outright attacks from post-Marx Marxists. This makes it necessary to be prepared, not only for that encounter, but for further concretizing that challenge. With this in mind, I decided to add that paragraph quoted earlier directly to the Introduction. For while it is true that the actual events of the 1970s -- Women's Liberation on the one hand, and the publication of Marx's Ethnological Notebooks on the other -- are what first led to a renewed interest in Rosa Luxemburg; and while it is true also that the Women's Liberation Movement helped disclose the feminist dimension in Luxemburg never before recognized; it is not true that that is the goal of the new book.

The need to see all post-Marx Marxists in strict relationship to Marx's Marxism is what revealed that even so great and independent a revolutionary as Rosa Luxemburg did not fully comprehend Marx's dialectics of liberation and thereby committed her biggest error -- disregard of the revolutionary nature of Polish desire for national self-determination. Put simply, the determinant of the new book is Marx's philosophy of revolution. This is not for any academic reason, or any sort of orthodoxy, but the fact that his works disclosed a trail to the 1980s and revealed the problematic of this age. The totally new question that Luxemburg posed -- socialist democracy after gaining power -- pointed to a new aspect of Marxism itself. The new moments in Marx that the book discloses and that center around what we now call a Third World are not limited to the manner in which Marx revealed an "Asiatic mode of production" in the Grundrisse. Rather, this is extended to the 1880s as Marx was commenting on Morgan's Ancient Society and other then-new anthropological works on India, on the Australian aborigines, as well as in his letters both on his visit to Algeria and his correspondence with revolutionaries in Russia on the ancient commune there and its possible transformation into an altogether new type of revolution. In a word, it is to revolution in permanence that the book keeps returning, whether the subject is Luxemburg, or Lenin, or women's liberation, or the Hegelian dialectic. At the same time, we must keep in mind that, whereas it is Marx who transformed Hegel into a contemporary, and transformed the Hegelian dialectic into the
Marxian dialectic of liberation, the revolution is also present in Hegel. Hard as Hegel tried to confine this to a revolution in thought alone, he made his presence felt in history, even as he spoke of The Philosophy of Mind and History of Philosophy. As Hegel put it:

"All revolutions, in the sciences no less than in general history, originate only in this, that the spirit of man, for the understanding and comprehension of himself, for the possessing of himself, has now altered his categories, uniting himself in a truer, deeper, more intrinsic relation with himself."

Yours,
October 5-15, 1982
RAYA

Postscript —

Perhaps it would be good here to trace through the entire sequence of events from 1948, when CLR James' "Notes on Dialectics" inspired me to translate Lenin's Abstract of Hegel's Science of Logic, rather than beginning with the better-known (1953) date of my Letters on the Absolute Idea. Although I was then unaware that my brief comments in submitting the translation of Lenin's Philosophic Notebooks signalled a difference in interpretation of the historic and philosophic significance of those Notebooks, the truth is that that is the beginning of philosophic differences within the Johnson-Forest Tendency (JFT). (See Archives on deposit/Wayne State Univ., Vol. III, Sec. I, Part C, microf. #1595 - 1734.)

The miners' General Strike, which had erupted in 1949 and continued into 1950, followed a period when CLRJ, who remained in New York, and I, who had moved to steeltown (Pittsburgh), were hardly on speaking terms. As soon as the strike erupted, I went down to West Virginia and worked with the members of the JFT who were very active in that strike. (The SWP local there was all JFT.) I had begun sending a very new type of article on the miners' strike and interviews with miners' wives to the Militant, whose editor, George Breitman, greeted them as "a breath of fresh air." It was clear that the workers' attitude to the "continuous miner" -- the word "Automation" had not yet been invented, and the workers simply referred to
it as the "man-killer" — signified a new stage of production and a new stage of cognition. The predominant question in workers' minds was not just higher wages; they questioned the very kind of labor man should do, demanding to know: Why should there be this unbridgeable gulf between mental and manual labor? It is this type of question which led the JFT to cast their summation document of ten years' development of the theory of state-capitalism in a very new way. CLRJ and Grace came to Pittsburgh where we jointly wrote *State-Capitalism and World Revolution*, which we were to submit to the SWP Convention that year. For the first time, we included a section on philosophy, written by our "official" philosopher, Grace Lee, and entitled "Philosophy in the Epoch of State-Capitalism."

I was enthusiastic about the new section, but I had questioned two points in the draft: 1) How does it happen that Contradiction, which is the central category in Essence, becomes the central point for Lenin's philosophic reorganization when, in fact, his notebooks show he had gone through the whole of the Doctrine of Notion? 2) Why are we omitting reference to the Absolute Idea, which CLRJ had posed in his "Notes on Dialectics"? The only answer CLRJ and Grace seemed to have given me was incorporated in the documents: "There is no longer any purely philosophical answer to all this."

This had been preceded by the explanation: "These intellectuals are the most cultivated in the modern world, in the sense of knowing the whole past of human culture. Having achieved what the idealism of Hegel posed as the Absolute, they are undergoing a theoretical disintegration without parallel in human history..."

When, in 1951, Grace tackled the Syllogism in the Doctrine of the Notion, I still seemed satisfied, but all that disappeared by 1953 when I, myself, worked out both the Absolute Idea and Absolute Mind in the letters of May 12 and May 20, 1953. It is true I was sufficiently taken aback with her critique of my "exhortation" of Lenin in the May 12 letter to begin the May 20 letter with: "Please do not interpret this as any prodding of you to commit yourself on my analysis of the Absolute Idea; it is only that I cannot stand still and so rushed directly to the Philosophy of Mind." But there was no doubt by then that, hard as I tried to continue in the context
that pre-occupied CLRJ and Grace -- the "dialectics of the party" -- I was bound in a very different direction once I concentrated on Hegel's "dialectic mediation" rather than any sort of "mediator,\" whether the Party or otherwise. (See my "Letters on the Absolute Idea" in the Archives, Vol. III, Section I, Part E, microf. #1797-ff. See also my later reference to Poggeler's 1961 statement: "In opposition to the usual interpretations of the Hegelian text, I should like to propose the following: that the actual science of Spirit is not the Logic but the philosophy of Spirit," which I quote in New Essays, p. 22, as well as in my lecture to the HSA on "Absolute Idea as New Beginning", p. 171 of Art and Logic in Hegel's Philosophy.)

It is worth noting here, also, that in plunging into the final three syllogisms, I had to dive on my own, since there was absolutely no one -- not even Marx, let alone Lenin, much less CLR James and Grace Lee -- who had written anything on that. Once I ventured out in 1953, and confronted the actual world movement from practice, the integrality of philosophy and revolution showed itself to be (or should we say, aspired to become) the solution to the problematic of the modern world. The one thing we know as fact in this centenary year is that -- once we do know the Marx oeuvres as totality, and once we do have our ears to the ground of both new voices from below and the creative nature of Marx's mind (and Marx's alone) -- then we do perceive in Marx's new moments a trail to the 1980s, be that as new Third World, or global theory reaching philosophy, a philosophy of revolution that is to become preparation for actual "revolution in permanence."

* Marx ended his Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic with a quotation from para. 384 of Philosophy of Mind.